


PHISHING FOR NAZIS

Conspiracies, Anonymous
Communications and White Supremacy
Networks on the Dark Web

LEV TOPOR



Phishing for Nazis

Phishing for Nazis is an evidence-based, undercover study of neo-Nazi communities on anonymous communication platforms that helps to shine a light on the dark web. It unveils how hatred and conspiracies spread and thrive online and how white supremacy is becoming prominent as extremists find shelter in the online dank underbelly of society.

Phishing for Nazis explains how online manifestations of hate radicalize people into taking “real-world” action, such as shooting sprees. Methodologically, this book is unique, as it incorporates undercover cyber-ethnography, a method frequently used by law enforcement and intelligence agencies, unlike traditional academic studies of racism or social behavior that rely on secondary sources or surveys.

With a particular interest on how race issues translate online, the book presents the true phenomenon of racism without relying on political correctness or whitewashing. It contributes to the field of cyber communication, as it details why and how people communicate and manage entire communities without knowing one another. The book also contributes to public policy, regulators, and technology companies as they deal with the practice of online anonymity and extremism.

Lev Topor is an ISGAP visiting scholar at the Woolf Institute (Cambridge), a senior research fellow at the Center for Cyber Law and Policy at Haifa University, and a former visiting fellow at the International Institute for Holocaust Research at Yad Vashem, Jerusalem. His main research fields are antisemitism and cyber policies. Topor’s most recent book before this one is titled *Why Do People Discriminate Against Jews?* (with Jonathan Fox). He has published articles for the *Journal of Advanced Military Studies*, the *Journal of Contemporary Antisemitism*, *Israel Affairs*, and the *International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism*, among others. Additionally, Topor’s research on the dark web has won several awards, including the annual Robert Wistrich Award from the Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism and an annual award from the Association of Civil-Military Studies in Israel.



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Preface

This interdisciplinary study aims to achieve a deep, evidence-based understanding of online neo-Nazi and White supremacist communities, including their reach, social impact, structure, and, most importantly, ideologies. This book combines two main fields of research. One is the field of antisemitism and racism studies, and the other is the field of the online domain, including online socialization and anonymous communications.

What inspired this research idea? I was deeply inspired by the writings of investigative journalists and other academic researchers on the topics of extremism, antisemitism, and online racism. For instance, Talia Lavin's (2020) book *Culture Warlords: My Journey into the Dark Web of White Supremacy* was a natural match for my article on dark web antisemitism, which was published by the *Journal of Contemporary Antisemitism* in 2019 and won the annual Robert Wistrich Award from the Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. In *Culture Warlords*, Lavin explores the unmonitored online environment of White supremacists, neo-Nazis, and other extremists. Her investigative book is a very important contribution to the study of online extremism and racism. She demonstrates that it is sometimes more fruitful to thoroughly explore ongoing real-life cases and experience extremism firsthand than to conduct surveys or count keywords online. This is not to suggest that online surveys and social media analyses are unimportant – they contribute significantly to our understanding of the online domain – yet there are times when it is better to see things as they are, not cumulated in numbers.

Jonathan Weisman's (2018) book about being Jewish in contemporary America, titled *(((Semitism)))*: *Being Jewish in America in the Age of Trump*, and Kathleen Belew's (2018) book *Bring the War Home: The White Power Movement and Paramilitary America*, about the White power movement in America, also contributed to the general conceptualization of this book. Of course, the "Iron March Exposed" project, as well as the 2018 work of junior but very inspiring student reporters John Milton, Shannon Carranco, and Christopher Curtis, provided further inspiration.¹ As a *Lawfare* blog article reads: "The Iron March data dump provides a window into how White supremacists communicate and recruit."² The current book is an academic continuation of the above-mentioned explorations of racist, antisemitic, White supremacist

communities. I was also inspired by the many other researchers who are cited throughout this book. Without them, my work would not have been as detailed.

Another source of inspiration was my own work. As an executive director of a cyber intelligence firm, I frequently engaged in dark web or anonymity-related research when other firms or individuals wanted to learn about their data leaks to assess the risks to their business. While exploring and searching for data breaches, blueprint leaks, or source codes, I noticed that a very significant part of the dark web, aside from the ubiquitous weapons sales, drug sales, and pedophilia, was focused on racism and political extremism. Specifically, neo-Nazism has a very significant presence on anonymous platforms. For every data leak I found, I encountered countless cases of antisemitism and racism. It was then that I realized the scale of this problem – and that I would have to expose it further.

Talia Lavin ended her book *Culture Warlords* with the wisdom of *Pirkei Avot* (literally, “Chapters of the Fathers”) from Jewish ethical literature, which I can only attempt to emulate. As Rabbi Tarfom said, “You are not obligated to complete the work, but neither are you free to abandon it” (*Pirkei Avot*, 2:16). As I finish writing this book, I feel as though this study is not yet complete, nor even half complete. The phenomenon of online hatred is becoming more and more prominent as people shift their entire life to the online domain.

I am positive that more research and more discussion will follow. Yet I can only hope that this book, as an evidence-based conceptual continuation of previous research on online extremism and racism, will encourage internet users to approach and use social media and communication platforms in general with care and caution. Furthermore, I hope this book will inspire other researchers to investigate this topic and nudge policymakers and technological entrepreneurs to prioritize social matters over profit. Social networks should live up to their name and be social, bringing people closer together. Ironically, these platforms are increasingly becoming “anti-social networks,” as hate on the regular web, the dark web, and secure messaging applications becomes ever more prominent – that is, they are causing even greater social rifts worldwide by providing a safe haven for fringe and extreme content.

I can only accept Talia Lavin’s invitation from *Pirkei Avot* and call on other researchers and policymakers to continue the fight against racism and antisemitism.

Lastly, it should be noted that this study contains offensive language. All quoted material from neo-Nazi platforms and channels has been printed verbatim.

Notes

- 1 Milton, J., Carrannaco, S., & Curtis, C. (2018, May 4). Exclusive: Major neo-Nazi figure recruiting in Montreal. *Montreal Gazette*. <https://montrealgazette.com/news/local-news/major-neo-nazi-figure-recruiting-in-montreal>

- 2 The Iron March Exposed project, available here: www.ironmarch.exposed; Singer-Emery, J., & Bray III, R. (2020, February 27). The Iron March data dump provides a window into how White supremacists communicate and recruit. *Lawfare*. www.lawfareblog.com/iron-march-data-dump-provides-window-how-white-supremacists-communicate-and-recruit

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I also thank the administrative and academic staff at the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP), the Woolf Institute at the University of Cambridge, Yad Vashem in Jerusalem, the Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, the Center for Cyber Law and Policy, and the Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide in Jerusalem for supporting this research. Finally, I would also like to thank Nathan Leibowitz for his assistance.

Abbreviations

ADL	Anti-Defamation League
AfD	Alternative for Germany
ARPANET	Advanced Research Project Agency Network
BBS	Bulletin Board System
CTSS	Compatible Time-Sharing System
DDoS	Distributed Denial of Service
DNS	Domain Name System
E2EE	End-to-End Encryption
FtF	Face-to-Face (communication)
FTP	File Transfer Protocol
I2P	Invisible Internet Project
IANA	Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
ICANN	Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
IHRA	International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance
IM	Instant Messaging
IRC	Internet Relay Chat
ISGAP	Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy
KKK	Ku Klux Klan
MP	Member of Parliament
OSINT	Open-Source Intelligence
SMA	Secure Messaging Application
SPLC	Southern Poverty Law Center
TCP/IP	Transmission Control Protocol/ Internet Protocol
Tor	The Onion Router
TOR	Theory of Online Radicalization
USENET	User Network
VK	Vkontakte
VPN	Virtual Private Network
WWW	World Wide Web



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1 Introduction

This interdisciplinary study seeks to arrive at a deep, evidence-based understanding of online neo-Nazi and White supremacist communities and individuals, including their characteristics, worldviews, community structures, reach, and influence, as well as their beliefs and ideologies. Have common antisemitic and racist conspiracy theories changed with the move to the anonymous online domain, or do they remain the same? In this book, I seek to explain the essence of neo-Nazi White supremacy on the dark web and anonymous platforms like Telegram, as well as in online communities in general. I strive to explain how hatred and conspiracy theories thrive online, how hatred shifts from the online domain to the real world and vice versa, and how White supremacy is becoming prominent online – a place neo-Nazis can hide from social criticism or regulation and nurture their communities of hate, radicalizing others and nudging them into real acts of violence and terror.

In the last decade, there has been a rise in worldwide antisemitism, racism, xenophobia, and extremism, as well as in the utilization of the cyber domain as a platform for mass and private communication.¹ This book uniquely combines these fields – antisemitism, racism, and anonymous communications. The connection between racism and mass communication is not new; Nazis used print and radio propaganda to brainwash and spread hate during World War II and the Holocaust, and radio was used to spread propaganda and operational guidelines for murderers during the Rwandan Genocide of 1994 (Herf, 2013).²

However, radio and the printed press have gatekeepers – editors and operators who decide what content should be presented to the masses and what content should be censored. From an operational perspective, society always had one or several gatekeepers in charge of the printing presses and radio stations to keep itself protected from radicalism and harm. Now, however, with radio and print generally being monitored and regulated, and less used by the public, anonymous platforms in the online domain have become the weapon of choice for extremists to spread conspiracy theories, recruit members, and execute plans (Jasser, 2021, pp. 193–222). Now, there are no gatekeepers; the editorial or censorship process has become the responsibility of individuals. Thus, the findings of this study will not only be of use

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to scholars and students in the fields of racism, cyber, and communications but also to policymakers and practitioners seeking to fight and abolish racism and online extremism and make the cyber domain more secure and friendlier than it is today.

Another key highlight of this book is its unique methodology – one which is seldom used in contemporary academic studies of racism but is frequently used in the law enforcement and cyber intelligence domains. The methodology is derived from anthropological and ethnographical studies that use methods such as cyber-ethnography, participation, and observation, as well as from the undercover cyber intelligence realm, where law enforcement and intelligence agents go undercover as “insiders” to reveal the true nature and intent of those under investigation – terrorists, pedophiles, narcocriminals, and disinformation spreaders. This is the methodology used to investigate online racism in this book.

The rationale behind this methodology is simple – since overt racism is less socially acceptable, since many social network platforms monitor and ban hate speech and hate groups, and since incitement to violence is illegal in many Western countries, those who practice and spread racism hide online, behind a technological curtain of privacy and anonymity. Also, few people would feel comfortable, let alone speak the truth, if overtly surveyed about prejudice, discrimination, racism, and hatred. Thus, to remove this curtain of privacy and anonymity and explore the true nature of the matter, undercover observation is required. In carrying out this observation, my intention is to uncover the nature and characteristics of antisemitism and racism, not to uncover the real-world identities or characteristics of those who spread such propaganda. That is, I am interested in the song, not the band.

Why is it important and relevant to combine antisemitism and racism studies with cyber and communication studies? Nazism was defeated in 1945. Black people, Asians, Jews, Muslims, and others should no longer have to suffer social discrimination and prejudice. Indeed, movements like Black Lives Matter have highlighted that racism has not yet been vanquished; this phenomenon is still among us. Even the global COVID-19 pandemic was quickly associated with Asians and even Jews.³ People of non-White origin should not have to hide their identity or beliefs. They should be able to walk in the street or visit their places of worship without fear. Specifically, Jews should no longer be subject to extreme physical violence or social harassment as they have for so long. Black people should not live in fear of White people who believe in pseudo-scientific theories such as the racial hierarchy. As antisemitism and racism have become a social taboo in many progressive countries in the West, mainly in the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the prevalence of physical violence, discrimination, and prejudice has declined. However, the fact that assaulting or killing Jews or Black people is no longer acceptable, legitimate, or legal in most Western countries has not cured the racist pandemic or abolished racism from society.

In fact, anti-racist legislation and regulations have pushed racists into the hidden crevices of society – whether private, secret clubs such as the Ku

Klux Klan (KKK) or anonymous forums and chatrooms on secure communication platforms such as the Tor dark web. Some have even migrated to competing “free speech” platforms such as Gab.ai or Gettr (Jardine, 2019; Jasser et al., 2021; Topor, 2019a).⁴ The main focus of this book is anonymous platforms such as the dark web and Telegram. The internet makes radical content available to all, with no filters or limits; it allows users to assume almost complete anonymity. In this way, it reduces the risks of social criticism, pressure, and possible legal prosecution for illegal behavior in countries where racism or the use of radical symbols is not allowed, such as in Germany, where the German *Strafgesetzbuch* (penal code), specifically sections 86 and 86a, outlaws extreme symbols that are associated with Nazism or Islamic extremism.⁵

As the cyber domain has become an integral part of people’s lives and a key method of communication, racists have adopted it as well. Academic studies, as well as investigative journalism and internal intelligence reports, suggest that White supremacists, or neo-Nazis,⁶ have adopted anonymous platforms as their preferred method of communication, mainly because they are private, secret, and secure – users suffer no social criticism or legal prosecution for their actions, even if their actions and manifestations are illegal (Daniels, 2009; Jakubowicz, 2017; Jakubowicz et al., 2017; Mason & Czapski, 2017; Topor, 2019a).⁷ Moreover, the fact that cyber threats are perceived as less dangerous than actual real-world threats has made online racism a marginal issue for many policymakers and people in general (Gross et al., 2017). Their argument is based on the fact that the majority of online content cannot harm, injure, or kill others. Yet, as presented throughout this book, I disagree. Words can indeed lead to actions. Hate in the online domain does indeed turn into real-world hate, taking the form of harassment such as doxxing or violent terror such as shooting sprees.

Online extremism and violence, including the spread of false accusations, disinformation or “fake news,” and racist conspiracy theories, can lead to actual physical violence. In fact, it has led to physical violence too many times already. For instance, John Timothy Earnest, who went on a murderous shooting spree on April 27, 2019, opening fire inside the Chabad of Poway Synagogue near San Diego, was inspired by content available online and stated that the Christchurch mosque shooting of March 15, 2019, which left 51 people dead, was a catalyst. The terrorist from Christchurch, Brenton Tarrant, was an inspiration to him: “Brenton Tarrant was a catalyst for me personally. He showed me that it could be done. And that it needed to be done.”⁸ Tarrant himself was inspired by Norwegian mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik, whose actions were widely covered by television news channels and online.⁹

Now, in the 21st century – the age of cyber and online socialization – the social taboos of antisemitism and racism are being practiced with concerning ease. Conspiracy theories and racist manifestos can reach millions with a few mouse clicks, an extremely worrisome fact, given that conspiracy theories are one of the main causes of discrimination and racism (Fox & Topor,

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2021). Neo-Nazi racists gain power by spinning facts and sharing fake news on social media. In the digital world, racism finds plenty of crevices in which to hide. Platforms that promote free speech, such as Telegram or the dark web, are becoming the safehouses of bigots (Topor, 2019a). Even mainstream social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Twitch, TikTok, Discord, Gab, or the Russian VK network have problems monitoring and handling racist content.¹⁰ Websites such as 4chan or 8kun (formerly 8chan) also disseminate hate speech, racism, and antisemitism with little to no regulation; however, since they have already been taken down for promoting hate speech and inciting violence, calls for real-world action are the least frequent posts on websites like 4chan (Kasimov, 2021, pp. 149–170).

The online domain has become the main operational platform of extremists worldwide, upon which they structure their social network of hate. This is true for both White supremacists and extreme Jihadists such as members of ISIS (Weisman, 2018).¹¹ Furthermore, neo-Nazi White supremacy networks are now operating without geographical borders, and their radical hate and incitements to violence are reaching more people worldwide, from the United States and Germany to New Zealand, Norway, and elsewhere; the anonymous and unregulated cyber domain facilitates hate and incitements to violence. As the title of a January 2021 *TIME* article put it, the “Like, share, recruit” phenomenon is a major problem in the online domain and represents a worrisome process of radicalization.¹²

This book is presented as an evidence-based study, conducted to unveil and understand how hatred and conspiracy theories thrive online and how White supremacy is becoming more prominent online – where neo-Nazis find private and safe places to communicate and nurture their global cyber-communities of hate. Importantly, based on its observations, this study also suggests some significant policy recommendations that can – and hopefully will – be applied by governments and online social platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, VK, Discord, Telegram, and perhaps even the dark web of Tor. In general, I suggest that free speech is a double-edged sword that must be regulated. Platforms whose primary purpose is to promote hate, including antisemitism, racism, and xenophobia, must be taken offline or, at the very least, monitored and regulated by accountable gatekeepers. Though this is done today, it is only on a very small scale.

Free speech is a vital value in liberal and democratic countries. Yet liberalism and democracy must also defend themselves against the “democratic” rise of evil. This was exemplified on January 6, 2021, when an array of domestic extremists rioted and raided the United States Capitol. In the cyber or information age, democracy must be vigilant. As a global society, we must learn from past mistakes and remember that the Nazi Party took over the Weimar Republic through democratic means in 1933 and immediately moved to suppress personal freedoms and the press. Unfortunately, as I discuss in Chapter 3, many neo-Nazis and White supremacists worldwide argue for their right to freedom of speech. However, they aim to prevent others from exercising this right – just as Hitler did.

This book opens with a close examination of antisemitism and racism in the political and sociological context, as well as an overview of popular and frequently used private, secure, and anonymous communication platforms; the findings detailed in the subsequent chapters are fascinating yet worrisome. First, I have discovered that White supremacy, racism, antisemitism, and neo-Nazism are not local or national but international phenomena, and they take similar forms in places with different cultures and histories. Second, I have discovered that neo-Nazis manage and develop their own secluded communities online – on the regular web, the dark web, and various Telegram channels – and, while many such websites or channels are general, some are dedicated to the dissemination of propaganda and the glorification of neo-Nazi martyrs/terrorists. Third, I have discovered that words typed on keyboards can turn into real actions and shooting sprees when internet users are radicalized and inspired by the extreme content they consume – content that is only partially and insufficiently censored by mainstream regulation. The detailed findings and examples of each are presented in the following chapters.

The presentation and explanation of the findings are directly connected to the structure of the book, which combines the field of antisemitism and racism with the field of anonymous communications. Chapter 1 – this introduction – presents the framework and context for this study, as well as the research design and methodology of each chapter. Additionally, the avatar, or character, used for the open-source intelligence (OSINT) gathering is introduced – Andy88. The research design and methodologies are presented here for reasons of convenience. Instead of learning about each methodology separately at the beginning of each chapter, the reader will be better served by understanding the entire methodological rationale beforehand, which will allow for a closer focus on the key findings and insights. Potential ethical concerns regarding OSINT gathering are also presented in this first chapter to affirm that no privacy rights or norms have been violated – because the study does not seek to unveil the true identities of the research subjects but rather their manifestations and actions, this information is kept separate from their real identities and specifically their real email addresses, phone numbers, social media accounts, and Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.

Following the introduction, Chapter 2 deals with dark webs and anonymous messaging applications. This is placed before Chapter 3, which deals with White supremacy, racism, and antisemitism, because most readers understand what these phenomena are but have less understanding of what exactly anonymity is – particularly online anonymity. After consulting colleagues at the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP) and the Woolf Institute, I was convinced it was crucial to explain the technology and platforms before addressing the phenomena to be found on them. To use a sailing analogy, you must first learn to understand the seas before you can understand how, where, and when ships sail. Additionally, more specific examples of cyber technologies are explained throughout the book, in Chapter 4 in particular.

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Chapter 2 describes the combination of technological, socio-political, and philosophical aspects within the realm of anonymous communications. It answers the question of what anonymous communications are good for. The essence of this chapter is duality – on the one hand, anonymity and anonymous communications allow oppressed and persecuted people, for example in authoritarian countries, to avoid censorship, monitoring, and surveillance; on the other hand, these same methods allow malicious users to hide from the law when they engage in cybercrime, terrorism, espionage, the spread of dis/misinformation and conspiracy theories, and, in the context of this book, antisemitism and racism (Jardine, 2015; Shandler & Canetti, 2019; Topor, 2019a, 2019b). A comparative approach is taken, comparing various anonymity tools from the Tor dark web and the secure messaging application Telegram to regular and less private communication tools such as the regular internet and mainstream social networks. Comparisons are also made to historical ways of utilizing anonymity or impersonation. This chapter, alongside Chapter 3, on the rise of White supremacy, serves as the theoretical framework of this book. Additional material regarding cyberspace, virtual communities, Holocaust denial, and radicalization is presented throughout the subsequent chapters where suitable.

Chapter 3 deals with White supremacy worldwide and presents a review of the current trends, and the rise, of White supremacy and neo-Nazism. It discusses the key historical, political, and sociological trends of White supremacy, neo-Nazism, antisemitism, and racism in a general manner, after which a comparative analysis of several case studies is presented. These include cases from the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, and other places. This chapter not only contributes to the theoretical framework but also to some of the later findings on conspiracy theories and the globalization of White supremacy – that, in the 21st century, as I already suggested in a 2020 report for the Kantor Center at Tel Aviv University, antisemitism, racism, xenophobia, and nationalism are not national but international.¹³ Although neo-Nazism and White supremacy predate the online domain, it is the latter that is presented in Chapter 2 to explain the relevant features of anonymity before explaining how extremists abuse it.

Chapter 3 is written as a qualitative literature review and presents key types and trends of antisemitism and racism. In later chapters, the findings are compared to these types and trends. It becomes clear that international racists simply hate everyone who is not of pure White European origin. They do, however, display different approaches to different groups. For instance, Jews are perceived as the “brains” behind a global conspiracy of domination or the so-called “White genocide,” while Muslims, Black people, or Latinos are considered the “brawn.” In this sense, according to White supremacists, Muslims and Black people are also being used by Jews.

Chapter 4 deals with the migration of extremists to the dark web and other platforms such as Telegram and addresses two main questions. First, why neo-Nazis prefer anonymity over overt social networking and actions. Second, how Western democracies and technology companies pushed extremists to the dark web, thereby worsening the racism problem. This

chapter is based on the concept of process tracing to better understand what pushed neo-Nazis away from mainstream web platforms. To demonstrate this migration, I regard the neo-Nazis as a community, and I explain what a virtual community is and what roles different actors take in this community. The case of Holocaust denial is discussed to explain how the illegality of certain manifestations such as Holocaust denial is, in fact, almost useless by now. The fact that Holocaust denial is illegal in some countries has caused the denial to spread elsewhere on anonymous platforms but does not prevent it. Furthermore, the fact that Holocaust denial is found on the dark web also leads to an interesting psychological effect – since it is on the dark web, many may perceive it as more “authentic” and truer than Holocaust-related information published by academics or journalists on regular media.¹⁴

Chapter 5 deals with antisemitism on the dark web. In this chapter, a thorough comparison is made between antisemitic conspiracies on the dark web and traditional antisemitism. Methodologically, it is built upon the largest content analysis of dark web antisemitism to date (2022), with a qualitative and quantitative analysis of 264 samples from the dark web. These samples are compared to traditional antisemitism and the working definition of antisemitism provided by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).¹⁵ A summarized outline of antisemitism, historical and political, is presented before the main findings to help the reader better understand them. The findings indicate that traditional antisemitism did not vanish; traditional conspiracy theories and concepts are still taught among neo-Nazi White supremacists, but each conspiracy is tailored to fit contemporary events. For instance, as with other plagues throughout history, Jews were blamed for spreading the coronavirus (COVID-19). Neo-Nazis promote the conspiracy theory that Jews created the plague to achieve global dominance, population dilution, or financial gains.¹⁶ Also, Jews are blamed for the large immigration influx to Europe from Africa and the Middle East.

Chapter 6 addresses the question of how antisemitism and racism shift from the online domain to the real domain and vice versa, and the role that anonymous platforms play in the process of online radicalization. Methodologically, a comparative qualitative analysis of several significant case studies is conducted. The concept of process tracing is also utilized to understand how certain actions have led to additional violent actions. In terms of structure, this chapter has three main parts. The first part summarizes the background of online antisemitism and racism, elaborating on the entire book. The second part explains the process of online radicalization and the use, or abuse, of anonymity and the online domain by radicals, mainly neo-Nazis. In the third part, several significant case studies are presented and analyzed – cases in which either the dark web or the general online domain served as a significant agent of influence – either before the violent actions or afterward. I suggest that the internet, and specifically anonymity, has become a utilitarian tool for spreading radical propaganda, endorsing terrorism and neo-Nazism, and radicalizing and recruiting people worldwide with the click of a mouse and a few keyboard strokes.

The main findings of Chapter 6 are also compared to traditional types of antisemitism and racism. As discovered, private anonymous White supremacist communities and “clubs” operate within the social cyber domain to disseminate conspiracy theories and radicalize and recruit people worldwide. They even translate antisemitic and racist manifestos into dozens of languages; thus, racism is no longer nationalist or xenophobic in the traditional sense but is international. Ironically, the real international conspirators seeking global influence and control are not Jews, as neo-Nazis frequently argue, but radical neo-Nazis themselves, who now operate all over the world.

Finally, Chapter 7 combines all the previous chapters, including both theories and findings, to draw overarching conclusions. It summarizes the main characteristics, worldviews, and community structure of White supremacists. In addition, policy recommendations and future predictions regarding online racism are presented. These are aimed both at the technology companies that facilitate social networks and private communications and at policymakers and law enforcement practitioners who seek to eradicate the phenomenon of online antisemitism and racism.

Research Design

This study takes the form of interdisciplinary ethnographic research. Its interdisciplinarity lies in its combination of theories and approaches to antisemitism and racism from the fields of sociology, political science, and communication, as well as intelligence-gathering methods practiced by law enforcement and intelligence agencies worldwide. The study examines the core ideology of White supremacy, its online community, and its global spread; it examines how members of the community interact, spread messages, and communicate in general. The academic type of this research is related to cyber-ethnography, as it seeks to interact with the study’s participants in their authentic real-life environment (Hallett & Barber, 2014; Keeley-Browne, 2011, pp. 238–330). It is similar in nature to an OSINT or undercover law enforcement investigation – whether a “real” one or a cyber one – in which law enforcement or intelligence agents impersonate and pose as a radical character and go undercover to gather intelligence on an extreme criminal organization or community. It is thus similar to cases in which drug dealers, terrorists, or pedophiles are caught in a law enforcement cyber “honey-trap” (German, 2007; Miller, 2006; Topor, 2019a).¹⁷

This type of study was chosen to investigate the underworld of White supremacy for several reasons. First, because hardcore antisemitism and racism are less socially accepted, at least in mainstream Western society, many White supremacists avoid unwanted criticism and public pressure by refraining from publicly engaging in antisemitism and racism or expressing their real worldviews and opinions. Thus, they choose to hide behind the veil of privacy and anonymity provided by dark webs and anonymous communications. Second, although many White supremacists are openly racist and do not hide

their extreme, hateful identity, I nonetheless assume they would not authentically cooperate with researchers on the topic – let alone a Jewish researcher like myself. In fact, when I asked some to participate in interviews, they all declined, although I did not reveal my identity but only my request to conduct an academic interview or talk to them generally. Those that did answer were very suspicious, although they did provide some meaningful insights, as presented further in this study.

My main concern was that they would try to manipulate or mask their words and actions. The most reasonable and probable assumption is that racists, criminals, and most people, in general, will only speak the full truth when they feel safe and in non-hostile, non-judgmental company. That is, they will only speak truthfully to a person they trust or if their identity is fully protected. That is why I assume that, in this case, undercover ethnographic observation offers far more reliable results than interviews or surveys.

The actual research, after the literature review, is organized into three studies based on observation and evidence. The first study, in Chapter 4, is about Holocaust denial on the dark web and Telegram. Evidence was collected through screenshots and chat archiving. The second study, in Chapter 5, is about antisemitism on the dark web and is based on 264 cases that, due to the nature of the dark web, are all screenshotted samples, as further elaborated in the chapter. The third study is a review of several cases of online radicalization leading to actual terror and violence – extremists who went on shooting sprees to kill people. Some evidence from the dark web and Telegram is presented, as well as quotes from the perpetrators that were published by the media after law enforcement had investigated the case.

Using the research avatar Andy88, I entered several dark web sites, Telegram groups, Gab groups, and Discord servers to observe and record their rhetoric and communication in general and to obtain information about and referrals to various websites and channels. The use of an avatar that other group members can identify as ideologically similar is important since many websites or channels are private. That is, there is no way of gaining admittance through simple search engines or without specific referrals from other groups or other members. Thus, after gaining the trust of other users, I was referred to more private groups and websites.

Ethical and Legal Concerns

General information about White supremacists and internet users was collected in this study. Even though the methods used to collect the information were covert, and at times deception was used, users' real identities were neither collected nor shared, nor was any related information, including, but not limited to, names, family-related information, email addresses, home or work addresses, phone numbers, bank accounts, and so on. Any personal or "real" information that was available was either ignored or has been censored in this book. This applies to the identities of the subjects of research but also to people who had their personal information doxxed. In any case, real information was

not stored, and I cannot reproduce or restore it. All material is thus censored by me, and the real identities of the antisemites and racists and those who used hostile rhetoric, if available, have not been disclosed to others, including to editors, reviewers, or other professionals who have contributed to this book.

This was not only done due to legal constraints but also ethical concerns. Journalists, anti-fascist activists, and promoters of liberalism and human rights can be tempted to expose and publicly shame radical neo-Nazi White supremacists. At times, when they have the public's interest in mind, they are not legally restricted from doing so. However, this can lead to a hostile response by the exposed individuals and even increase their hatred and hostility toward those outside their community. It can also lead to legal prosecution. Other initiatives that might be proposed in the wake of this research will likewise have to deal with ethical and privacy-related concerns.

Additionally, the avatar Andy88, in its various forms, was never used to incite or nudge users to speak in a certain manner but only to observe their behavior online. Furthermore, the process of designing, building, and maintaining the fake online character was conducted entirely by me. The process of establishing a fake technological identity, bypassing the mandatory authentications of various online platforms, and the general process used to create the actual figure are not discussed for reasons of ethics and the prevention of potentially harmful use.

The Avatar: Andy88

The avatar Andy88 was used solely for observation and to obtain access and referrals to restricted and private websites or channels. The avatar only engaged in conversations when first approached by others and took various forms to ensure my personal anonymity. On dark web forums that required registration, fringe websites, and Telegram groups, the avatar appeared as




Figure 1.1 Andy88's Avatar.

Andy88, alongside a graphic representation of the avatar – a profile picture. This picture was created using the Avatar Maker web service, and it is associated, as shown in Figure 1.1, with White characteristics.¹⁸ The “racial chart” from the *Holocaust Encyclopedia* in the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) was consulted to create a character that would appeal to neo-Nazi White supremacists – the top-left character in Figure 1.2.¹⁹ To put it simply, an avatar of a blond, White male with blue eyes was created. This racial ideology is further discussed in Chapter 3.




Figure 1.2 Racial Chart Titled “Races of the World I/Europe and its Border Areas.” Source: USHMM.

Additionally, any emails or phone numbers used to operate this avatar on online social platforms were censored due to personal privacy concerns.

Selection of Case Studies

The selection of case studies is never an easy task in research. While a few case studies are chosen, others are left unexplored. During this research, I found too many examples of neo-Nazi White supremacy groups – some with hundreds of thousands of users and some with only a few. I have chosen to study only a handful of dark web sites and Telegram groups. Since anonymous communications are, after all, a form of communication, I have chosen to focus on groups with significant reach or with very unique or extreme content. However, I argue that even websites or channels with less reach can have a tremendous impact on society, as they can radicalize others to take real-world action.

I have also chosen to focus more on anonymous communications than on regular websites. While the content on websites such as 4chan or 8kun can be extremely antisemitic and racist, these sites can still be held accountable for hosting content that incites actual violence. That means users are limited, at least theoretically, and discouraged from publishing actual leaked (i.e., doxxed) information or calls to action. Of course, in reality, these websites are seldom sufficiently censored. Furthermore, even though users appear to be anonymous, law enforcement can monitor and track users more easily than on the dark web or Telegram. This is why content is published on such websites, but calls to action, details of marches, doxxed information, and other types of information are often shared on more secure platforms instead.²⁰

Far-right and White supremacist parties and groups are growing in presence and power in many countries worldwide – in Europe, North America, Russia, New Zealand, Australia, and anywhere else radical White people live. In order to find the most prominent cases, I have narrowed my list to English and Russian-speaking groups, although I have also addressed German-speaking groups to some extent. A simple yet important analysis using web-traffic analytics such as *Similar Web* has revealed that private, secure, and anonymous communication platforms are mainly used in the United States, England, and Russia. These platforms also have significant user bases in other countries – Germany, France, Italy, Ukraine, Canada, and others. However, to maintain the focus of the book, I have chosen only a few cases, as presented below. Significant numbers of users were also found

in Arab and Asian countries but were excluded from this research due to the simple logic that those from the Middle East and Asia are often the victims of Western White supremacy. However, antisemitism, anti-Zionism, and neo-Nazism were found in many Persian groups, raising concerns about Iranian anti-Zionist and antisemitic propaganda. I discuss this briefly later in the book.²¹

Dark web onion sites for this research included 8chan, Picochan, Endchan, NeinChan, Ni-chan, NANOchan, Ableonion, Torum, Connect, Hidden Answers, and other random onion websites that were found while exploring these websites, including pastebins and file storage websites either on the Tor dark web or the regular web. These and others are listed in Chapter 5. Links and other information are presented in the recordings of these websites, as these are excessively long and constantly change. No reliable information on traffic and user engagement was available to independent academic researchers such as myself. Information available from the Tor project indicates that, as of the beginning of 2021, there were over 600,000 unique dark web addresses (new third version addresses), which millions of users visit daily. Additionally, as explained below, one of the major differences between Telegram and the Tor dark web is the availability of metadata. Users can find out about other users and about reach (i.e., number of subscribers, number of views) on Telegram but not always on the dark web.

Dozens of Telegram groups were also explored. However, due to concerns of time and space, I have chosen to focus on the most relevant ones – those with a significant number of users and that feature racist speech and ways of disseminating conspiracy theories (see Table 1.1). I have also included several smaller groups in this research, as some act only as intermediaries, and others are intriguing due to their structure or complexity. Furthermore, only a few of the groups presented in Table 1.1 were thoroughly analyzed. Table 1.1 is presented here in this introductory chapter, rather than at the end of the book, to illustrate the names, themes, and actual reach of these groups. This information reveals that, although neo-Nazism and White supremacy are still politically weak, they have a significant presence in society.²²

Finally, as reiterated throughout this book, the worldwide reach of anti-semitic and racist content is astonishing and worrying – it should be a red flag for both democratic and less democratic countries. Regular websites such as 4chan are visited by tens of millions of users; it is estimated that dark web sites and Telegram groups also reach millions of users each.

Table 1.1 Examples of Telegram Channels Used in This Research and Their Online Reach

<i>Group Name</i>	<i>Link</i>	<i>Official Category</i>	<i>Actual Theme</i>	<i>Official Location</i>	<i>Main Languages</i>	<i>Subscribers</i>	<i>Total Views ~</i>
Stop The Lockdown, Resist The Vaccine	https://t.me/StopTheLockdown	–	Anti-Vaccines, Conspiracies, Racism	–	English	3,296	9,113,232
Britain First	https://t.me/BritainFirst	Politics	Nationalism, Racism, Anti- immigration	–	English	26,030	1,854,910
Qanon Россия [Rossiya (Russia)]	https://t.me/qanonrus	Edutainment	Conspiracies, Racism	Russia	Russian	94,730	9,524,637
Nazi Telegram	https://t.me/nazitelegram	–	Nazism	–	English	526	4,943
Nazi Telegram	https://t.me/nazitelegramgroup	–	Nazism	–	English, Russian, Persian	55	20,829
Qanon Q17	https://t.me/QAnonQ17	–	Conspiracies	–	English	43,685	1,168,466
Железный Крест [Zheleznyi Krest (Iron Cross)]	https://t.me/cross_of_iron	Edutainment	Nazism	Russia	Russian	6,041	240,971
卐✘HITLER✘卐	https://t.me/hitler	–	Nazism	–	English, Persian	4,944	46,392
Stormfront on telegram	https://t.me/StormfrontActionRadioBitchFest	–	Racism	–	English	78	6,548
Q NEWS OFFICIAL TV #WWG1WGA ❤️US	https://t.me/QNewsOfficialTV	–	Conspiracies, Racism	–	English	126,617	18,408,525
NSDAP INTERNATIONAL	https://t.me/NATSOCIALISM	–	Nazism (Promotional)	–	English	320	115

NSDAP Channels Guide	https://t.me/NSDAPchannels	–	Nazism (Promotional)	–	English	1,017	–
NSDAP	https://t.me/NSDAPUF	–	Nazism	–	English	4,122	64,064
ᄇᄇ Aryan Guard ᄇᄇ	https://t.me/AryanGuard	–	Nazism	–	Persian	12	–
Ku Klux Klan	https://t.me/kkk_empire	–	KKK	–	–	459	–
British National Vanguard	https://t.me/british_national_vanguard	–	Racism, Nationalism	–	–	95	241
/wsg/ Mirror	https://t.me/wsg_mirror	–	Racism, Pornography	–	–	1,304	444,472
Cricket House 3///0	https://t.me/niggermonkey48	–	Racism	–	–	2,685	626,090
Boss HawG News CREW!	https://t.me/HawGa	–	Racism, Conspiracies	–	English	14,581	2,458,926
/BMW/ – The Bureau of Memetic Warfare	https://t.me/TheBureauOfMemeticWarfareOG	Politics	Racism, Conspiracies	–	English	6,299	349,980
WHITE LIVES MATTER	https://t.me/whitelivesmatter818	Pictures and Photos	Promotion of White privilege, Racism	Ukraine	English	7,347	1,037,209
White Lives Matter Official	https://t.me/WhiteLivesMatterOfficial	–	Promotion of White privilege, Racism	–	English	9,563	557,218
Right Voice	https://t.me/rightvoice88	Music	Nazism (Promotional)	Ukraine	English	11,620	2,542,032
Русское Имперское Движение [Russkoe Imperskoe Dvizhenie (Russian Imperial Movement)]	https://t.me/Rus_imperia	Politics	Nationalism, Racism	Russia	Russian	876	28,859

(continued)

Table 1.1 Cont.

<i>Group Name</i>	<i>Link</i>	<i>Official Category</i>	<i>Actual Theme</i>	<i>Official Location</i>	<i>Main Languages</i>	<i>Subscribers</i>	<i>Total Views ~</i>
The Daily Stormer	https://t.me/TheDailyStormer	–	Racism, Conspiracies	–	English	115	–
Combat 18 Division Bohemia	https://t.me/C18telegram	–	–	–	Memes	53	–
Brenton Tarrant's lads.	https://t.me/Tarrant_Lads	–	Racism	–	Russian	1,105	19,006
AdoLf HiTleR	https://t.me/Adolf_God	–	Nazism	–	Persian	275	4,923
Holohoax Info Chan	https://t.me/holohoaxinfo	–	Holocaust Denial	–	English	1,239	4,702
Holocaust Lies Exposed	https://t.me/holocaustliesexposed	Politics	Holocaust Denial	–	English	1,783	180,790
KomMittment: Watch Europa The Last Battle	https://t.me/kommitted	–	Promotion of White privilege, Racism, Conspiracies	–	English	247	125
GALLIA DAILY FR IN GB	https://t.me/GalliaDaily	News and Mass Media	Anti- Immigration, Racism	Delaware (USA)	English, French	20,603	555,593
BHJATDE(Blood and Honour Jugend) @allparty 🇩🇪	https://t.me/bhj28	–	Racism, Nazism	–	German	29	742
DAYS OF ACTION CALENDAR	https://t.me/allparty https://t.me/DaysOfAction	– Telegram	Racism, Nazism, Racism, Nazism, Promotion of White privilege, Conspiracies	Germany –	German English	380 701	110,956 58,433

The HoloHoax	https://t.me/HoloHoaxer	–	Holocaust Denial	–	English	36	–
Dissecting the Reich	https://t.me/NSDAPtruth	–	Holocaust Denial	–	English	594	–
HoloGems	https://t.me/ZisblattsDiamonds	–	Holocaust Denial	–	English	1,391	–
HoloHoax Tracker	–	–	Holocaust Denial	–	English	9	–
Good Little Hebrews	https://t.me/holoHoaxlies	–	Holocaust Denial	–	English	12	–
HoloHoax	https://t.me/HoloHoaxFacts	–	Holocaust Denial	–	English	70	–
The Bunker Final	https://t.me/ZuendelsBunker	–	Holocaust Denial	–	English	790	–
Bunker Gate	https://t.me/TheBunkerGate	Politics	Holocaust Denial	–	English	1,102	–
DAYS OF ACTION CALENDAR	https://t.me/DaysOfAction	–	Racism, Nazism, Promotion of Terrorism and Violence	–	English	828	–

Note: All the information in this table was collected between September 1, 2021, and November 30, 2021 (three months).

Notes

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2 Anonymity and Anonymous Communications

This book is about the social phenomena of antisemitism, racism, extremism, radicalization, and anonymity. But before a discussion about these social phenomena can take place, it is important to understand the concept of anonymity in social and historical terms and review the platforms on which racism and anonymity thrive – platforms such as the regular web but also the dark web and private messaging applications (e.g., Telegram and Signal). This chapter combines a socio-political review of anonymous communications, antisemitism, and racism with a few technological aspects.

The main question of this chapter deals with the very essence of anonymous communications – what are they good for? Specifically, if anonymity nowadays promotes antisemitism, racism, extremism, and crime, why do nations allow technology companies to develop anonymity tools? And why do nations develop anonymous communications themselves? For example, the Tor (The Onion Router) dark web was developed by the United States Navy, and it is the most popular dark web today. The United States is currently the largest funder of the Tor dark web, even after turning the whole Tor project into a non-profit organization [501I(3)] in 2006.¹ Although the United States developed it for strategic intelligence reasons, it also knowingly allows antisemites, racists, terrorists, drug dealers, arms dealers, and even pedophiles to hide and thrive on Tor (Topor, 2019b).

The main point of this chapter is duality – on the one hand, anonymity and anonymous communications allow oppressed and persecuted people, for example from authoritarian countries, to avoid censorship, monitoring, and surveillance; on the other hand, these same methods allow malicious users to hide from the law when they engage in cybercrime, terrorism, espionage, the spread of dis/misinformation and conspiracy theories, and, in the context of this book, antisemitism and racism (Jardine, 2015; Shandler & Canetti, 2019; Topor, 2019a, 2019b). This chapter takes a comparative approach, comparing various anonymity tools, such as the Tor dark web and the secure messaging application Telegram, to regular and less private communication tools such as the regular internet or mainstream social networks. Along with Chapter 3, on the rise of White supremacy, it serves as the theoretical framework of this book.

This chapter is presented in three parts, excluding the short introduction and main conclusions. Along with the theory introduced in these parts, various short case studies are used to illustrate the main concepts behind the trends and social processes. First, the historical and socio-political aspects of anonymity and impersonation are presented. This is done to explain not only how but why people used to hide their identities before technology made it easy and available to all. An overview of the concept of “identity” is also included in this part because anonymity is a concept used to hide a specific identity – that is, what exactly is identity, what is social identity, and how can people change it for their own benefit? Second, online anonymity is explained, and a general survey is provided of the most common anonymous channels, such as various communication protocols, the regular internet, deep webs, dark webs, and anonymous messaging applications. In addition, a somewhat philosophical debate is presented regarding the dark web – is it a useful and necessary evil, or is it a tool or strategy that has shifted beyond its initial purpose? Can it be that a nation like the United States developed a tool it can now no longer control?

Third, the actual use people make of anonymous communications is presented through several case studies and the debate on online radicalization. This last part, which is mainly based on Weimann (2010, 2016a, 2016b), Weimann and Masri (2020), Jardine (2015, 2019), Topor (2019a, 2019b), and Kasimov (2021), outlines the way online users are radicalized to the point that they leave their keyboard to take to the streets and murder people they dislike. The debate about radicalization is further expanded in Chapter 6. As the analyses of the case studies and findings of this chapter suggest, the internet has become a utilitarian tool for spreading hate, racism, and extremism and for radicalizing others by exposing them to this hatred with no censorship whatsoever.

Anonymity and Pseudonymity

Throughout history, people have wanted to hide their identity for various reasons and in various places where their desired expression (whether opinions or acts) was either banned by the ruling party or socially unacceptable to the local community. Nowadays, with the proliferation of technology and the internet, anonymity is not hard to achieve. In previous centuries, however, those who wanted to publicly or privately express their opinions were required to think of unique ways to do so. But what exactly is anonymity? According to the Cambridge Dictionary, the noun “anonymity” represents a situation in which someone’s name is not given or known.² To further expand and explain this definition, one can regard the concept of anonymity as a situation in which a person’s identity is not known. This, of course, applies not only to a single person but also to entire social networks of people – acting parties in any social situation can be anonymous if the appropriate measures are taken. Wallace (1999) defines anonymity as the noncoordinatability of traits in a given respect – that is, to be anonymous

is to be non-identifiable in some respect or context. The traits are those of a person or, to be precise, an identity of a person – the identity the person wants to hide or change and the identity they want to present.

Interestingly, to be anonymous does not mean to be erased from the world, either the real world or the cyber world. Instead, it means hiding an identity that is associated with a person (or with other things in this regard, such as computers) and showing a different one. Thus, anonymity is not a lack of identity but the presence of an alternative one. In cases where an individual desires to be publicly known but with a different identity, a fake identity must be adopted – a pseudonym. Pseudonymity means using an alternative name and identity instead of the real one.³ A person might want or need a pseudonym to avoid local censorship and express their true opinion, gain privacy rights, or hide their personal affairs from social or governmental criticism. In the context of this book, the individual might also want to hide their radicalism, conspiracy theories, and hatred of others to evade persecution or prosecution. For instance, in places where social norms welcome the expression of opinions and freedom of speech is sanctified, like in the United States, neo-Nazis do not legally need to hide their true opinions. They do so for other reasons, which are discussed in Chapter 4, on Nazi migration to the dark web (Bleich, 2011, pp. 3–13). In places like Germany, where some radical ideologies such as Nazism or extreme Islamism are banned, those who practice them need to separate their true identities from their actions. The German *Strafgesetzbuch* (penal code), specifically sections 86 and 86a, outlaws symbols associated with Nazism or extreme Islamism.⁴

Pseudonymity or impersonation – the act of taking up a fake (or stolen) identity to avoid social norms or governmental laws – is not a contemporary phenomenon but rather an ancient practice used throughout history by writers, critics of authority, terrorists, and criminals. Impersonation was even used in biblical times, for instance, in the story of the blessing of Isaac. The biblical story from the book of Genesis describes the relationships of Jacob and Esau with their blind father, Isaac. In the story, Jacob assumes Esau's identity to trick their father into giving him his blessing. Identity is made up of several characteristics, which are discussed further below, and the act of impersonation goes beyond the simple act of lying to an old blind man using a different name (see Genesis 25:23–34, 27:1–46). In the literary context, the pseudonyms of George Eliot and Voltaire are also very relevant to this overview of anonymity and pseudonymity (Topor & Pollack, 2022).

George Eliot, one of the greatest English novelists and poets of the Victorian era, wrote very critical works. *Middlemarch, a Study of Provincial Life*, written by Eliot in 1871–1872, addressed many social issues that were not being publicly debated and were disregarded by the wealthy and powerful. *Middlemarch* addresses discrimination against women and women's status in society in general; it addresses issues relating to marriage, religion, education, and political reform. But why should a Victorian-era man write about women? George Eliot was, in fact, the pen name of Mary Anne (or Marian) Evans, a female novelist. She decided to assume a male name to be taken

seriously, as she worried that British society would disregard a woman (Casanova, 2016; Lemon et al., 2010, pp. 536–550). In another example, Voltaire chose a pseudonym to protect himself from prosecution, as he criticized Christianity, the French, and European society in general. Voltaire was the name of François-Marie Arouet (Israel, 2013, pp. 110–140).

Changing one's name is just a part of the process of impersonation – a name is just one aspect of an identity. It is, therefore, important to understand the concept of identity to better understand anonymity. So, what exactly is identity? Identity is a complex structure of personal psychological and extroverted sociological characteristics – that is, regarding the psychological side of identity, a person's identity contains objective traits, such as the way they act, and more subjective traits, such as the way they think they act, how others perceive them, and how they want others to perceive them or how they think others perceive them (Burke & Stets, 2009, pp. 1–3, 18–32, 61–89; Elliott, 2019, pp. 1–45; Jenkins, 2014, pp. 1–16). Regarding the sociological side of the definition of identity, this is the external expression of identity, including all physical traits. It includes descriptive characteristics such as body structure, facial shape and expressions, height, weight, skin color and tone, and hair color and type. Of course, birth-related components are an important part of the complex structure of identity. These are characteristics such as age, sex and gender, place of birth, family, friends and relationships, and, last but certainly not least, the socio-economic environment in which one was born (Suh, 2012; Topor & Pollack, 2022).

Thus, identity is a social concept that is tangled up in the broader public sphere. It cannot be separated from various social circumstances, and it is deeply culturally influenced, as it affects our perceptions and others' perceptions of us. Identity, or its perception and presentation, is a social and behavioral strategy that can be manipulated and adapted by people according to their preferences. In the context of this book, identity can also take the form of an online identity that masks a person's true characteristics. In the “real” world, when a person enters a room full of people, they are instantaneously judged on their physical characteristics, manners, and way of presenting themselves. All the above-mentioned characteristics make it easier for people to judge, identify, and define social situations (Goffman, 1959, pp. 46–75). This process lets people assess the personality they are interacting with. In the real world, it is harder to create a credible pseudonym, but this is much easier in the cyber domain, where the absence of a visible physical presence plays an important role in perception and trust. In fact, this physical presence is often only represented by a picture or avatar (Topor & Pollack, 2022).

Online Anonymity, Pseudonymity, and Privacy

The wide availability of the internet has made the phenomenon of fake identities more relevant than ever. While a real interaction between humans reveals certain characteristics to each side, in the cyber domain, it is easy to mask or adapt both the psychosocial and the physical characteristics of

users (Suler, 2002; Topor & Pollack, 2022; Turkle, 1999). In the context of this book, and in relation to the cyber domain – the internet – aspects of an identity can even include IP addresses or verified online accounts. Just as a person can mask their appearance, they can mask their cyber-related character aspects (Topor, 2019b). Cyberspace lacks the real-world cues of face-to-face (FtF) communication, and computer-mediated communication creates problems of socialization, interaction, and trust. How can you know exactly who you are chatting to on social media? Even when internet users are familiar with each other and use verified social media accounts, what guarantee is there that your friend is the one actually typing the messages or posts? These problems of trust might not be so significant when casually browsing the web, but if a person wants to share love, conspiracy theories, or hate, they become significant. Either way, with or without complete trust, social networks, and the internet as a whole, have become important agents of socialization among humans (Fogel & Nehmad, 2009; Livingstone, 2008; Min et al., 2020; Pollack, 2019; Topor & Pollack, 2022).

To achieve online anonymity, an alternative online identity must be developed – an online pseudonym or, as most internet users call it, a fake profile. Boyd and Ellison (2008) referred to people who use fake profiles as “fakesters.” As long ago as 2008, they argued that fakesters were an integral part of social interactions in cyberspace and that while some derive pleasure and fulfillment from building and managing a fake identity, others abuse this feature of the internet for their own ends, such as fraud, espionage, terrorism, the dissemination of radical conspiracy theories and racism, stalking, and other abuses. Topor and Pollack (2022) reviewed various cases of online impersonation and argued there are seven common types of online fakesters, each with a different purpose. The motives for using an online fake profile are fraud and phishing, information gathering (espionage), voyeurism, revenge, personal fulfillment, personal privacy, and law enforcement. Although they placed the online fakesters on a positive–negative scale and a fakeness scale, they did not discuss the actual legality of this use of fake profiles because there is currently no standardized or normative approach to this; each technology company and each nation regards fake profiles differently. As elaborated in subsequent chapters, the lack of standardized regulation in cyberspace helps neo-Nazis hide online, manage international networks, and promote their radical and racist material worldwide.

Internet users thus create fake profiles for various reasons, some harmless and even positive but others harmful. In the context of this book, the main purpose of faking an online profile is privacy. I can reasonably assume that, while neo-Nazis do commit fraud or information gathering online, they are mainly concerned with remaining anonymous to continue their promotion of radicalism and hate without interruption. In addition to the types of fake profiles presented by Topor and Pollack (2022), Kang et al. (2013) also discovered why people seek online anonymity and the types of activities these people carry out. Based on interviews with 44 people, they

discovered that 41% of participants used online anonymity for filesharing and downloading purposes, 41% used it to browse and search for information, 57% used it to participate in special interest groups, and 20% used it to either discuss or be involved in politics.

Furthermore, Kang et al. (2013) also discussed the main perceived advantages of online anonymity. People utilize online anonymity to avoid others, to avoid commitments to their community, to protect others, to control personal material, to avoid criticism, to feel free to express their views, to have more control over the information they disclose, and to protect themselves by avoiding legal repercussions or stalking, among others. Kang et al.'s discoveries align with the motives suggested by Topor and Pollack (2022), particularly the motive of privacy – being safe and protected from criticism, stalking, and legal repercussions. As Topor (2019a, 2019b) has suggested, neo-Nazis' significant presence on the dark web and other anonymous platforms is because they seek to avoid public and social criticism, as well as monitoring and prosecution by law enforcement. As Talia Lavin exemplified in her valuable book *Culture Warlords: My Journey into the Dark Web of White Supremacy* (2020), the current anti-fascist opposition to neo-Nazism also causes neo-Nazis to seek to avoid being monitored by civil society.

An online pseudonym can be created to ensure privacy and safety. This alternative online identity is created with two concerns in mind – a technological concern and a social concern. As I explain later in this book, neo-Nazis are motivated by both. First, they post and spread conspiracy theories about Jewish control over the media, the state, and socio-political affairs at large. The economy is also included, in accordance with Nazi and antisemitic tradition (see Fox & Topor, 2021). In addition, they post and spread conspiracy theories about the authorities' control over cyberspace, including most social media platforms and applications. Some even claim that the dark web itself is a plot against them. The dark web of Tor is maintained and controlled by the US; however, neither neo-Nazis nor even drug dealers are of significant interest to strategic international security (Topor, 2019b). The technological concern and the social concern can be understood by reviewing the actual structure of cyberspace. These concerns do not only affect malicious internet users, dark web users, or, in the context of this book, neo-Nazis. They affect each and every internet user worldwide. Thus, to become anonymous online, create a pseudonym, and control their own privacy, individuals must understand and then “trick” the structure of cyberspace.

Cyberspace is made up of four main layers – the physical layer, the logical layer, the information layer, and the layer of users. The physical layer is the actual physical infrastructure, including fiber-optic cables, nodes, satellites, servers, computers, and any other type of hardware. The logical layer is built on the infrastructure and acts as the central nervous system of the cyber domain. It consists of applications and services, and it routes information to and from clients and servers. The information layer is the actual data that is either permanently or temporarily stored on the servers and accessible to

users. This can be encoded text, video, audio, pictures, and so on. Lastly, the most important layer is the user layer – the users are those who shape the actual experience of cyberspace. They can be regular, harmless users who just socialize and utilize the internet, but they can also be malicious users who commit fraud, espionage, or crime (Choucri & Clark, 2019, pp. 33–66).

This structure of four layers can be conceptually divided into the two above-mentioned types of concerns: The physical and logical layers make up the technological concerns, while the information and user layers make up the social concerns. To create and use an effective online pseudonym, it is necessary to manipulate infrastructure, traffic, information, and other users. But why should anyone manipulate their use of cyberspace in the first place? They might want to preserve their right to privacy, avoid being targeted by marketing propaganda, hide their web use and traffic, or conceal their actions from local authorities. Using a pseudonym is an important and legitimate method of ensuring privacy. For instance, a person might be banned from expressing an opinion or contacting other users worldwide by their local government. To avoid political oppression, pseudonyms are used in combination with private communications. Others might want to opt out of aggressive or unfair marketing methods that differentiate prices based on locations or devices used (Topor, 2019b).

An effective online pseudonym requires more than just using a fake name or a fake profile. Nowadays, internet service providers (ISPs), including actual providers, websites, and the government, can trace a large amount of internet users' personal information. This information includes not only their online accounts, pictures, and other posted material, but also IP addresses, the IP addresses and names of internet hosts, ports, the type and version of operating system used (e.g., Windows, macOS, Linux, etc.), browser type and version (e.g., Chrome, Safari, Internet Explorer, etc.), type of device (e.g., mobile or desktop), screen size, processor type, available memory, and much more. As mentioned above, this information can be used to track down criminals or regime opposition but also to differentiate between wealthy and less wealthy users in order to set different prices or suggest different products (Topor, 2019b).

To truly manipulate the physical aspect, avoid precise geolocation by others, and avoid giving away personal information to other users, all four layers of cyberspace must be manipulated. Thus, a pseudonym without any personal details must be created and not shared with other users, no matter how trustworthy they might appear. This is done by using fake (or stolen) details (Topor & Pollack, 2022). Next, the association with IP addresses, ports, devices used, and any other technical information mentioned above must be manipulated. The use of privacy tools such as virtual private networks (VPNs), unassociated devices, and IP routing such as dark webs can all help ensure that the online user is truly anonymous. In the context of this book, neo-Nazis (and other extremists and terrorists) frequently hide their social identities as well as their technological or physical identities to avoid detection by anti-fascists or law enforcement agents.

Anonymous Communications: Internet, Dark Webs, and Secure Messaging Applications

The internet has made anonymity widely available worldwide, at least to a certain extent. Our familiar World Wide Web (WWW) has given people the option to interact with others without fully identifying themselves. As has been mentioned, this has made human interaction more accessible worldwide but also more complex – the internet lacks the traditional FtF cues that help us review, analyze, and understand who is in front of us and what we are dealing with. This has made social situations difficult. Dark webs, as well as anonymous and secure messaging applications (SMAs) such as Telegram or Signal, were developed to increase privacy; however, in practice, they further separate the user behind the screen from the people they are communicating with. The main conceptual difference between the regular internet and dark webs or SMAs is that the internet can provide anonymity between users, but both are exposed to ISPs and consequently to the state. In contrast, dark webs and SMAs are designed to hide individuals not only from each other but also from ISPs and state surveillance and monitoring.

In order to fully understand the concept of dark webs and SMAs, how they work, and what can be done using these platforms, it is necessary to understand the origins and concepts of the regular (surface) internet (or web, used interchangeably) – the World Wide Web. The internet was developed in the 1960s by American scholars and the American government at large, although wired and wireless telecommunications were already being used by American, Russian, British, and other nations' civil services and armed forces. Of course, the history of telecommunications dates back to the late 1800s and Alexander Graham Bell; a full historical overview is not within the scope of this book, however. What made the internet unique was that it allowed users to share information with a potentially unlimited number of others online. Previous telecommunication types allowed users to share information with others, but it remained “online” and almost nothing was stored. The internet allowed users to enter the online domain without necessarily having to interact with others in real time. It was only in the 1990s that the internet was made fully public (Flood, 1997, pp. 1–15; Leiner et al., 2009; Ryan, 2010, pp. 88–104).

The first recorded social interactions achieved through networking were a set of notes written by Joseph Carl Robnett Licklider from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in August 1962. Licklider and the networking project were part of the computer research program of the United States Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), a governmental agency under the control of the United States Department of Defense (DoD). The regular surface internet originated from a United States DoD project called the Advanced Research Project Agency Network (ARPANET) in the early 1980s. Following major breakthroughs and success in the field, the project was switched from a closed network to an open network. The closed network is known as the Network Control Protocol

(NCP) and the open network is today known to most advanced internet users as the Transmission Control Protocol/ Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) (Hurlburt, 2017; Leiner et al., 2009; Ryan, 2010, pp. 88–104).

This transition led to the expansion of the network project as a whole and the expansion of protocols and communication types. More networks were added and combined together from the early 1960s onwards, through the opening of the ARPANET project in 1983, and up until the 1990s, when the internet was made publicly available. As the number of users and networks grew, network types were categorized as national (Class A), regional (Class B), or local (Class C) networks. Early ARPANET networks connected only a few “dots” – a few computers connected via nodes (network crossroads) – but the number of dots grew tremendously over the years. And, while early networks were allegedly used only inside the United States, in the 1980s and 1990s, other countries began to develop their own networks. In 1983 the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) was formed to allocate IP addresses globally, and, since there were simply too many addresses, the Domain Name System (DNS) was introduced. The DNS system translates IP addresses to words and vice versa for ease of use (Hurlburt, 2017; Leiner et al., 2009; Ryan, 2010, pp. 88–104; Topor, 2019a; Waldrop, 2008).

In 1989 the ARPANET project was officially terminated, and the tremendous, now global, network morphed into the internet we know today. Later in 1989, IANA was integrated into a newly emerging organization, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). Through ICANN, the internet was made more accessible to the public. ICANN, and IANA within it, became the yellow pages of the internet – a large index. ICANN assigned names, IPs, and DNSs to every domain, industry, organization, home, and by this time even mobile devices. ICANN is a significant addition to the internet since it makes it more accessible to the public, an accessibility that is absent from the dark web, as explained further on. Thus, instead of typing a complex IP address that few can remember, users now type website names. Assigning names, or DNSs, to websites and services also contributes to the indexing and manipulation capabilities of search engines like Google. This type of indexing is also not easily performed on the dark web (Hurlburt, 2017; Leiner et al., 2009; Ryan, 2010, pp. 88–104; Topor, 2019b; Waldrop, 2008).

The indexing process causes the internet to be inherently biased – that is, the decisions of what to index, how to index, and who should be listed first raise some serious philosophical and ethical concerns. However, since the internet is an American-led project, one can assume that American websites and preferences will indeed go first. Furthermore, national and international regulators and ISPs can determine what they approve and deny – that is, based on the ICANN indexing, among others, a government can decide whether or not to allow its citizens to use or be exposed to certain websites (Hurlburt, 2017; Leiner et al., 2009; Ryan, 2010, pp. 88–104; Topor, 2019b; Waldrop, 2008). For instance, Russia and China block many foreign websites and services, based on indexed IPs, DNSs, and content, to prevent the

dissemination of foreign content and agendas in their sovereign domains (Topor & Tabachnik, 2021).

To sum up, the internet is a network of networks. It is a global network that provides both information (e.g., website content) and methods of communication (e.g., emails), using standardized communication protocols such as TCP/IP, ICANN and technology companies such as Google constantly index the internet. These search engines continuously crawl the internet, and the many IPs, DNSs, services, and content on it, collecting data, parsing it, and assigning more context-like keywords to it. Effectively, the indexing of the web makes everything accessible – simultaneously available and exposed. In addition, ISPs, regulated by sovereign governments, can geo-tag and pinpoint every single IP address in the world because an IP is assigned as an ID to every website, device, and service. Those who use the internet are completely exposed to the ISPs and consequently to the local government. This exposure is what deep and dark webs are designed to circumvent.

The Deep Web and the Dark Web

Technologically speaking, the dark web is everything not indexed by search engines such as Google, Bing, Baidu, or Yandex. This is a commonly used definition. However, more precise definitions have been offered by Gehl (2018, pp. 4–8) and Topor (2019b), and these are a better fit for the main aspects of this book. First, the deep web is everything that is not indexed by search engines but is still accessible using regular internet browsing tools and methods. Openness and accessibility are the key differences between the regular surface web and the deep web. While the surface web (internet) is open to all users, the deep web mostly consists of dynamic webpages that are generated on request, websites blocked to the general public, and unlinked, unindexed, or blocked websites that require authentication methods. Deep webs also include networks run on private infrastructures, such as internal networks (organizations' intranets). Other examples of deep webs are private data pages that are only accessible with a username and password or non-public networks such as military or police networks.

The regular internet can be accessed using common and globally standardized tools such as web browsers and regular communication protocols, which connect one end to the other end almost directly. The deep web is less accessible and open but is also based on near-direct communication protocols. This means that an ISP, government, or company can monitor users and the communication between them – that is, a user's computer makes a direct connection with a website's server, and anyone monitoring the internet traffic can see and read the connection type, and they can see which websites a user visits and their IP address and ports used, among other things. A secure connection such as Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS, as opposed to HTTP) might protect the content of a connection, but not the connection itself (Gehl, 2018, pp. 4–8; Negi, 2017; Topor, 2019b).

In contrast, the dark web is only accessible through special browsing applications such as the Tor browser, and the actual communication between one end and the other does not necessarily pass through standard protocols such as TCP/IP – although TCP/IP is used in most cases, such as the Tor browser. However, instead of directly connecting a user and a server, a dark web connection is overlaid on several nodes. Thus, the connection passes through several IP addresses, making the user more anonymous than when surfing the regular web. Each route is also secure, making it more difficult for ISPs and governments to monitor. This structure also makes indexing extremely difficult since there is no direct visible connection between a server/website and an IP address. Additionally, Tor and other dark webs usually use unique top-level domain endings such as “onion” or “i2p” (Gehl, 2018, pp. 4–8; Negi, 2017; Topor, 2019b).

Although people can develop and use their own dark webs with their own software, some dark webs are publicly available – for instance, the Tor dark web, I2P (Invisible Internet Project), Riffle, and Freenet. Most dark webs offer users more privacy and anonymity, while dark webs such as Freenet require users to donate some local storage to create the free internet domain, in contrast to the commercial and regulated cyberspace. Currently, in 2022, the most popular dark web platform is Tor. Dark webs allow users to be more secure and more anonymous by allowing them to handle and manipulate the levels of technological concern and avoid any possible geo-tagging and review of the hardware and software used to browse the web. With the technological concern eliminated, users merely have to “shut their mouth” to keep their private data hidden from other users who might act as honey traps. Of course, dark webs, and specifically Tor, are not fully anonymous, but this is a topic for another book or paper (Gehl, 2018, pp. 4–8; Negi, 2017; Topor, 2019b).

The popular dark web Tor was designed and developed by the United States Naval Research Laboratory and introduced in 2002. At first, it was used solely to increase the privacy and security of military and intelligence communication worldwide. An intelligence operative or authoritarian regime opposer could be easily monitored by local ISPs, but the use of secure and routed communications allowed them to be more anonymous and conceal themselves from the censorship and monitoring of local governments. A Tor user passes a few nodes before reaching his or her final IP destination. Thus, an ISP can identify the first node but not the final target website/IP requested by the user. Content and IP destinations are hidden from sight. However, there was still a crucial flaw: traffic uniqueness. A network traffic analysis could detect these sorts of connections, although it still lacked the ability to access the content of users’ final destinations (Gehl, 2018, pp. 4–8; Negi, 2017; Topor, 2019b).

A method of deprivation was used, similar to the methods used during World War II to detect irregular radio frequencies or the use of radio at irregular times. The concept of this deprivation method of network analysis is simple: While most internet users visit only a handful of websites, or at least

known websites and IPs, a Tor user constantly visits unknown IP addresses, which also change frequently. Additionally, while the content of regular users could at times be monitored, the content of Tor users was hidden. Thus, local intelligence agencies or ISPs had merely to single out the irregular internet users and interrogate them. This made the tool irrelevant for cyber privacy and security. The solution to this problem was simple – flood the world with Tor users by advocating human rights and emphasizing the need for and right to privacy. Intelligence operations were saved. However, for crime, extremism, and terror, the dark webs offered a perfect hiding place where they could proliferate (Topor, 2019a, 2019b; Weimann, 2016a, 2016b).

Secure Messaging Applications

Messaging applications are another key component of internet privacy and anonymous communications. The simplest form of online messaging is instant messaging (IM), where two users can interact and share text messages and other content with each other while using a server or platform of some sort to host their messaging. In contrast to online chats, or Internet Relay Chats (IRC), IM is not as public and may also be less immediate, as users are often required to log in to see messages, similar to the way they would access their emails. Additionally, unlike chat rooms, users do not have to enter certain servers or “rooms” to communicate but can do so directly. An early example of IM is the Compatible Time-Sharing System (CTSS), which originated at MIT in the early sixties. Using the CTSS system, users could remotely connect to the platform, send messages, and share files. The system grew beyond MIT, and many other institutions adopted similar messengers. One of the first IM platforms to emerge was AOL. Nowadays, large corporations, militaries, and security and intelligence forces use messengers that are based on their intranets – private IMs that are not exposed to the outside world (Creasy, 1981; Herbsleb et al., 2002; Nardi et al., 2000).

There are many versions of IM services and applications and an even larger number of chat rooms. In this part, my goal is not to provide a technological and historical review of each but to illustrate how IMs can be secure, private, and less vulnerable to government monitoring than regular internet use. One of the concerns of using a regular IRC channel (unlike a dark-web-based IRC) is that IRC channels are exposed to many users, as well as to the ISPs that monitor the chat. This is also true for large, modern public chat platforms such as Discord. The example of Discord is discussed further in this book even though Discord itself has banned some neo-Nazi and extreme servers from its platform.⁵ The main difference between traditional chats and modern chats like Discord is the available features beyond plain text; modern chats can host video, audio, and other types of content sharing, including voice-over-IP (VoIP) (Creasy, 1981; Herbsleb et al., 2002; Nardi et al., 2000).⁶ Since IMs, and online platforms and services in general, rely on servers and routers, they are more vulnerable to eavesdropping than Public-Switched Telephone Networks (PSTN), which are more direct in the sense

that a user (caller) connects directly to another one. Manipulations such as a Man in the Middle (MITM) attack can, of course, be carried out via telephone and internet connections; however, this is a discussion for a different project (Varshney et al., 2002).

What makes an IM service private and secure – that is, what are the main differences between a traditional IM and a secure messaging application (SMA)? Users can, of course, change their names and usernames, registration details, and other credentials. They can also connect using VPNs. However, information exchanged in traditional IMs is more accessible to ISPs as well as to cybercriminals and foreign spies. The main difference between IMs and SMAs is data encryption. Many modern SMAs such as Telegram, WhatsApp, Viber, Thereema, Signal, Facebook Messenger, and others are based on private servers and have end-to-end encryption (E2EE), which is intended to prevent data from being read or modified by a third party. The only ones to have full access to the data are the users – the sender of the data and the recipient. As with the dark web, this “promise” of privacy creates a false perception of reality since, just as dark webs are monitored to some extent, SMAs also have backdoors through which local governments can monitor/eavesdrop. Moreover, even with E2EE, metadata can still be gathered – for instance, IP addresses, the duration of engagements, and at times even phone numbers and device types. However, because SMAs are generally privately owned companies, access is much harder to obtain, even for government regulators (Dechand et al., 2019; Elkin-Koren & Haber, 2016; Endeley, 2018; Ermoshina et al., 2016).

Telegram Messenger Inc.

This secure IM application, or SMA, was chosen for this book for several reasons. Many popular SMAs offer a similar or even greater level of security and privacy than Telegram. The main difference is in the scale of communications – the group chat feature. This means that content, whether positive or negative, innocent or radical, can be disseminated quickly and privately to a very large number of users. Although undercover agents can still manipulate their way in, it makes real-time analysis more difficult (compared to computational or artificial intelligence analysis). As of June 2022, Telegram groups can host up to 200,000 members, and, unlike websites or social media, these groups have many privacy-oriented features such as E2EE and self-destructive timers (where content will self-destruct after being read). Other popular SMAs are far behind in terms of group sizes. For instance, as of June 2022, WhatsApp can host up to 512 users in each group, while Signal can host 1,000. Servers/rooms in online chats such as Discord can host up to half a million users, but private groups, called “Direct Messages” (DM), can host only ten users at one time (Nobari et al., 2017; Sutikno et al., 2016; Yayla & Speckhard, 2017).

These figures and facts are very relevant to extremists, as some of them – White supremacists and extreme Jihadists alike – wish to disseminate their

manifestations of hate among large crowds. Telegram, Discord, and dark web sites are the perfect platforms for doing so. In reality, extremists use cross-platform methods to promote their extreme ideas, as further discussed in this book. Furthermore, when they do want to keep things private, they use other privacy-oriented features to manipulate the cyber domain and each of its layers – hardware, software, and consciousness. Governments around the world are constantly urging Telegram to either block extreme content or open the platform to external monitoring. However, if Telegram monitored the content of its users, the privacy features and advantages would become irrelevant. This is true both in the scenario where Telegram monitors content itself and the scenario in which it allows governments to monitor it.⁷

Use and Abuse of Anonymous Communications

Anonymous communications are a double-edged sword; as with many things in life, it all depends on the users themselves. On the one hand, anonymity can be an important tool under authoritarian regimes that censor content and forbid criticism. In this case, anonymity allows citizens to criticize their oppressive governments without fear of prosecution. It is important to note that freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and general access to knowledge and information are all parts of a set of normative values. In this regard, anonymity promotes human rights. On the other hand, anonymous communications allow people to take advantage of technology for malicious reasons, such as committing fraud, espionage, terrorism, hate speech, and other crimes (Gehl, 2016, 2018, pp. 1–24; Peng, 2014, pp. 1–10; Topor, 2019b). However, as Topor (2019a) noted, dark webs such as Tor promote all sorts of expressions, from those that are perceived as legitimate by the mainstream to those that are perceived as extreme and radical. In the case of racism and neo-Nazism on the dark web, freedom of expression has negative consequences, as the unmoderated expression of White supremacy leads to racism, xenophobia, discrimination, and even actual violence against minorities.

A prominent example of the beneficial uses of online anonymity is privacy against targeted advertising and marketing. Online targeted advertising is the act of directing advertisements toward an audience with specific characteristics; the logic behind this act is that pinpointing people with certain characteristics, needs, and desires will significantly boost sales since people can be presented with services or products that are tailor-made for them. For instance, a person with an active lifestyle will probably be more interested in sportswear, smart sports watches, bicycles, or running events than an inactive person. Thus, it is more efficient to direct marketing efforts toward those who might be interested than those who probably would not be. If and when advertising companies gain these pieces of information, it allows them to sort people by age, sex, education, income, health, location, and so on. Social media and internet use in general also help advertising companies to group people according to their opinions and interests. Thus,

by collecting personal information, their marketing strategy becomes more effective (Iyer et al., 2005; Kox et al., 2017; Tzoulia, 2021).

Targeted marketing can, of course, benefit consumers by narrowing down choices and helping them purchase more suitable services or products. However, this process pushes services or products onto users who would not necessarily have bought them in the first place. It harms people's freedom of choice by narrowing their choices. Moreover, this process can influence not only purchasing trends but also electoral trends, thereby undermining the very nature of liberal democracy. One of the most significant examples of this is the case of the political consulting company Cambridge Analytica Ltd and the social network Facebook.

Cambridge Analytica acquired and used the personal information of over 50 million American Facebook users to support the election campaign of former American President Donald Trump. Cambridge Analytica analyzed this information to create targeted advertisements, persuading Facebook users to vote for Trump and against other candidates. Thus, in this case, just as in more market-oriented cases, targeted advertisements can be considered as influence campaigns – campaigns that foreign powers undertake against their adversaries (see Boerboom, 2020; Wylie, 2019). Another example came to light in October 2021 when former Facebook employee Frances Haugen revealed documents suggesting that Facebook knowingly turned a blind eye to cases where extremism, crime, or disinformation might have harmed their profits. Interviewed in early October 2021, Haugen argued:

Here were conflicts of interest between what was good for the public and what was good for Facebook. And Facebook, over and over again, chose to optimize for its own interests, like making more money.⁸

How does this fit into a discussion of online privacy, and how can online privacy prevent the abuse of information for political and economic reasons? First, influence campaigns are defined as coordinated, combined, and synchronized applications of diplomacy, information, military, and economic abilities made in an attempt to influence the decisions of foreign targets (Larson et al., 2009; Shuker & Topor, 2021). Second, targeted advertisements can also be considered a coordinated, combined, and synchronized application of various means to influence a target; however, in this case, the targets of influence are either domestic voters or domestic and foreign consumers. Foreign powers might have attempted to influence American politics, but it was Americans and American companies who wrongly influenced themselves the most. Thus, online anonymity can serve to protect users from online influence campaigns.

A key example of the abuse of online anonymity is cybercrime. Common cybercrimes include actions such as financial fraud, identity theft, extortion, sexual abuse, banned pornography, drug and weapons sales, and general phishing manipulations.⁹ The cyber domain allows criminals to take advantage of online anonymity and keep themselves safe and secure while

committing crimes. Even if a criminal attempt goes wrong or fails, they are better protected and safer than in similar real-world situations – that is, if you rob a bank in person, you run the risk of being caught by security guards or police, but it can be done online with no immediate physical risk. Furthermore, cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin allow cybercriminals to receive or launder money anonymously and then use it by converting it into traditional currencies (Taylor et al., 2019, pp. 1–17, 49–71; Yar & Steinmetz, 2019, pp. 1–18, 215–231). For instance, in July 2021, the British Metropolitan Police announced it had managed to seize nearly 180 million pounds’ worth of bitcoin cryptocurrency that had been intended for money laundering.¹⁰ A month later, the British National Crime Agency (NCA) and its affiliate organization, the National Cyber Crime Unit, announced they had managed to safeguard over one million victims from cybercrime during the 2020–2021 financial year.¹¹

A well-known example of anonymous cybercrime is the case of the Silk Road marketplace, which was founded in 2011 on the dark web. Users could trade illegal products via the Silk Road, mostly drugs and weapons. The platform was shut down by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in late 2013; it was estimated that during around two years of activity, “goods” worth over two hundred million dollars had been sold there. In October 2013, the FBI arrested Ross William Ulbricht, who was behind the anonymous marketplace, and, in February 2015, Ulbricht was convicted in the State of New York of charges of conspiracy to commit drug trafficking, money laundering, and computer hacking (Topor, 2019b).

Another significant example of anonymity abuse is radicalization – using social media, messaging applications, and dark webs to radicalize and recruit like-minded extremists, whether extreme Jihadists such as the Islamic State (ISIS) or Hamas, or the neo-Nazi far right. As McCauley and Moskalenko (2008), Bott et al. (2009), and Borum (2011) described in detail, radicalization comprises both worldviews and actions. Radicalization is a process, as further discussed in this book; it is not an instant matter but a process of incremental nudges toward or along a radical path (Munn, 2019). In January 2021, *TIME* magazine featured an article about the neo-Nazi Ukrainian militia the Azov Battalion, with the title “Like, Share, Recruit: How a White-Supremacist Militia Uses Facebook to Radicalize and Train New Members.” The article describes how the Azov Battalion managed to utilize the online domain to their advantage, similar to ISIS, and radicalize and recruit young people from Ukraine, Europe, and even the United States.¹²

The Azov Battalion is partly recognized by the Ukrainian authorities and military, as it has aided in the fight against Russia since 2014. The battalion even has its own organizational website with a domain ending in “org.ua.”¹³ Still, many Western countries consider the Azov Battalion a far-right militia and not an integral part of the Ukrainian military. Since the battalion recruits not only Ukrainians but also foreign nationals, it must recruit through secure and anonymous platforms to prevent potential foreign recruits from being stopped or sanctioned in their countries. For instance, Azov has several

Telegram accounts aimed at recruiting and radicalizing Ukrainians and foreigners. Many Telegram groups also direct people to other websites and links, including more private and secure recruitment groups.¹⁴

Conclusion

This book examines neo-Nazism, White supremacy, and racism on the dark web and anonymous platforms such as Telegram. All individuals have a right to freedom of speech, as well as privacy and private communications, even those with more extreme worldviews. However, the expression of extreme ideologies on anonymous platforms leads to a situation in which the lives and rights of others are being harmed. As radical online users spread conspiracy theories and radicalize each other, they constantly nudge each other on, creating a vicious cycle of racism, hate, and violence. As exemplified in Chapters 3 and 4 of this book, extreme freedom of speech can turn into actual violence. Words in blogs or social media posts can quickly spread and turn into action (Munn, 2019). Anonymity is far from a novel concept; it dates back many centuries and is used for various reasons, some good but some evil. In the age of information and cyber technologies, and the age of online socializing, it is only logical and obvious that this social practice would shift from the “real” world to the online domain, as many other social practices have done. Current technologies are used and abused by various actors who utilize the current inadequacy of cyber forensics and legislation to their own ends.

Notes

- 1 The Tor Project, see “About” section: www.torproject.org/about/history/
- 2 Cambridge Dictionary. (n.d.). Anonymity. In *Cambridge Dictionary online*. Retrieved June 28, 2022, from <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/anonymity>
- 3 Cambridge Dictionary. (n.d.). Pseudonym. In *Cambridge Dictionary online*. Retrieved June 28, 2022, from <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/pseudonym>
- 4 Deutschland Strafgesetzbuch (German penal code). Sections 84–91a. <https://dejure.org/gesetze/StGB>
- 5 Roose, K. (2017, August 15). This was the alt-right’s favorite chat app. Then came Charlottesville. *The New York Times*. www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/technology/discord-chat-app-alt-right.html; Liao, S. (2018, February 28). *Discord shuts down more neo-Nazi, alt-right servers*. The Verge. www.theverge.com/2018/2/28/17062554/discord-alt-right-neo-nazi-white-supremacy-atomwaffen
- 6 Delfino, D., & Dean, G. (2021, March 24). *What is Discord? A guide to the popular group-chatting app*. Business Insider. www.businessinsider.com/what-is-discord
- 7 Feldstein, S., & Gordon, S. (2021, March 13). Are Telegram and Signal havens for right-wing extremists? *Foreign Policy*. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/13/telegram-signal-apps-right-wing-extremism-islamic-state-terrorism-violence-europol-encrypted/>

- 8 60 minutes. (2021, October 4). *Facebook whistleblower Frances Haugen: The 60 Minutes interview* [Video]. YouTube. www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Lx5VmAdZSI
- 9 FBI. (n.d.). *Cyber crime*. www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber
- 10 Sly, E. (2021, July 12). Met Police seize record £180m of cryptocurrency in money laundering investigation. *The Independent*. www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/cryptocurrency-money-laundering-met-police-london-b1883100.html
- 11 Rach, S. (2021, August 24). NCA protects 1m victims from cyber crime attacks. *Financial Times*. www.ftadviser.com/regulation/2021/08/24/nca-protects-1m-victims-from-cyber-crime-attacks/
- 12 Shuster, S., & Perrigo, B. (2021, January 7). Like, share, recruit: How a White-supremacist militia uses Facebook to radicalize and train new members. *TIME*. <https://time.com/5926750/azov-far-right-movement-facebook/>
- 13 Azov Battalion, see <https://azov.org.ua>
- 14 See, for instance, the Telegram groups @azov_recruiting, @polkazov, @MaksymZhorin.

3 White Supremacy

A Global Concern

The rise in power and prominence of the far right in the 2020s, mainly of White supremacist neo-Nazis, is an alarming phenomenon for liberalism and democracy worldwide, not only because radical far-right groups endanger democracy, but because they threaten to nullify the rights of migrants, Black people, Muslims, Jews, and all non-Whites in general – rights which, over the centuries, were gained through blood and tears. This chapter aims to raise the alert about the growing role of White supremacists in social and political spheres and provide a review of contemporary trends worldwide. I will also present a discussion of the pseudo-philosophical explanations of White supremacy – the social and political explanations and justifications that White supremacists employ in their quest for power and the way they legitimize themselves to appeal to less radical people. This chapter is significant to the argument of the entire book and to a thorough understanding of why the use and abuse of anonymous communications by White supremacists is socially dangerous.

The main message of this chapter is that White supremacy is becoming increasingly prominent in social life and in politics and that, by using anonymous communications, White supremacists are impacting the minds and hearts of others worldwide. They have created a segregated, hateful online community that has real effects on society and politics. Anonymous neo-Nazis disseminate propaganda and conspiracy theories with no borders to stop them. Sadly, this leads to radicalization and even acts of violence and terrorism by those who are sufficiently persuaded by this hateful propaganda. This chapter aims to answer the question of how significant White supremacy is in the 2020s. I will also present a brief review of the concepts of racism and antisemitism, which will help readers better understand the justifications of White supremacy and its growth over the years.

This chapter is presented in three main parts, excluding this short introduction and the concluding remarks. Methodologically, it is a historical and socio-political review of radical ideas and trends. The first part explains what White supremacy is in the broadest and most general way possible – it explains the phenomenon's core concepts and ideas. In essence, the idea of White supremacy is that White people of European descent are better than others – particularly Black people and Jews. Furthermore, White supremacists

argue that they should control – enslave – other people for the benefit of the White race or exterminate dangerous races such as the Jews. Thus, it is in the first part that I elaborate on the historical and social trends of antisemitism and racism.

The second part focuses on White supremacists' reasons and core arguments. This will prepare the reader to critically read the third part, which presents several case studies. The second part also presents the different types of groups that believe in and promote White supremacy and racism, including neo-Nazis, fascists, and those from the alternative right (the alt-right). This will show that the different far-right groups are essentially very similar in ideology and practice, a fact that also helps to explain the global appeal of similar extreme conspiracy theories, which are promoted using anonymity.

Lastly, the third part presents several case studies from different countries. Far-right parties and White supremacy are a growing trend in many countries worldwide, mainly in Europe, North America, Russia, and even Australia. Many countries were considered for this book; however, the selected cases represent countries with the largest user bases of common anonymous communications, and which are mostly White and Christian. Thus, after carefully reviewing information from the *Similar Web* service and data-usage analysis from the official Tor website, I narrowed the list down to the countries with the highest user numbers of Tor, Telegram, and Discord. These are the United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, and Ukraine. Significant use of anonymous communications was, of course, found in more countries – in the Netherlands, Canada, and Italy, for instance. However, to avoid overwhelming the reader and combining too many cases, only three are included in this chapter – the cases of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia.¹ The case of Russia was chosen rather than Ukraine because the Russian language is used and understood not only in Russia but in Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states such as Lithuania and Latvia, and throughout the Caucasus and Central Asia (though not by White Russians).

Significant numbers of Tor and Telegram users were also found in Arab and Asian countries, but these were excluded from this research for the simple reason that those from the Middle East and Asia are often the victims of Western White supremacy. Right-wing ideologies and nationalism do exist in Asian and Middle Eastern countries, including in the Jewish State of Israel; however, this book focuses solely on White supremacy and not extreme nationalism.

White Supremacy: Concepts of Racism and Antisemitism

What exactly is White supremacy? To answer this question and precisely define the term, I will present some basic concepts of racism and antisemitism. These are presented conceptually to highlight the main ideas and avoid excessive writing on the actual history of the social phenomena, which would be a topic for a separate book. According to the Anti-Defamation

League (ADL), *Encyclopedia Britannica*, George M. Fredrickson (2015), and Ibram X. Kendi (2016), White supremacy is a term used to describe a set of ideas and beliefs purporting that White people of lighter skin color, mainly those of European descent, are a superior human race from a genetic as well as a cultural perspective. Promoters of White supremacy commonly use the term “Aryan race” to describe themselves as people of European origin who are descendants of an Indo-European race – a separate, superior subrace of the Caucasian races. Furthermore, White supremacists such as Arthur de Gobineau, among others mentioned below, have argued that the White race originated from Adam and Eve (Gobineau, 1915, pp. 117–140). Mainly, White supremacists argue that White people are superior to people of other races, such as Asians, Slavs, Black people, Arabs, Jews, and any other racial or ethnic group. Those who believe in and promote the idea of White supremacy call for dominance over other races, either through enslavement or discrimination. In general, White supremacists strive for homogeneity – a society consisting solely of White people. In cases where co-existence is acceptable, they strive to dominate other races.²

White supremacy can be traced back to the 15th, 16th, and 17th centuries, when pseudo-scientific concepts about race and humanity emerged. Yet, unlike more simplistic racism, or common antisemitism, the concept of White supremacy became more popular in the largely White European society in the Age of Enlightenment, mainly because scientific or philosophical explanations began to be applied to every aspect of life, including discrimination. Although discrimination and antisemitism had been widely practiced throughout history, people from all social classes now sought to scientifically justify their deeds, especially regarding enslavement and colonialism (Fredrickson, 2015, pp. 16–48; Mosse, 2020, pp. 1–17, 71–84; Poliakov, 1982, pp. 55–64). Prominent promoters of White supremacy from the 19th, 20th, and 21st centuries include Arthur de Gobineau and Georges Vacher de Lapouge from France, who both studied anthropology and promoted ideas of racial superiority and eugenics; Alain de Benoist, Guillaume Faye, and Richard Wagner from Germany; and Adolf Hitler, who, sadly, needs no introduction (Mosse, 2020, pp. 1–17, 71–84, 136–156). German figures also include Carl Schmitt and, though still controversial, Martin Heidegger. John Hutchins Tyndall, former leader of the British National Front and later the British National Party, and American neo-Nazi and KKK Grand Wizard David Duke are other prominent figures in the world of White supremacy.³

White supremacy plays a significant role in racism and antisemitism. From a historical perspective, racism is a modern concept that has been shaped in recent centuries, since the birth of European colonialism in the 16th century and the birth of scientific racism in the 19th century, as mentioned above. There was little consciousness of racial differences before the 16th century, though certain examples can be quoted, such as the biblical story of Noah and Ham (Genesis 9:18–25; Fredrickson, 2015, pp. 16–48) or ancient Christian antisemitism (see Klein, 1984; Nicholls, 1995). Going further back,

Aristotle regarded the barbarians as slaves (Lewis, 1992, pp. 3–15). However, in ancient times the world was not as globalized as it is today, and different people or races had very few encounters with others. For instance, the Greco-Roman people and the Germanic barbarians were very similar in physical characteristics and had very little contact with races from Asia or Africa. When racism was present, ancient hate and antagonism were primarily motivated by cultural, religious, and linguistic differences; there was little interest in racial domination for the sake of the concept – the emphasis was on economic and military domination. Leaders wanted slaves; they did not mind what color their skin was (Allen, 2001, pp. 357–379; Snyder, 2001, pp. 91–97).

Racism is thus a modern concept that was shaped in the 15th, 16th, and 17th centuries, as previously mentioned. It was shaped by processes relating to European colonialism. In fact, as Ibram X. Kendi (2016, pp. 22–31) demonstrated, the colonial leader Prince Henry the Navigator of the Portuguese Empire encouraged the chronicler Gomes De Zurara to invent the concept of certain people's superiority over other types of people. This idea was invented to justify and promote colonialism and the slave trade. To help their businesses and achieve financial gain, European rulers promoted the idea that people from Africa were all inferior and barbaric (Fredrickson, 2015, pp. 16–48).⁴

Antisemitism, in contrast, is a much more ancient phenomenon than racism; it is as ancient as Judaism itself. Throughout history, Jews have been discriminated against, persecuted, and oppressed, even as early as Biblical times when, as described in the Book of Esther, Haman tried to commit genocide against the Jews of Persia in the 4th century BC. Jews have suffered from hatred since that time (and earlier) and up to the present day. Jews were not discriminated against because of their skin color or accent but rather because they promoted monotheism over polytheism and the divinity of humans such as emperors and kings. Later, after the crucifixion of Christ and the birth of a new type of Judaism – Christianity – they were persecuted because they competed with this new religion. Later, the birth of Islam caused similar persecutions. Islam, the new religion, wanted to quash any opposition (not only from Judaism but also from Christianity and non-monotheistic religions). Antisemitism was – and still is – very prominent in Europe; the minority status of the Jewish population caused them to be used as scapegoats. They were frequently blamed for social and economic problems such as inequality, poverty, crime, war, and even disease (Fox & Topor, 2021, pp. 64–90; Sacks, 2017, pp. 93–135).⁵

Jews were perceived to be inhuman, associated with the devil, and dispossessed from God's inheritance after failing to accept the true gospel and betraying Jesus. The fact that it was socially and politically more complex and that early Christianity had, in fact, been a sect within Judaism was disregarded (Nicholls, 1995, pp. 3–4, 209–210). For thousands of years, Jews were suspected of global domination and conspiracies against non-Jews,

mainly Christians (see Wistrich, 2010). A contemporary conspiracy theory and prejudice against Jews is that they, at least some of them, can “pass” as Whites and therefore covertly manipulate Christian Whites. White supremacists argue that White Ashkenazi Jews are dangerous as they can become double agents – a fifth column from within. They are perceived by White supremacists as a “faux-White” race that has tainted America, Europe, and the entire world (DiAngelo, 2018, pp. 16–18).⁶ As Topor recently exemplified, White supremacists have even blamed the Jews for spreading COVID-19.⁷

Racism and antisemitism are expressed as prejudice, discrimination, and violence. Prejudice, the mainstay of racism, takes the form of discrimination, ethnocentrism, favoritism, bias against a group, out-group derogation, social antagonism, stereotyping, and social distance. Prejudice can be defined as a negative attitude toward a certain group from another race, nationality, religion, gender, or even political ideology (Augoustinos & Reynolds, 2001, pp. 1–23; Fox & Topor, 2021). According to the ADL, “Racism is the belief that a particular race is superior or inferior to another, that a person’s social and moral traits are predetermined by his or her inborn biological characteristics. Racial separatism is the belief, most of the time based on racism, that different races should remain segregated and apart from one another.”⁸

To conclude this short description of the concepts of White supremacy, racism, and antisemitism, White supremacy is a set of ideas and beliefs that ascribe superiority to the White European race. More often than not, this White race is also Christian, though many White supremacists are pagan and purport to follow the ancient beliefs and religions of Nordic culture. White supremacy can be theoretically segmented into several ideas about race, religion, and culture. Yet in the 2020s these ideas have become mixed together, and you are very unlikely to stumble upon a White supremacist who has hateful or antagonistic feelings toward only Jews or only Black people. In general, White supremacists oppose everyone whose origin is “other” (see Erbschloe, 2020; Lavin, 2020).

White Supremacy in Far-Right Movements

In the 21st century, White supremacy is on the rise, following a period immediately after the Second World War and the downfall of Nazism when it was less palatable. The political expression of White supremacy can be found in far-right and nationalistic political parties and groups and in far-right leaders. Although racism and antisemitism do exist on the left side of politics as well, it is often covert, indirect, and more publicly acceptable; left-led racism often masquerades as an attempt to promote other human values – the leftists are just doing it wrong. Racism on the left can generally be found in people, not in ideas. On the contrary, leftist ideas often promote diversity and multiculturalism (Fox & Topor, 2021, pp. 152–163; Topor, 2018, 2021). After the end of the Second World War in 1945, democracy and liberalism prevailed in

Europe, the United States, and elsewhere; under the shadow of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, Europe promoted human rights. Yet, as the years went by, new generations and ideas changed the face of politics again.

In the United States, particularly after the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001, the American far right grew much stronger, promoting the rationale that protection of the homeland was required. Even though Muslims were a minority in the United States, they were collectively blamed for the wrongdoings of extreme Islamists. After 2001, Muslims suffered from disproportionately high levels of discrimination. This process is widely known as the securitization of Islam (SOI) (Cesari, 2009, pp. 19–37; Edmunds, 2012; Fox & Akbaba, 2015). This added to the existing hostile nature of some American groups such as the KKK that hold negative opinions about Muslims but also, and primarily, about Jews and Black, Latino, and Asian people (Beirich, 2021; Newton, 2005, pp. 3–22, 168–183; Smith, 1995). In the United States, many minority groups suffer from social processes and misconceptions similar to the SOI theory, such as the theories of criminalization or the racialization of crime (Hinton & Cook, 2021; Young, 2005). The American case is discussed in detail later in this chapter (Bonilla-Silva, 2001; Brewer & Heitzeg, 2008; Rios, 2007).

In Europe, the far right also grew stronger in the wake of terror attacks on the continent, adding to the existing presence of neo-Nazi and fascist communities in Germany, France, Italy, Greece, and Poland, among others. The major factor that pushed Europe rightwards in the 21st century was the migration crisis, which caused many social problems for both migrants and residents.⁹ Native Europeans, who are mostly White and Christian, were and still are those ruling Europe; they formed the vast majority in most European countries in 2021, excluding Albania. Thus, political leaders began promoting ideas favorable to the majority and began associating social problems such as crime and inequality with migrants. A survey from 2016 demonstrated that people on the right are more likely to have hostile attitudes toward immigration, although, at the time, the median share of immigrants in the population of ten European countries was 12.2 percent. Following the train of Machiavellian thought, alongside the history of antisemitism and racism in Europe, it is much easier to find a scapegoat and blame “outsiders” than to blame problematic domestic affairs (Sanders et al., 2017).¹⁰

In Russia, which was significantly influenced by Christian European culture throughout the centuries, particularly since the 18th century and the rule of Peter the Great (Peter I), Russians consumed and adopted a great deal of the traditional European antisemitism and racism. Russia, which was known as Kievan Rus’ at the time, adopted Christianity (from paganism) upon the baptism of Saint Olga in 957 and through the Christianization process spearheaded by her grandson Vladimir I Sviatoslavich, Vladimir the Great, in 988. In adopting Christianity, Russia not only embraced the good qualities but also the bad, including its hostility toward the Jewish people,

although White people from Kievan Rus' also discriminated against groups from other parts of the country that is today considered Russia. In fact, Jews were not even allowed to enter the Russian Empire east of the Pale of Settlement until the first partition agreement with Poland in 1772. In 1750, the European Enlightenment had taken firm root, and, as with Christianity, the Russians adopted the positive liberal and humanistic thinking of the Enlightenment but also the negative aspects, including pseudo-scientific racism. Thus, the idea of White Christian superiority was embedded in Russia even before the 19th century, before the publication of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* in 1903, and well before the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 20th century (Bushkovich, 2011, pp. 1–19, 37–58, 172–185). In the 21st century, as explained later in this chapter in the discussion of the Russian case, the idea of “Russianness” as a superior quality is perceived by many Russians to be valid, as their leaders emphasize the characteristics of the ruling majority (see Alapuro et al., 2012; Laryš & Mareš, 2011; Zakharov, 2015). Belikov (2003, pp. 38–39) estimated that, in the first decade of the 21st century, around 50,000 skinheads were active in Russia. Understanding race and racism in Russia, ex-Soviet nations, and Eastern Europe is crucial to understanding the dissemination of White supremacy worldwide, as is discussed and explained later in this chapter (Law & Zakharov, 2019; Zakharov, 2015).

Turning back to Europe, “populism” and appeal to the majority not only created a native “pure” group and a corrupt elite in the eyes of the majority but also led to officials being blamed for the migration crisis and the failed integration of mainly African and Arab migrants in local societies. Simultaneously, racists and antisemites began to blame the Jews for economic problems and terrorism, and even the migration crisis (Golder, 2016; Lazaridis et al., 2016, pp. 1–23, 239–272). In several European election campaigns in 2017, 2018, and 2019, far-right parties gained significant power. For instance, the far right gained over 20% of the votes in campaigns in Hungary, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, and Belgium, and over 10% of the votes in campaigns in Italy, Estonia, Spain, Finland, Sweden, France, the Netherlands, Germany, and the Czech Republic.¹¹ In the German general elections of September 2021, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party also gained over 10% of the votes.¹²

Racist people, even some in the political mainstream (to some extent), generally discriminate against Jews and blame them for everyday problems due to their belief in conspiracy theories against Jews (see Fox & Topor, 2021). What makes the European case interesting is that this hostile attitude toward Jews can be traced back centuries. The most prominent examples of populist antisemitism in Europe include former Viennese mayor Karl Lueger, a member of the Austrian Christian Social Party, who served in office from April 1897 until March 1910, and the Nazi leader Adolf Hitler, who ruled Germany between 1933 and 1945 (Boyer, 2010; Wistrich, 1983). Hostile attitudes can also be found in the history of the United States, though

proponents of racism and slavery had a European cultural and educational background. For instance, immediately after the American Civil War (1861–1865), the KKK was established in direct response to the Southern downfall. From 1866 to 1875, approximately 3,500 Black and poor White people were killed by Klansmen in the United States (Erbschloe, 2020, pp. 9–14; Seltzer & Lopes, 1986).

Far-right movements around the world differ from each other, as they do in Europe and the United States. This is particularly true in the 21st century due to the increase in social and political problems. These movements no longer focus solely on antisemitism or anti-Black racism but also on Islamophobia, anti-immigration sentiments, and anti-LGBTQ sentiments. In general, far-right movements are characterized by several ideological traits: extreme nationalism, ethnocentrism, anti-communism, anti-parliamentarism, anti-pluralism, militarism, law-and-order sentiments, demand for strong political leadership, anti-Americanism, and cultural pessimism (see Falter & Schumann, 1988; Merkl & Weinberg, 2003; Mudde, 1996).

Far-right movements take many shapes, from underground terrorist movements to more palatable and completely legal political parties. For instance, in Germany, the far-right AfD party is criticized for its hostile attitudes toward immigration and Muslims, yet it is much more widely accepted than other groups.¹³ In contrast, the German terror group known as “Gruppe S” was put on trial in late 2021 for planning attacks on migrants, Muslims, and even local politicians.¹⁴ Prior to the arrests of members of Gruppe S, German domestic intelligence managed to stop a plot to take over Germany by some of its own elite forces in the *Kommando Spezialkräfte* (KSK). These soldiers were preparing for the collapse of Germany – “X Day.” The rogue KSK company was disbanded, but extremism within the KSK and German military and intelligence in general has not yet been eradicated.¹⁵

Far-right extremism poses a great threat to democracy worldwide.¹⁶ In general, the archetype of far-right movements can be found in Italian Fascism or German Nazism. Each country and movement has a different focus based on its local characteristics. Yet there is an underlying idea and method common to all. The single idea common to the vast majority of far-right movements in Europe, the United States, Australia, and even Russia is White supremacy – an extreme version of ethnocentrism.¹⁷ As mentioned in the previous part of this chapter, White supremacy is a set of ideas and beliefs that ascribe superiority to the White race. The method common to all movements is scapegoating – finding another group to blame. Karl Lueger famously said, “I decide who is a Jew!” Lueger pointed out that “a Jew” was merely a scapegoat upon whom society’s miseries could be cast (Wistrich, 1983). Today, in the 21st century, Black people and Muslims are the Jews of the United States, Muslims and other foreign immigrants are the Jews of Europe, and, when they are blamed for the COVID-19 pandemic, Asian people become the Jews worldwide.

Explanations and Arguments of White Supremacy

Why is White supremacy on the rise? Does it arise out of pure hatred, or is there a rational foundation for some of its core concepts that might make sense not only to radical followers but to the mainstream as well? To answer these questions, it is necessary to understand the current reasoning of White supremacists worldwide – the explanations and justifications for their ideology. The specific justifications for White supremacy in each case study are detailed in the next part of this chapter. However, a general outline of the ideas behind White supremacy is offered here, before the detailed case studies, to serve as a guideline (See Topor, 2022). This guide to understanding the arguments of White supremacists in the 21st century will help the reader understand the case studies in the next part and will, as further explained throughout this book, begin to demonstrate why White supremacists from different parts of the world support each other, even when these nationalistic groups should logically be enemies. Americans might not adore Russians, and Western Europeans might not admire Eastern Europeans, but, as Hanna Arendt (2006, pp. 154–155) pointed out in the early sixties when reporting on Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem, although there were great differences between the antisemites in various countries, and although Germans may have regarded people from further east, such as Ukrainians, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, or Romanians, as subhuman, antisemitism was the ideological glue that held them all together, as White supremacy does today.

How, then, do White supremacists explain their ideologies and actions? White supremacists from all over the world, even those from countries that have historically been hostile to each other, maintain and disseminate five main explanations for their hatred and discrimination: (1) They argue that one religion is superior to others (Fox & Topor, 2021, pp. 64–90); (2) they argue that one race is superior to others (Allen, 2001, pp. 357–379; Gobineau, 1915, pp. 117–140; Snyder, 2001, pp. 91–97); (3) they argue that one culture is superior to others (Fredrickson, 2015, pp. 16–48); (4) they argue for protectionism – they must discriminate to protect themselves from terror, as in the case of the securitization of Islam, or from criminal activity, in the case of Black people and immigrants (Cesari, 2009, pp. 19–37; Hinton & Cook, 2021; Young, 2005). They argue that they are not racists or extremists, they must merely protect their own group from an alleged “White Genocide” – a systematic liquidation of the White race (Moses, 2019; Weisman, 2018, p. 3). (5) Lastly, when pushed to their limit, especially in the United States, they present the argument of freedom of speech – they are entitled to think and speak as they wish (Bleich, 2011, pp. 3–13; Glass, 1978; Kretzmer, 1986, p. 445). Yet, as I will demonstrate shortly, freedom of speech often crosses the line to incitement of violence. In the following paragraphs, the concepts and reasons behind these arguments are further laid out, without reference to specific cases.

The first argument is that of religion. Historically, reasons for hatred and discrimination date back further than modern racism. As previously

mentioned, although people in the ancient world did engage in conflicts, massacres, and enslavement, these were for the purpose of gaining power, not to prove the supremacy of one skin color over another. Moreover, although ethnocentrism was indeed present in the ancient world, it was used by groups of people to promote themselves in a utilitarian manner. Groups of pagan or polytheistic believers argued that their gods were better or stronger than others, leading to conflict between different groups. However, with the emergence of Judaism and its monotheistic approach, the hostilities escalated. The ancient Israelites, believers in a single God, were perceived as competitors by polytheistic believers. Then, with the emergence of the Christian sect within Judaism, Christianity was argued to be a replacement or better version of Judaism. After the crucifixion of Christ, Jews were further persecuted by Christians and pressured to convert to Christianity. Several centuries later, when Islam emerged in Mecca, Muslims perceived both Christians and Jews as rivals. Thus, they began to pressure Jews and Christians to convert to Islam. In short, each religion perceived itself as superior and other belief systems as inferior.

The second argument is biological. With the emergence of Enlightenment, the Age of Reason, science became a prominent social agent. Scientific facts and philosophical arguments caught the public's attention, at times at the expense of their religious beliefs. One of the most significant scientific theories is Darwinism, named after its creator Charles Darwin. Darwinism states that species of organisms develop and evolve through a process of natural selection – that is, stronger or better groups of organisms survive while weaker ones vanish. As such theories emerged while European colonialism was thriving, Darwinism and eugenics were also applied to the human race. In Europe, Darwinism merged with traditional prejudices against Jews. Thus, the ideology emerged that White Christian Europeans were superior to Jews and all non-White people under colonial rule. Naturalists and anthropologists such as Arthur de Gobineau and Georges Vacher de Lapouge and politicians such as Karl Lueger and Adolf Hitler promoted the argument that the White, or Aryan, race was superior and should therefore rule – or, as Hitler attempted, exterminate – all other races. The biological argument thus merged with the traditional religious argument.

The third argument is related to culture – that is, the idea that some cultures are superior to others as they have progressed further and become better. This is a “light” version of biological ethnocentrism. Those who espouse it suggest that European culture is superior to other cultures and reject multiculturalism. In our context, the “superior” European culture is based either on the Greco-Roman or the Scandinavian culture. The argument of cultural superiority evolved not only from the Ancient Roman view of outsiders as uncivilized or primitive “barbarians” but also from the progress of colonialism and imperialism. Thus, the cultures of lesser quality were those from Africa, Asia, South America, and the Middle East. In the 21st century, the argument of cultural superiority has merged with the biological and religious arguments. Foreign interventions, modern-day imperialism, and

even religious missions to convert people around the world can be regarded as expressions of cultural superiority. Nevertheless, it must be noted that a conviction of religious and cultural superiority is not just a Western sin – extreme promoters of Islam, for instance, attempt to convert people to Islam and, in extreme cases, even murder those who reject the religion.

The fourth argument is based on protectionism – that is, the idea that a certain group of people is endangering another group; the idea that a hostile race of attackers, in the broadest sense, is harming a victim group. In the context of White supremacy, the victims are White people, while the attackers might be anyone else – Muslim terrorists, Black drug dealers, or Jewish conspirators plotting global domination. Those who embrace this argument suggest that the White race is in danger of attack and must therefore defend itself. This argument is the most palatable to people with less extreme views. While some might consider the religious, biological, or cultural arguments irrelevant or insignificant, the argument of protectionism can induce people to adopt a more extreme political mindset. This is where extreme ideologies encroach on mainstream society. To further elaborate on this argument, a question must be asked: What do White supremacists want to protect? The answer is simple: themselves – White Christian people (Cesari, 2009, pp. 19–37; Hinton & Cook, 2021; Moses, 2019; Weisman, 2018, p. 3; Young, 2005; Smith & King, 2021). For instance, in a 2019 interview with *Deutsche Welt*, Simone Capradossi, an Italian Northern League (*Lega Nord*) supporter, said, “What he doesn’t get is that I’m not a racist. I only have something against the criminals who come to my homeland.”¹⁸

Thus, when a significantly White country suffers from crime, corruption, economic problems, or war, many of its citizens choose to blame a scapegoat, an outsider, since it is easier to blame others for our problems. Lueger used this strategy, as did Hitler. Jews are frequently accused of conspiring against White Christian people through economic fraud or the promotion of unnecessary wars. Other examples, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, include the securitization of Islam and the racialization of crime – theories that can be classified as protectionist arguments since it is only natural to defend against these outside threats. This type of argument has greater mainstream appeal because it sounds less overtly racist. For instance, those who promote this argument claim they are not anti-Muslim but merely need to protect their country from an ongoing war with extreme Islamists, and if the borders were closed to Muslims, they would not need to persecute Muslims. They also claim that they are not anti-Black but merely need to protect White people and White neighborhoods from the criminal activities Black people engage in; if Black people would stay away from White neighborhoods, no anti-Black actions would need to be taken. This, of course, would lead right back to segregation, discrimination, and inequality. However, those who uphold this argument forget, ignore, or neglect the fact that only a small fraction of Muslims engage in terrorism and that only a small number of Black people engage in crime – not to mention that White people engage in both. Those

who argue for protectionism forget events like the Centennial Olympic Park bombing or people like serial killer Ted Bundy.

The fifth argument is that of freedom of speech. White supremacists who argue their religious, biological, or cultural superiority or who argue that they are merely protecting the White race from outsiders often use the freedom of speech argument as a last resort, especially in the United States, where it is a constitutional right, but also in most democratic countries in Europe. White supremacists claim that, even if some people oppose their ideology and arguments, they have the right to think and say whatever they wish. Freedom of speech and expression is indeed an important democratic right. Yet, in this case, the argument is used fraudulently. White supremacists want freedom for themselves while calling for the freedoms of others to be restricted. Furthermore, words do lead to actions, and extreme public expressions encourage other extremists to commit terror and crime. This process of radicalization is the focus of Chapter 6.

Ironically, however, it is the main idea behind each argument that nullifies it. For instance, the religious argument can be spun in any direction. Jews can always claim that their religion is the original monotheistic religion, while Muslims can claim that, as the world's fastest-growing religion, Islam is superior.¹⁹ The biological argument does not stand up to scrutiny either. If the White race is indeed superior to other races, how can White supremacists explain occasions when Black people defeat White people – in sports competitions, for instance? Yet White supremacists use this logic to defend their call to enslave or exterminate other races. However, applying similar logic, should other races not enslave White people if they lose sports competitions? Arguments of cultural superiority are similar to arguments of religious superiority and often amount to a struggle between collective rights and individual rights (Kukathas, 1998; Kymlicka, 1995).

Arguments based on protectionism are also incorrect. Presumably, White supremacists use such arguments to make their racism seem data-driven and reasonable, as was historically attempted with scientific racism. They are easy to disprove, however. For instance, in 2019 the American Office for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) published information about the frequency of criminal offenses among American juveniles and young adults. Of the 10,085,210 offenses recorded, White people committed 7,014,550 million, while Black people committed 2,667,010 offenses, American Indians 244,200 offenses, and Asians only 159,450 offenses. Furthermore, the commonly cited example of drug use, which is frequently used in White supremacist circles and even some mainstream circles, is also incorrect. Information from the OJJDP shows that White people have committed 1,109,600 offenses relating to drug abuse, while Black people have committed only 406,940. Logically, the majority population will almost exclusively be responsible for any problematic social issue or behavior.²⁰ Yet, since it is not “popular” and can even be difficult to hold the majority accountable for social problems, many nationalists and populists

blame minorities. This, of course, is the reason Jews have been scapegoated for thousands of years (see Fox & Topor, 2021).

Lastly, White supremacists, especially in the United States and under the protective umbrella of the First Amendment, defend their position by appealing to their freedom of speech – they can say and argue whatever they desire. But there is a catch. In the American case, White supremacists can indeed argue whatever they desire; however, they cannot call for action or incite violence. Under the US Code, Title 18, solicitation to riot or commit a crime of violence is illegal.²¹ And, since many White supremacists fail to draw a line between theoretical arguments and actual calls to action, they are acting illegally. Researchers and activists argue that radical speech and literature play a significant role in inciting people to commit crimes and terror offenses against minorities and even the government, especially in the United States (Bleich, 2011, pp. 3–13; Glass, 1978; Kretzmer, 1986, p. 445; Lowe, 2020; Topor, 2019a).²² Furthermore, White supremacists use the freedom of speech argument in a utilitarian, hypocritical manner since they also call for the enslavement of and discrimination against others, which would restrict this very same right for minorities. Essentially, White supremacists advocate for freedom of speech to be applied only to them.

White Supremacy Worldwide: Global, Not Local

The final part of this chapter presents and discusses several significant case studies of countries in which White supremacy is on the rise and in which there is significant usage of anonymous communication platforms such as Tor, Telegram, Discord, and others. I focus here on the cases of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia, but I also include other examples. Countries such as Germany, France, Ukraine, Poland, the Netherlands, Canada, and Italy are also significant in terms of rising populism and the use of anonymous communications but have been excluded for reasons of length and focus. The cases are presented as a historical and political summary of significant events and concepts but should not be regarded as standalone historical reviews, as they are incomplete and lack comprehensive historical depth. However, in combination, they are meant to give the reader a sense of the way White supremacy is promoted globally – that is, as has already been mentioned, the fact that White supremacy is not a local or national but a global phenomenon.

As I demonstrate in the following pages, White supremacy cannot be equated with local nationalism or even extreme nationalism such as fascism. It is a global ideology common to many people worldwide. It is a shared ideology that joins even adversaries or societies that have not always seen eye to eye. Capitalist or communist, from the East or the West – it does not matter, as long as you are White. Americans, Ukrainians, and Russians, for instance. The core ideology of White supremacy is not connected with modern-day borders; people across the world endorse racism, antisemitism, anti-Muslim attitudes, and the idea that the White race is the best. The

findings of this chapter shed light on the reasons for White supremacists to adopt the internet and specifically anonymous communications. The internet and anonymity help them spread their propaganda, communicate with each other regardless of local restrictions, and manage their communities. Thus, in the 21st century, the spread of White supremacy and the spread of the internet have gone hand in hand. Building on this context, the Nazi migration to the dark web is explained in detail in Chapter 4.

White Supremacy in the United States of America

The United States was founded on the principles of equality and freedom – that all men were created equal. However, in the early years of the nation, non-White people were discriminated against, persecuted, subjected to all kinds of violence, and, in many cases, killed. White European men established the federal entity after several hundred years of colonization experience. Native Americans and “imported” Black people were enslaved, serving as both an economic resource and a social burden. Religious, biological, and cultural arguments were employed to discriminate against Black people, other non-Whites, and non-Christians, and, in recent years, these were joined by arguments of protectionism. The various argument types were interlaced with each other; whenever one argument was refuted, another was brought up. White supremacists argued that the White race was superior to other races, especially the Black race. They further argued that even if Black people had been racially equal, they were culturally inferior. And, finally, even if Black people were racially and culturally equal to Whites, they were the descendants of Ham, the biblical figure, and, as such, doomed to suffer and be enslaved. Similar arguments were applied to the Jews, who were considered corrupt and duplicitous (Allen, 2001, pp. 357–379; Fredrickson, 2015, pp. 16–48; Miles, 1999, pp. 344–355; Snyder, 2001, pp. 91–97; Wistrich, 2010). As Song (2001) demonstrated for Asian Americans, however, Asians (and, in this context, Jews) possess more options to be less foreign and whiter, while African Americans do not have this social “benefit.”

White supremacists in the United States perceive themselves as racially, culturally, and religiously superior to other people. They also want to bring back older, less liberal, and less democratic rules – a confederate order – as their privilege was eroded in three landmark events. First, immediately after the American Civil War (1861–1865), the KKK was established; this was a direct response to the fact that the Confederacy (South) had lost, but also to the fact that White privilege had been taken away from them. Between 1866 and 1875 an estimated 3,500 Black and poor White people were killed by Klansmen (Erbschloe, 2020, pp. 9–14). Later, between the end of the Reconstruction in 1877 and the Civil Rights Movement, the Southern states managed to develop and enforce a system of racial segregation through the Jim Crow laws.²³ The White sense of superiority over others is an important concept that was brought up again in the 1960s and 1970s. The second landmark event was when the accomplishments of

the Civil Rights Movement took more White privilege away from White supremacists and further promoted equality among United States citizens (Bonilla-Silva, 2001; Byman, 2021; Seltzer & Lopes, 1986; Smith, 1995, pp. 37–52; Tischauser, 2012). On July 2, 1964, the United States passed the Civil Rights Act, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.²⁴

The third landmark event that eroded White privilege was the election of the first Black president, Barack Obama, in 2008. His election did not change racial trends in American society, nor did it absolve the United States of its racist history.²⁵ However, the fact that minorities, specifically Black people, gained more political power and social legitimacy among White Americans exemplified to White supremacists that action should be taken against egalitarianism to prevent further erosion of White privilege. Barack Obama's election provoked a rise in hate crimes against ethnic minorities, with hundreds of abuse and intimidation incidents reported immediately following the election results on November 4.²⁶ According to the ADL, 14 hate incidents were reported between 2006 and 2007. This number jumped to 62 from 2008 to 2009. The incidence of anti-Black violence has only worsened since then. Overall, between 2002 and early 2020, 12,441 hate incidents were reported. Of this number, 5,258 were directly associated with White supremacy.²⁷

The landmark events through which the erosion of White rights occurred may seem disconnected from each other. Indeed, the social forces and social trends before, during, and after each landmark event were different and unique, and generations of people have passed since then. However, in each of these cases, minorities, especially Black people, gained social acceptance and legitimacy, support, and rights. While the situation of this non-White group improved, White supremacists considered themselves to be under pressure. They perceived the situation as a zero-sum game. Furthermore, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva's arguments and findings (2001, 2006) showed that White supremacists (and even some of the mainstream White population) felt they had to act to preserve their economic, political, social, and cultural stake. In recent years, White supremacists have claimed that there is an ongoing "White Genocide" against them – an onslaught of genetically or culturally inferior non-White interlopers driving them to extinction. Like German Nazis, and now neo-Nazis, American White supremacists want to preserve a "pure" White race (Erbschloe, 2020; Weisman, 2018, pp. 1–3).²⁸ Robert Bowers, the White supremacist who went on a shooting spree and attacked the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh on October 27, 2018, posted his hate online months before the massacre. Bowers called immigrants "invaders" and said that "Jews were the enemy of white people." His final message spoke of the perceived White genocide: "I can't sit by and watch my people get slaughtered. Screw your optics, I'm going in."²⁹

In 2018, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) tracked the locations of 1,020 White supremacy-related hate groups across America. New York, one of the most diverse places in the United States, had 47 hate groups.

California had 83. In 2000, the SPLC tracked 599 hate groups, most of them clustered in the eastern parts of the United States. The SPLC categorized each hate group according to its ideology; however, the reality is much more complex, and many hate ideas interlace.³⁰ Mass Resistance, ACT for America, Soldiers of Odin, Asatru Folk Assembly, American Guard, Knights of the KKK, League of the South, Atomwaffen Division, The Daily Stormer, Blood and Honor, Crew 38, Firm 22, Golden State Skin Heads, American Freedom Party, Identity Evropa, Patriot Front, and The Right Stuff are all White supremacy, neo-Nazi, and anti-immigrant hate groups.³¹

In recent years, especially around the time President Donald J. Trump ran for office, many White supremacists enhanced their protectionism-based arguments. They began to promote racism in a more subtle and palatable manner to stay politically legitimate and draw people from the mainstream toward the far right. This variation on the “Southern Strategy”³² attracted votes from both marginal and mainstream White voters in the United States, as they did not want to be associated with overt violence and oppression but sought to promote White rights by diminishing the rights of others. Though protectionism arguments are indeed more subtle, they covertly and indirectly promote racism and antisemitism. This “New Racism,” which is often based on liberal or subtle stances, as Marin Barker argued (1981), is highly attractive to mainstream voters.

Over time, in the United States and elsewhere, racism has adapted so that modern norms, values, policies, and practices result in similar outcomes as in the past while not appearing to be explicitly racist. American White supremacy is a form of aversive racism. It is ambivalent, complex, and commonly appealing – the case it makes for defending the nation from crime, terrorism, and economic inequality cannot be logically rejected by others (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986, 2000). As Federico Finchelstein (2017, pp. 247–256) argued in *From Fascism to Populism in History*, contemporary fascism and racism (which he describes as populism) evolved out of fascism after 1945 and express the same energies and impulses in a way that has been repackaged or adapted for more democratic times. The argument of protectionism appears to be one of their most efficient arguments. White supremacy now attracts support from the mainstream as well – protectionism just makes sense.³³

In recent years, expressions of White supremacy, racism, and xenophobia have mainly taken the form of anti-immigration arguments. Right-wing parties have enjoyed electoral gains in many Western European countries – not just in the United States, where President Donald J. Trump was elected in 2016. Right-wing and radical-right populist parties oppose immigration (mainly from Muslim countries in Europe and Hispanic and Muslim countries in the United States) and oppose multiculturalism, as they feel that it undermines their own race and culture, similar to the way the Third Reich perceived non-Aryans to be less or inhuman (Akkerman & Hagelund, 2007; Brown, 2013; Scales-Trent, 2001).

As mentioned, some American White supremacists (and others worldwide) claim that they are not racists at all but protectionists. Some even

claim that non-Whites should live outside of the United States, as American soil should be reserved for White Christian Americans. A well-known justification of the White supremacy movement's prejudice and discrimination in the United States regards Muslims. In the wake of 9/11, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the rise of Jihadi extremism as well as the Islamic State (ISIS), Islam has been brought to the forefront of the political debate. Many in the United States perceive Muslims to be a security threat. Fox and Akbaba (2015) have suggested that Muslims suffer from higher levels of discrimination than other religious minorities, especially since 2001. This securitization of Islam is constructed around a perceived Islamist threat and the promotion of actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure that require the commitment of greater resources. It has been translated into new political discourses, institutions, state policies, and societal behaviors toward foreigners, regardless of whether the threat is actual or imaginary. To put it simply, White supremacists think that all Muslims are terrorists and should thus be banned from entering the country (Balzacq, 2010; Cesari, 2009; Edmunds, 2012). For instance, during Trump's term, he attempted to ban Muslims from entering the United States entirely, suggesting that it was an act of self-defense since they (Muslims) hate Americans: "I think Islam hates us."³⁴

Muslims, Black people, Latinos, Jews, and Middle Eastern and Asian people all face similar processes of the securitization, criminalization, or racialization of crime in the United States. Black people and Latinos are overrepresented as perpetrators of crime (Omi & Winant, 2014, pp. 111–112; Rios, 2007, pp. 17–33).³⁵ This social process in which crime is racialized is also promoted as a non-racist, reasonable, pro-human-rights justification of discrimination. The racialization of crime seems perfectly natural to White supremacists, and even many mainstream White Americans, due to extensive and disproportionate media coverage and a biased criminal justice system (Brewer & Heitzeg, 2008).³⁶ An extreme right-wing example of this is the White supremacy website Daily Stormer. The site has a special section called "Race War," which lists only non-White crimes with an emphasis on Black and Latino criminals and White female, young, or elderly victims.³⁷ The mainstream manifestations of this process are, as mentioned, disproportionate media coverage, a biased criminal justice system, and the acceptance of radical rhetoric by public figures, such as Donald J. Trump's remarks on non-White people.³⁸

White supremacists claim that this is not racism but logic and protection – that is, they are protecting their home from terrorism and crime. Since that is the case, killing sprees and xenophobic violence are legitimized and become "understandable," just as radical leftists legitimize terror and antisemitism by appealing to radical anti-colonialism and pro-Palestinian solidarity (Topor, 2021). In an interview in late 2017, *The Guardian's* Gary Younge spoke to White supremacist Richard B. Spencer, who argued that "the ethnos ... is an ideal that it would be a state for all people of the White race, it would be our homeland, it would be our safe space." Spencer suggested that Whites

are not safe among others.³⁹ In another example from August 2019, Patrick Wood Crusius from Texas, then 21 years old, went on a shooting spree and murdered 22 people in an attempt to harm the Latino and Hispanic population in the United States, which he perceived as harmful. As described later in this book, he had been radicalized by online content, some of which appeared on regular and anonymous platforms.⁴⁰

As further discussed in the next chapter, on extremists' migration to the online domain, many American White supremacists are vociferous in their arguments for free speech, as some extreme activists have been deplatformed and banned from the online world, their posts deleted by social media moderators. Some have even been permanently blocked from major social networks, such as Facebook and Twitter. At the "Demand Free Speech" rally, online activist and White supremacist Milo Yiannopoulos demanded that the Federal government intervene and protect free speech and the First Amendment.⁴¹ White supremacists argue that these actions by social networks undermine the First Amendment and that, even if some oppose their ideology, it does not represent an act of violence but a competing narrative.⁴²

White Supremacy in the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom was once one of the foremost colonial powers. Thus, when addressing the topic of racism in the United Kingdom, one must take into account not only the fact that it consists mainly of White Christian people but also that it was once a great colonial (imperial) power. In fact, British influence can even compete, in soft power if not in hard power, with contemporary powers such as the United States, Russia, China, Germany, and France (McCourt, 2014; Morris, 2011).⁴³ It is important to note that, when I refer to the United Kingdom in this section, I refer to England and Wales. In the United States, many White supremacists sought to control other races for local benefits, and racism was commonly associated with far-right movements and the Confederacy. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, put a great deal of effort into controlling people and resources overseas, and racism, or prejudice at the very least, was common not only on the right but in general society. In fact, racism in the United Kingdom was not only aimed at those who had been colonized, such as Black, Latin, Arab or Asian people, but also toward Jews and the Irish (Fox & Topor, 2021, pp. 142–163; Ghail, 2000; Solomos, 1993, pp. 38–51). David Hume's social division between White and Black people in his 1777 essay "Of National Character" hints at a colonialist and imperialistic approach: "I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the whites" (Hume & Miller, 1985, essay XXI). This, as previously mentioned in this chapter, aligns with European thoughts on supremacy espoused by Arthur de Gobineau, Georges Vacher de Lapouge, Karl Lueger, Richard Wagner, and eventually Adolf Hitler (Mosse, 2020, pp. 1–17, 71–84, 136–156).

Interestingly, discrimination and xenophobia in the United Kingdom date back to well before its rise as a global colonial power. One of the first well-documented instances of hostility toward other people in the United Kingdom took place in Norwich in 1144, when Thomas of Monmouth, a Benedictine Monk, investigated the case of a dead body found on the outskirts of Norwich. With no conclusive evidence, he invented the story that Jews had killed a Christian man to assist their alleged magic and spells as they prepared for Easter. At the time, the most common motivation for discrimination against Jews was religious antisemitism. The first recorded Jewish settlement in the United Kingdom dates to 1070, but by 1290 all Jews had been expelled from the United Kingdom. They were not allowed to return until 1656 as “non-Protestant citizens,” just as the British Empire began to establish its colonial presence. The Abolition of the Slave Trade Act was enacted in 1807, and the Slave Emancipation Act was passed in 1833 and came into force on August 1, 1834. Black, Indian, Asian, and other slaves throughout the British Empire became free at that moment, though in practice they were treated poorly for the remainder of the 19th century (Fox & Topor, 2021, pp. 142–148; Rawley & Behrendt, 2005, pp. 129–147).⁴⁴

Thus, from 1656 Jews could enter the United Kingdom, and in 1834 slavery was no longer legal in the British Empire (though it was still practiced). This parliamentary progress did not, however, abolish racism or prejudice against non-English or non-Christian men and women. In 1919, after the First World War, riots took place across Britain, partly because troop mobilization had caused significant changes to the labor market. However, these were not the ordinary riots of working and unemployed men and women, the riots were racist. As riots spread across Britain, claims that foreigners were “stealing” jobs from Anglo-Saxon people emerged. Other claims included accusations of inter-racial consorting or miscegenation, as Black and Arab men were accused of taking advantage of White Anglo-Saxon women. In some places, such as Liverpool and Cardiff, Black people were murdered by the angry British mob (Evans, 1994; Jenkinson, 1987; Rowe, 2000).⁴⁵ In the same year, race riots also took place in the United States, mainly in Chicago, partly for similar reasons and because the increase in the Black population made White people more aware of the racial presence (Sandburg, 2013, pp. 3–11).

Another significant agent of White supremacy, a direct agent, was the sympathetic attitude toward fascism in some British circles, not just on the far right but also on the left. Between the First World War and the Second World War, fascism and even empathy for Nazism and Adolf Hitler were common within British society. The British fascist Oswald Mosley served as a Member of Parliament (MP) in the 1920s and 1930s. Following his defeat and lack of trust in British politics, Mosley believed that only fascism could socially and politically “fix” Britain after the First World War. By 1932, Mosley was describing Italy’s Mussolini as a man whose mind was hard, concentrated, direct, and modern. In fascism, Mosley saw the greatest constructive and revolutionary creed in the world, and he thoroughly approved

of Nazism and Hitler's actions in Germany. Thus, with Mussolini's policies and Hitler's organizational structure in mind, Oswald Mosley established the British Union of Fascists in September 1932. In the context of this book, what matters is not the structural organization of Mosley's vision but its essence of nationalism, ethnocentrism, and racism. Mosley's supporters blamed the Jews for dragging Britain into unnecessary wars. In 1936, in a series of clashes in the East End of London known as "The Battle of Cable Street," Oswald Mosley and his "Blackshirts," or militiamen, accompanied by British police for protection, attempted to walk through neighborhoods dominated by Jews, Irish people, communists, and other migrants. On October 6, 1936, the people of Cable Street and other supporters blocked the fascists and denied them access, shouting, "They shall not pass." After that moment, Mosley's Blackshirts gradually lost momentum (Brewer, 1984, pp. 104–113; Cross, 1961; Goodwin, 2011, pp. 19–25; Thurlow, 1998; Topor, 2018; Wistrich, 2011; Worley, 2011).

After Britain fought Germany and Italy in the Second World War, support for fascism and Nazism gradually declined. Fascists like Mosley could no longer find support for fascism while their country was battling the same forces – it was not politically rational. Following the Battle of Cable Street, Britain passed the Public Order Act. This passed into law on January 1, 1937, and prohibited military-style demonstrations and the use of uniforms in demonstrations. Eventually, Mosley's British Union of Fascists was dissolved in 1940 (Thurlow, 1998).⁴⁶ However, the Second World War and the decline of the fascist movement did not abolish racism in the United Kingdom. In fact, it was not until December 8, 1965, that the Race Relations Act 1965 came into force, banning racial discrimination in public places and making it an offense to promote hatred on the grounds of "colour, race, or ethnic or national origins."⁴⁷ In 2000, the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 came into force, requiring the police and other public authorities, such as colleges and universities, to promote racial equality.⁴⁸

Yet even the political and social shift toward equality and tolerance in the United Kingdom in the 20th century did not abolish racism. It was, and is, still present – though racism, antisemitism, and White supremacy can at times be more subtle in the United Kingdom than they are in the United States, Germany, or Italy. Extreme events have, however, taken place in the United Kingdom. In June 2016, a White supremacist named Thomas Mair shot and stabbed British MP Jo Cox to death while shouting "Britain First," referring to the 2016 referendum about British and European relations that eventually led to the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union (Brexit). Mair claimed that Cox was a collaborator who was allowing other races into the United Kingdom. The White race, Mair once wrote, was about to be plunged into "a very bloody struggle." Mair was later sentenced to life in prison after the judge ruled that Mair had acted "to advance a cause associated with Nazism" (Jackson, 2019; Jones, 2019).⁴⁹

Although the murder of MP Jo Cox was a unique occurrence, a survey conducted by the University of Oxford's Migration Observatory found that

44% of Britons would like immigration to be reduced. Immigration was considered Britain's most important issue from 2001 to mid-2016. While the report suggests that British attitudes prioritize job skills over race and ethnicity, Black people from Nigeria were perceived by most participants as "more culturally distant," while White people from countries such as Australia were preferred.⁵⁰ While migration issues were not the sole catalyst for Brexit, Arnorsson and Zoega (2018) did highlight the fact that interaction with other races, Muslims, immigrants in general, and even with homosexual people affected attitudes toward the issue. In fact, as Virdee and McGeever (2018) discovered, the referendum and Brexit itself highlighted the relationship between identity and power. Thus, the "Englishness" of people was a significant topic promoted by those who voted to leave the European Union – as if to claim that English people were not European. Yet, it would be wrong to solely associate nationalistic and interracial relations with Brexit since issues of economy, trade, and sovereignty had a more significant effect on convincing people to vote to leave the European Union (Benson & Lewis, 2019).⁵¹

Even after Brexit, White supremacy maintained a significant presence in the United Kingdom. The director of the British MI5, Ken McCallum, said teenagers are drawn into extreme online activities. McCallum argued that right-wing terrorism was "here to stay" and that the origin of racism and extremism was local. McCallum emphasized that it was important to look deeply into the British case from within instead of blaming foreign forces for disinformation campaigns against Britain.⁵² Shuker and Topor (2021) also highlighted that foreign disinformation campaigns are not invented by foreign powers "out of nowhere" but rather focus and enhance extreme issues that can lead to rifts in society. In May 2022, the BBC revealed that even MI5 is not impervious to extremism as one of their employees, while allegedly working on secretive things, came under investigation after terrorizing and harassing his partner. The investigation discovered that he had Nazi propaganda in his house, expressed affection for White supremacy, and had praised various White supremacist mass murderers while stating that he planned to carry out similar acts. The BBC mentioned he had written about killing Jews in his private diary.⁵³

To conclude this section about the United Kingdom, in 2021 British Prime Minister Boris Johnson said:

I do think that racism is a problem in the United Kingdom, and I believe it needs to be tackled, and it needs to be stamped out with some of the means that I've described this morning. Last night I met representatives of Facebook, of Twitter, of TikTok, of Snapchat, of Instagram, and I made it absolutely clear to them that we will legislate to address this problem in the Online Harms Bill, and unless they get hate and racism off their platforms, they will face fines amounting to 10% of their global revenues.⁵⁴

White Supremacy in Russia

Even before the era of the Soviet Union, racism in Russia was an interesting phenomenon, not only because Russia did not vigorously take part in the global trends of colonialism and slavery (that is, in a European manner) but also because Russians, mainly descendants of the Kievan Rus' and the Rurik dynasty that established its power in Novgorod around 862, had long been in a love-hate relationship with the peoples surrounding them. Throughout Russian history, specifically from the late 9th century onwards, the Russians have been in conflict with the peoples and tribes around them, balancing their priorities between Caucasian, Tatar, Central Asian, and Mongolian tribes, and later between Eastern and Western European peoples and nations. In 957 Saint Olga was baptized, and in 988 Saint Vladimir I, her grandson, formally introduced Christianity to the Russian people. Russia converted to Christianity from paganism, and, with Christianity, Russia adopted anti-semitism as well, though a certain amount of anti-Jewish discrimination had been present even before this. From that point onwards, even through Soviet times, Russia was home to severe antisemitism, including the dissemination of one of the world's most well-known conspiracy theories to date, *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, as well as pogroms organized by Imperial Russia in present-day Ukraine and Poland in the late 19th century. In fact, for hundreds of years, Jews were not allowed to settle in Russia, from the times of Kievan Rus' until the first partition agreement with Poland in 1772. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Jews were allowed to live in the Pale of Settlement near Russia but not to enter it. This Pale of Settlement consisted mostly of modern-day Belarus, Ukraine, Poland, Moldova, and Lithuania (Bushkovich, 2011, pp. 1–19, 37–58, 172–185; Weinerman, 1994).

In Russia, Christianity was perceived as the new and only true religion. In 1480, in the famous standoff between Ivan III and Ahmed bin Küchük (Akhmat Khan), one of the leaders of the Great Horde, Russia managed to position itself as a powerful regional actor while not giving in to the Horde's demands. The outcome of this standoff served to further root the Russian idea that Russia was a unique and even divine nation, separating it from the peoples that had surrendered to the Horde and solidifying the notion that Christianity was superior to Islam (Bushkovich, 2011, pp. 1–19, 37–58, 172–185; Weinerman, 1994). Aside from pervasive antisemitism and anti-Muslim sentiments, and because there were almost no Black or African people living in Russia, the ideal of "Russianness" developed over time to set Russians apart from Caucasians, Tatars, Central Asians, and Mongols, many of whom were Muslim or otherwise non-Christian. In Russia, ethnic groups such as these, with slightly darker skin than ethnically White Russians, are sometimes called *chernozhopy* (Russian: черножопый), which literally means "black asses." This slur is used to distinguish them from ethnic Russians, while suggesting that Russians are superior in terms of religion, culture, and ethnicity.

During the time of the Soviet Union, many Soviet and Communist Russians presented the Soviet regime as international and inclusive while simultaneously trying to control the pro-Western Jewish population from within and gain support from many South Asian, South American, and African countries. In theory, the Soviet Union was indeed egalitarian and anti-racist; in practice, the ruling majority was ethnically Russian and Christian and held centuries-old prejudices against non-Christians and non-Russians. Geopolitically, Moscow controlled all other members of the Soviet Union, allowing them a façade of self-determination while keeping overall control. Interestingly, while the United States and Europe began to change their perspectives on colonialism and imperialism (to some extent), the Soviet Union used its own imperialist scheme to gain power and control the member states under its umbrella. The Soviet Union presented a “raceless” society in which all were theoretically equal as long as they supported communism and the regime. However, in practice, some races still dominated others. Furthermore, even though very few African people visited Imperial Russia, during the Soviet era more arrived for purposes of education. Yet the imperialistic approach to education also promoted prejudice within Russian society, and those who studied with foreigners got the sense that foreigners, specifically Africans, came to study in Russia because there was no proper education in their countries of origin – reflecting the previously mentioned argument of cultural superiority. African residents in Russia were frequently called “monkeys” (Beissinger, 2015; Russell, 2005; Sahadeo, 2019, pp. 93–115; Zakharov, 2015, pp. 30–45, 60–62).

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, nationalism and xenophobia emerged even stronger than before. Having discarded the communist theory, ethnic Russians – Slavs – began to intensify their overt manifestations against non-Slavs, including former comrades from Soviet times. The dissolution of the Soviet Union also brought more economic instability, which caused an increase in xenophobia. In the early 2000s, xenophobia was ignored by the authorities, as it was perceived to be correlated with Russia’s economic and social transition. With the state facing more prominent problems, such as the geopolitical struggles in Chechnya and economic problems, xenophobia and racism were largely ignored. The public was mostly concerned with such social problems as racism. Demographically, mainly Caucasians, Central Asians, and Asians resided in Russia, and only very few African people. Thus, in contemporary Russia, racist Slavs are mainly hostile toward the above-mentioned ethnic groups, not toward Africans. Racist Slavs may call Caucasians *chernozhopy*, but they are significantly less hostile toward Black people than American or British societies – probably because, as mentioned, there are very few African people in Russia (Sevortian, 2009).

One of the most well-known racist incidents in Russia occurred in broad daylight on February 9, 2004, when a group of neo-Nazi teenagers attacked Tajik workers in St. Petersburg. Sultanov (the father of the family), his 9-year-old daughter, and his 11-year-old nephew were attacked with baseball bats, chains, and knives. His daughter, Khursheda Sultanova, was

stabbed to death. On March 22, 2006, a jury convicted the neo-Nazi murderers on charges of hooliganism rather than of murder, making their sentences lighter. This sparked a public criticism campaign against the authorities, including a direct letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin and St. Petersburg Governor Valentina Medvedenko.⁵⁵ In response to another set of incidents, in 2011 a court in Moscow sentenced five members of a neo-Nazi group to life in prison for the racially motivated murders of 27 people, most of them from the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Asia, including Tajiks and Chinese people.⁵⁶ While the majority of racist attacks and general discrimination are directed toward Caucasians, Central Asians, and Asians, African people also suffer from racism. In April 2006, a Senegalese student named Lamzar Samba was shot to death in St. Petersburg. The shooter used a swastika-covered rifle.⁵⁷

According to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which bases its information on official publications and data volunteered by organizations such as the Russian Center for Information and Analysis (SOVA),⁵⁸ the Russian police recorded 1,450 hate crimes in 2016. In 2017 the number dropped to 52. A total of 576 cases were recorded in 2018, 585 cases in 2019, and 833 cases in 2020.⁵⁹ These numbers should be approached with suspicion since many attacks are not classified as hate crimes or racist attacks and many victims choose not to report racist crimes due to their lack of trust in the authorities. For instance, victims of crimes have mentioned to Amnesty International that they did not file a police report because they were afraid of negative repercussions. Victims often cited the cases of other victims and worried that the police might accuse the victims of being the attackers. Others told Amnesty International that the state does not provide any effective protection for victims of hate crimes.⁶⁰

In a 2004 documentary by Kim Trail, then-19-year-old Maxim, a racist architecture student, summarized Russia's racism problem:

These are the hats of people we beat up. This is a hat of a Rastaman [shows a hat]. And here, these hats *hatchs* wear [shows a hat].⁶¹ Here, rappers wear these [shows a hat]. Rappers are like monkeys and dance to Negro music. Here [shows a hat], this is another interesting hat, it is a Muslim's hat ...

Skinheads are often called Nazis or Fascists but in reality, we are racists. Racism is love of one's race, nothing more and nothing less ...

We need to proudly stand up and say that we are Aryans and slice [using a knife] all niggers, Chinese, Jews, *hatchs*. Simply slice them so that they would be no more.⁶²

In the 21st century, racism in Russia has shifted to the online domain. Russian racists find the web a useful tool to disseminate their ideology, recruit like-minded people, and organize events. This trend is on par with the situation in the United States and the United Kingdom, as mentioned

in the sections before. For instance, the Russian VKontakte (VK) network, which hosts more than 500 million individual accounts, hosts dozens of racist and neo-Nazi communities and individual profiles. While VK does censor racist accounts and posts, it takes far less action against racism than American social networks. In fact, individuals who have been banned from Facebook or Twitter often find a place on VK (Myagkov et al., 2020).⁶³ The Russian VK network is international and hosts users from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and the United States, among others.⁶⁴ As detailed in later chapters, Russian racists also frequently use anonymous or private communications such as the dark web or Telegram to avoid public pressure and interact freely with members from other countries.

Conclusion

White supremacy is becoming increasingly prominent in the West. Calls for the White race to rule and maintain its purity, calls to endorse Nazism or glorify Hitler, and calls to enslave Africans and kill Jews seem to be taken straight from Third Reich propaganda. Yet these calls are made in the 21st century through various media outlets and online. Sadly, some calls are turned into action when White supremacists murder others. White supremacy is very similar around the world and has become international rather than nationalist, especially with the use of the internet. Interestingly, while different countries have different historical, cultural, and political backgrounds, White supremacy and support for neo-Nazism are common in all White-majority places. The hatred toward non-Whites is the glue that holds together people from all over the world, even those who were historically hostile to one another. As this chapter has shown, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia have different histories, but White supremacy is common to all. All three cases show similarities in the ways that White supremacists think and act – they spread conspiracy theories, build their own communities, and take violent action against non-Whites. White supremacists argue that non-Whites or non-Christians are religiously, biologically, and culturally inferior. They also argue that the White race must protect itself from hostile races that exploit society, such as Jews, Black people, and Caucasians. In addition, White supremacists argue that they are proud of their race and are not ashamed to glorify it publicly. Of course, the problem is not the glorification of one race but the vilification of other races and religions.

Notes

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4 Nazi Migration to Anonymous Platforms

The Case of Holocaust Denial

The internet, as described in Chapter 2 and well known by most people worldwide, is a global network of users that allows people to interact with each other more conveniently than through the use of telecommunications or physical mailing systems. In the 21st century, the internet has become a social network – a place where communities of people grow and interact together – that is, people socialize in a way similar to reality: They chat and interact together, use it for work or education, consume, create, and promote content, find love, and so on. Yet, since most of our social life can be conducted online, the internet also acts as a platform for negative and hostile phenomena such as cybercrime, terrorism, and racism. Neo-Nazis, White supremacists, terrorists, cybercriminals, and other similarly radical figures are, hopefully, condemned by most of society; but they are still people and internet users, and they act as people act – they socialize and use convenient platforms to create their own communities. The difference is that they utilize them for negative reasons such as spreading radical and racist propaganda, recruiting new members, radicalizing existing members, and even supporting and calling for real-world violence, from cemetery vandalism to shooting sprees in mosques, synagogues, and churches.

This chapter addresses two main questions. First, why do neo-Nazis and/or White supremacists sometimes use anonymous platforms instead of overt, “regular” platforms such as mainstream social media and websites? Second, how are Western democracies, civil society, and technology companies such as Facebook or Twitter pushing extremists away from regular platforms to private, secure, and anonymous platforms such as the dark web and Telegram? Methodologically, the concept of process tracing is used to try to trace the main reasons for the migration of extremists and racists to anonymous platforms. To further examine this phenomenon, I analyze the case of Holocaust denial – why neo-Nazis and White supremacists spread material denying the Holocaust on private and anonymous platforms but often refrain from publishing this material on mainstream social media. This is not to claim Holocaust denial is absent from mainstream social networks and regular websites; it does exist there, and many Holocaust deniers promote and disseminate material in a hybrid manner – they promote content on the regular web, on Telegram groups, and on the dark web, and each

platform refers users to another and vice versa. However, on the regular web, it can be targeted and removed more easily by contacting web administrators and demanding the removal of such content if it violates local laws or companies decide against it.

The chapter is presented in four main parts, and it is where, following the presentation of phenomena and concepts in the previous chapters, the real research, or phishing phase, begins. The first part briefly explains the concept and operation of online communities. This will help readers understand how online neo-Nazi communities are created and how they act, which will make the following empirical chapters easier to understand. The second part presents the online activities of neo-Nazis and White supremacists, including their initial shift to the online domain – that is, why, how, and when they moved online. The third part examines the reasons for the neo-Nazi migration from the regular internet to anonymous platforms. And the fourth part examines the case of Holocaust denial on the dark web and Telegram – specifically on Tor onion websites such as *NeinChan* and on the Telegram channel “*HoloHoax Info Chan*,” which had approximately 1,278 subscribers and 185,015 views in 2021.¹

Interestingly, conspiracy theories are very prominent on the internet, and even more so on anonymous communication platforms and specifically on the dark web. Internet users assume that the internet – in this case, the dark web – is a “red pill,” a term that refers to a scene from the film *The Matrix* in which taking a red pill means choosing to learn about reality as it is, even if it is unsettling and upsetting (in contrast to choosing a blue pill, which will keep the person ignorant) (Flanagin & Metzger, 2000). The fact that Holocaust denial is found on the dark web leads to an interesting psychological effect – since it is on the dark web, many might perceive it to be more “authentic” or true than Holocaust-related information published by official organizations, prominent scholars, or mainstream media outlets.² For instance, on the Telegram channel “*HoloHoax Info Chan*,” an extensive post titled “🔪 Red & White Pill documentaries” lists dozens of conspiracy theories and materials that allegedly present the truth about the Holocaust and Jews in general.

Online Communities: A Short Introduction

What is an online community, and how does it differ from a regular “real-life” community, if at all? Understanding the core concepts and practices of online communities will help us understand what neo-Nazi or White supremacy communities are and how they operate – that is, how members of these communities spread and consume content, interact, and trust or distrust each other and the online domain. As Rheingold (2000) described in 1993, a “virtual community” is one in which people interact virtually. According to the *Cambridge Dictionary*, a community can be defined as “the people living in one particular area or people who are considered as a unit because of their common interests, social group, or nationality.”³ Following

the definition of this term, examples are given, one of which refers to social media: “on social media, a group of people who have similar interests or who want to achieve something together.”⁴ Furthermore, the term “online community” is defined in the *Cambridge Dictionary* as “a group of people who use a particular internet service or belong to a particular group on the internet.”⁵ Kindsmüller et al. (2009) defined an online community as “a voluntary group of users who partake actively in a certain computer-mediated service.” Thus, a community, on or off the internet, is a group of people who have similar interests and/or want to achieve something together. A real-world community might be restricted by geographical borders, but an online community enjoys the borderless domain of cyberspace and can generally develop and grow with no geographical limitations.

An online community is thus a group of people. But who are those people? Each internet user is an individual with their own identity, beliefs, and online manners (Bowman-Grieve, 2009; Halupka, 2017). Ario Seto (2017) argued that a person cannot simply become a netizen (citizen of the net) but must first go through a process of dwelling on the internet and experiencing different types of communities, discussions, and online interactions. During this process, they must acquire a set of technological and social skills, like learning how to use certain platforms or software, learning online norms, and even the use of language and memes. In 2007 Francine Charest and François Bédard suggested six socio-types of internet users that use tourism websites (explorers, agenda-setters, demanding types, party types, what-to-do types, and Google addicts). Singer et al. (2012) concluded that, in general, internet users can be active or passive, versatile, entertainment-oriented, work-oriented, communication-oriented, or practical information-oriented. This aligns with Seto’s perspective; the suggested types are also based on certain levels of techno-social expertise. More often than not, beginner users consume and follow ongoing trends, while experienced users create and promote trends. The typologies suggested by Charest and Bédard (2007) and Singer et al. (2012) might not be completely suitable for every internet user, but they do raise an important point: There are indeed leaders and followers in online communities. And a person can be both at different times, depending on their engagement on each platform.

In 2012, Elliot Volkman suggested a typology that is more suitable to the current research and internet research in general, or at least the study of online communities. His user types are also categorized according to expertise, experience, and responsibilities:⁶

1. The Community Architect – This is a person or a group of people who want to create an online community. This person decides on the purpose of the community, the platform(s) on which the community will be based, and the norms this community will follow. This is the founder of the online community.
2. The Online Community Manager – This person manages the online community. They can be the architect or founder, or an affiliate. This

person can post, engage in marketing, add new members, enforce laws and norms, and so on.

3. The Paid Member – This person, often one of several such members, is paid to contribute to the community so that the community will appear to be active, especially if it is a newly established online community.
4. The Contributor – This person, often a part of a group, contributes to the community. They post content, communicate with other users, help market the community, and so on.
5. The Power User – This person, often a part of a group, is a hybrid between an online community manager and a contributor. They often do all the above-mentioned tasks along with developing new ideas and discussions and providing feedback.
6. The Free Member – These members engage in the activities of the online community, including posting content and communicating with other members. However, what makes this type different from the above-mentioned types is their privilege level. Free members are often limited in what they can post or use or in the amount of communication or “chatting” they can engage in.
7. The Active Lurker – These members, who together with passive lurkers often make up the vast majority of users, generally consume content and only occasionally share or communicate with others.
8. The Passive Lurker – These members only consume content; they do not share it or communicate with others.

In the context of this book, however, an anonymous community and anonymous internet users need to be further defined. In Chapter 2, I noted that anonymous internet users often worry about privacy and security; they worry about being safe and protected from criticism, stalking, and legal repercussions (Topor & Pollack, 2022). Moreover, Kang et al. (2013) discovered that people use online anonymity to share and download files, browse and search for information, and participate in politics or groups of interest. People also use anonymity to avoid exposure. To put it simply, anonymous users often want to hide from their family, friends, and colleagues to avoid criticism or protect themselves from legal repercussions if they are engaged in illegal activities.

Thus, in the context of this book, an anonymous online community can be defined as a group of people who use a private and secure internet platform or service that helps them mask their true identity to engage in common interests. It should be mentioned that the common interests of the anonymous online community are not inherently illegal; however, in many cases, they are either illegal, socially unacceptable, or both. A group of people who have nothing to hide will likely opt for a mainstream and convenient internet platform or service. In contrast, a group of people who do have something to hide will likely use private, secure, and anonymous platforms or services. Such is the case for neo-Nazis.

Building on Volkman's typology of online community users and Halupka's (2017) work on anonymous communities, I suggest that anonymous online community users can be conceptually and practically divided into the following types:

1. The Anonymous Community Architect – This is a person (or group of people) who wants to create an anonymous online community. This person decides on the purpose of the community, the platform(s) on which the community will be based, and the norms this community will follow. This is the founder of the anonymous online community.
2. The Online Community Manager – This person manages the anonymous online community; they can be the architect or founder, or an affiliate. This person can post, engage in marketing, add new members, enforce laws and norms, and so on.
3. Paid/Recruited Members/Leaders – These members are financially or ideologically recruited to contribute to the community and help it appear active, especially in newly established communities. Leaders promote their ideologies and goals.
4. Lurkers (Active/Passive) on Unrestricted Platforms – These members consume content and occasionally share or communicate with others. Active lurkers on unrestricted platforms can share and communicate as they wish. In most cases, only users with administrative privileges can censor other users. Examples of unrestricted platforms are Tor boards or forums.
5. Lurkers (Active/Passive) on Restricted Platforms – These members consume content but cannot share or communicate with others. Often, they can contact the architect or manager and request something. Examples of restricted platforms are restricted Telegram groups that do not allow followers or visitors to publish or share.

Trust and reputation are important factors in the domain of anonymous online communities. Since online users lack the real-world cues of face-to-face (FtF) communication and their interactions are mediated by computers, most community members do not trust other members when using anonymous accounts. One can assume that the more fringe and illegal the purpose of the anonymous community is, the less members trust each other. Furthermore, since, in many cases, there are no unique usernames or user numbers (IDs), user X can change their name to user Y a minute later, and person A can pose as user X and manipulate others into believing they are actually X. Furthermore, reputation plays a role in interactions between members in anonymous online communities; the significance of this role needs to be further analyzed and researched, however. Generally, reputations emerge when an actor's actions become a widespread belief and can be characterized and predicted. In cyberspace, particularly on anonymous platforms, it is very hard to build and maintain a reputation. Architects and

managers might be able to create a certain reputation, but recruited members, leaders, and lurkers will probably fail to do so. Community architects are also approached with caution by other members, as many are aware of attempts by law enforcement agencies to track anonymous users (Donath, 2002; Kollock, 1994; Nikander & Karvonen, 2000; Topor & Pollack, 2022; Raub & Weesie, 1990).⁷ Furthermore, as Norbutas (2020) argued, the member who decides whether to give their trust – the trustor – may either give or deny their trust, but it is the member who gets the trust – the trustee – who decides whether to abuse the trustor’s trust or not.

In the context of White supremacist neo-Nazi anonymous communities, members often distrust not only other members but also entire platforms. Some, as evidence presented later in this book suggests, express their worry that Telegram and the Tor dark web are full of lurking law enforcement agents waiting for members to act or express themselves illegally. Others do trust enough to engage in activities such as firearms trading, drug dealing, hacking, and more. However, distrust does not stop hate and conspiracy theories from being disseminated among members worldwide. Spreading this information may not be as overtly and conclusively illegal as selling drugs, but it does play a part in members’ radicalization. The more radical members become, the more they are exposed to and believe conspiracy theories, and the more likely they are to take action in the real world, as explained in Chapter 6.

Neo-Nazi Migration to the Internet

At the very beginning of the internet, and in the years after it was made completely public in the 1980s and 1990s, it gave people hope that borderless communication would make the world a better place – a world in which people from all backgrounds could talk to each other instantly and extremism and conflict would be made obsolete. In the 21st century, we know that, although the internet in its current form offers many advantages, it has only made human interaction more complex. It has expanded ongoing social and political rifts and problems and even created new ones, such as cybercrime, cyberbullying, trolls, and bots. To put it simply, the internet has made hate worse. It has allowed hate to spread faster and without any borders. The internet provides openness, but, ironically, it is being utilized by radicals who do not wish for a free and open world. It is similar to the way that far-right, racist, and neo-Nazi parties have learned to play by democratic rules, get elected, then undermine democracy and freedom from within the system of governance. They have adapted themselves to democracy; now, neo-Nazi activists have adapted themselves to the internet. They are against everything the internet represents, but they use it to their own advantage (Devries et al., 2021; Halavais, 2010, pp. 83–103; Whine, 1997, pp. 209–227).⁸

Why would a White supremacist or neo-Nazi prefer the online domain to the real world? It seems likely that the most extreme White supremacists would prefer to take actual action against non-Whites instead of posting

manifestos on social media or forums. For instance, the American KKK movement, throughout its many iterations, has committed acts of violence and terror against non-White people in the United States, mainly against Black people (Baudouin, 2011). There are two reasons why neo-Nazis prefer to use the internet and have transferred almost their entire movement online.

The first reason concerns the media. Since printed (and radio) media have gatekeepers in the form of editors and other operators, extreme racism has generally been banned from the mainstream media in the United States and Europe. Generally, the media gives very little space to purely racist or conspiracy-oriented publications. For instance, in 2012, Twitter banned neo-Nazi accounts following a special request from Germany. A few years later, Twitter banned hate groups altogether (although work is still being done to censor and ban groups).⁹ Thus, because the traditional media chose to censor neo-Nazis, they decided to transfer their operations to a platform with less regulation and less censorship – the internet (Jasser, 2021, pp. 193–222). The second reason concerns the law and is elaborated in the next section on the neo-Nazi migration to the dark web. Because some countries, and, later, internet service providers, outlawed hate speech, racism, and the promotion of extreme ideologies or symbols, neo-Nazis could no longer publish their opinions. For instance, in 2021, the United Kingdom, following similar legislation in the United States, designated the Russian-led American neo-Nazi group “The Base” a terror organization, making their social media activities illegal.¹⁰ In addition, though neo-Nazis were still taking violent action against other groups of people, they found the online domain to be a useful tool to hide away from the authorities while they recruited, planned, and executed their schemes (Topor, 2022).

Thus, extremists, and neo-Nazis in particular, wish to promote their own ideologies and avoid censorship, and if their manifestations or activities are illegal, they wish to avoid being prosecuted. One of the most prominent examples of this process is the case of Stormfront – a neo-Nazi website that was one of the first to emerge online. Stormfront was initially launched in 1990 as a Bulletin Board System (BBS) for David Duke’s senatorial campaign in Louisiana. BBSs were a precursor to the modern internet – the World Wide Web and social media. Bulletin boards allowed users to log in to a certain computer server and interact with each other. In 1995, a KKK Klansman named Don Black created a more accessible and open website for Stormfront, which went on to develop a certain community of like-minded people. Black claimed that Stormfront aimed to “provide information not available in the controlled news media and to build a community of white activists working for the survival of our people.”¹¹ Thus, Don Black hints that the media is controlled by the Jews and the only solution for his community is to operate outside this alleged sphere of (Jewish) influence. Another far-right activist, Ed Fields, from the National States Rights Party (NSRP), published his views on a separate website page within the Stormfront.org domain. He called it “The Truth At Last – News Suppressed by the Daily Press” (Bowman-Grieve, 2009; Daniels, 2009, p. 98).

Other neo-Nazi websites were also launched in the 1990s and 2000s, such as Thom Robb's kkk.com and kkk.biz websites; these, however, had almost no user engagement and acted as "brochure websites" that simply published text, similar to the traditional media. Jessie Daniels referred to these websites as "copy/paste brochure sites" (Daniels, 2009, p. 100). Another example of a website that was "outside of Jewish influence" was Tom Metzger's resist.com website. Metzger, a prominent American neo-Nazi and KKK grand wizard, had split from the KKK over ideological and religious arguments. His website was innovative in that it was not a simple copy/paste brochure site but redirected users to other means of communication, such as his radio broadcast and telephone hotline (Daniels, 2009, p. 112).

Another form of internet-based communication that was utilized by neo-Nazis in the 1990s and 2000s, and is still being used by niche members, is USENET (User Network), a decentralized network of clients and servers that was established in 1980, having been conceived by Tom Truscott and Jim Ellis in 1979. Just like the regular internet, as described in Chapter 2, USENET operates on TCP/IP. In USENET, users could read or post messages, called "articles," or share files. USENET was organized into groups, and every discussion was threaded, like in web forums or BBSs. However, the major difference between BBS servers and modern-day forums and boards was the absence of a central server and dedicated administrator. Governments found it difficult to regulate without shutting down the whole project and all servers worldwide. Local ISPs could deny access to certain newsgroups in USENET, but these would eventually be replaced, essentially becoming a game of cat and mouse. USENET articles were distributed through a large base of servers, and users could post articles on servers that either stored them or forwarded them to another server. Thus, with no formal moderation and no gatekeepers, neo-Nazis adopted USENET as well (Hauben & Hauben, 1997; Pfaffenberger, 2003, pp. 20–21). In 1993, Milton Kleim Jr. founded the Aryan News Agency, and in 1995 he published an essay calling for like-minded radicals to adopt USENET. In his essay "On Tactics and Strategy for USENET," Kleim wrote:

USENET offers enormous opportunity for the Aryan Resistance to disseminate our message to the unaware and the ignorant. It is the only relatively uncensored (so far) free-forum mass medium which we have available. The State cannot yet stop us from "advertising" our ideas and organizations on USENET, but I can assure you, this will not always be the case. NOW is the time to grasp the WEAPON which is the Net, and wield it skillfully and wisely while you may still do so freely.¹²

Remember: our overall USENET strategy must be to repeat powerful themes OVER AND OVER AND OVER. We cannot compete with the Jewsmidia, of course, as our propaganda dissemination is but a very small fraction of the everywhere pervasive Zionist propaganda. However, our ideas possess an energy that truth alone contains. Our ideas, when

matched one to one with the chimera of the Jews, overwhelm theirs with ease, because OURS ARE IN SYNC WITH REALITY. One well-written message containing our ideas has much greater “bang for the buck.”¹³

As early as 1995, Kleim issued a basic user guide to his fellow neo-Nazis. In his article, he explicitly suggested that the media is controlled by the Jewish people and/or Zionists. He also suggested that USENET is a new weapon that neo-Nazis – Aryans – must adopt in their “guerilla warfare” against the mainstream media. Kleim was, however, aware of the sphere in which USENET operated, a sphere of law and local jurisdiction. Kleim suggested that no illegal activities be advocated since this could, as he wrote, “be used against you, possibly immediately, by the Secret Police.”¹⁴ There are other types of internet platforms or older-version websites such as File Transfer Protocol (FTP) sites that can be used, or even Internet Relay Chats (IRC) or LISTSERVS for email distribution, but these are less popular, less informative, and less interactive, as well as less effective in recruiting activists and creating an engaged community (Kaplan, 2000, pp. 141–144).

Internet websites such as Stormfront or the Daily Stormer, which are discussed in more detail below, as well as boards and USENET groups, act as competitor media outlets for neo-Nazis. Since neo-Nazis in the United States and elsewhere think the Jewish people and/or the State of Israel control the mainstream media, they do not trust it, thus they naturally turn to other outlets. The media promoted and consumed by neo-Nazis differs from mainstream media, as it is based entirely on far-fetched conspiracy theories rather than real facts. However, as explained in the section below, even neo-Nazi media is limited in certain ways. For instance, the First Amendment of the United States might protect extremists and allow them to express themselves as radically as they wish, but it does not allow them to incite and advocate violence. When people or groups cross the line between free speech and violence and find themselves censored by technology companies or the government, they turn to more anonymous platforms such as the dark web or secure messaging applications (SMAs).

Early neo-Nazi regular websites were mainly static and acted as propaganda brochures – “copy/paste brochure sites” as Daniels (2009, p. 100) referred to them. The online communities built around these websites were also very limited and consisted mainly of a community architect and various lurkers, or consumers, as explained earlier in this chapter. In cases where no significant technical powers were held by the community architect, such as in USENET newsgroups, both active and passive lurkers could act as they wished, and leaders were simply those who were most active. Eventually, BBS and USENET declined as ISPs gradually adopted our modern-day internet, or World Wide Web (WWW), websites that were hosted on more accessible servers and were more dynamic, both in terms of broadband and regulation. ISPs and private website owners learned that they could gain much more profit from the WWW (Hauben & Hauben, 1997; Li, 2000).¹⁵

However, with the proliferation of social media in the early 2000s, racists and antisemites began flooding social media on the WWW as well. As their beloved, somewhat decentralized, non-regulated platforms became less available, they simply migrated to the regular internet – the web.

In the case of neo-Nazis, Andre Oboler (2008) called this new type of online interaction of racists “Antisemitism 2.0” and connected it to the rise of social media and interactive websites in general, mainly since 2004. Oboler noted that Antisemitism 2.0, which is based on Web 2.0 websites, allowed users to share or make changes to all kinds of content and interact with other users. Moreover, the content could be shared on many different platforms, making antisemitism a cross-platform problem; rather than one single platform or jurisdiction being accountable for such content, there were many. Similar to the early days of network-based socialization on USENET, users could act as community architects, managers, leaders, and lurkers. However, while networks such as USENET had no gatekeepers, social media platforms are accountable for their users. Very little accountability is required in countries such as the United States, where the First Amendment grants almost limitless protection, whereas in countries such as Germany even social media is restricted, at least in theory. Indeed, as Oboler noted, although Antisemitism 2.0 allowed antisemites to be community architects, managers, and leaders, they were still less free than they had been on USENET.

One significant example of a modern website that is still active in 2022 is 4chan. It was launched in 2003 by Christopher Poole initially as a message and image board where people could discuss anime, though it later came to cover almost every topic imaginable. One of the boards, “/pol/ – Politically Incorrect,” is full of racist and antisemitic posts and since its creation in late 2011 has grown into a hotspot for racists. This board is a place to share propaganda, whether textual or visual.¹⁶ Another example of a modern website is 8chan, which later became 8kun. It was created by Fredrick Brennan because he was dissatisfied with the extent of free speech on 4chan. 8chan became the go-to platform for far-right extremists. The website has changed its service providers and domains several times since it was discovered that it hosted content that incited violence and even child pornography.¹⁷ After the Walmart El Paso shooting in Texas in August 2019, Cloudflare, the company that provided cybersecurity solutions for 8chan, announced it would stop supporting the website because it had hosted a manifesto written by the shooter, Patrick Wood Crusius. 8chan went offline immediately following the shooting event and was then moved to BitMitigate, another cybersecurity provider that protected it, as well as the Daily Stormer in 2017, from distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. However, 8chan suffered from outages and later migrated to the Tor dark web, where it was rebranded 8kun. Since October 2020, 8kun has received indirect DDoS protection from the company DDoS-Guard, which has also expressed worries about indirectly servicing 8kun, especially after many of the Capitol rioters of January 6, 2021, organized on 8kun.¹⁸

Eventually, neo-Nazis moved on to a USENET-like platform that grants more privacy, security, and freedom – the dark web (and SMAs such as Telegram) (Topor, 2019a). However, not all neo-Nazi activity moved to anonymous platforms; they also operate in peripheral and smaller online communities and platforms such as Discord, Gab, Gettr, BitChute, and others. A significant amount of online hate propaganda is disseminated on these websites, many of which claim to protect free speech and therefore do not take action against hateful material. Nonetheless, they are obligated to remove material that directly incites violence. For instance, after the British Community Security Trust (CST) published a report on online racism and antisemitism, sites such as BitChute did say they would remove any inciting material.¹⁹ Regular internet websites are more accessible and thus more transparent and open to public criticism. Enough public pressure can nudge policymakers and technology companies to censor racism and antisemitism. For that reason, a significant number of neo-Nazis and White supremacists find refuge on the dark web and other anonymous platforms.

Neo-Nazi Migration to the Dark Web and Beyond

In general, neo-Nazis, whether community leaders, activists, or content consumers, prefer the online domain because it is not restricted or censored by gatekeepers. Thus, a typical neo-Nazi argument would claim that Jewish influence is less powerful on the internet. Yet, with the development of social media and the increase in moderation by technology companies as well as governments, many antisemitic conspiracy theorists claim that Jews control cyberspace too. Nonetheless, the online domain is preferred by many since it is more “user friendly” and open than traditional media such as radio, television, or print. With the ongoing and ever-increasing moderation of websites and social media, many neo-Nazis have migrated to the dark web and other anonymous platforms such as SMAs (e.g., Telegram). This section examines the question of why the average White supremacist/neo-Nazi might prefer secure, private, anonymous but limited communication methods over more accessible and more mainstream platforms such as the regular internet. Interestingly, the reasons and explanations are similar to those mentioned above, in the section on the neo-Nazi migration to the internet: media control and the law.

The alleged control of the media is the first reason for the migration to the dark web, as it was for the migration to the internet. The regular internet is controlled by governments, ISPs, and technology companies, which often take the shape of giant conglomerates such as Google or Facebook (Meta, as of October 2021). These companies effectively control the online domain, and, since many founders, directors, and senior personnel in these companies are Jewish, neo-Nazis argue that the entire regular internet is controlled by Jews who censor and restrict White supremacy and antisemitic propaganda (Schwarz-Friesel, 2019; Topor, 2019a). For instance, in the wake of the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville on August 12, 2017, and the car attack

carried out by James Alex Fields, Jr., which killed 32-year-old Heather Heyer, Google and GoDaddy banned the neo-Nazi website the Daily Stormer from their services. Although the website went offline, Twitter and Gab accounts representing the website immediately posted their Plan B – a link to the Tor platform. In these posts, they also shared the message: “Sorry kikes ... you lose.” This was meant to signal that “kikes,” an offensive slur for Jews, were behind the ban, as they allegedly controlled social media. Since the Daily Stormer did not disappear but simply transferred to the Tor dark web, it allegedly defeated or outsmarted the Jewish social media (Topor, 2019a).²⁰ A similar process occurred in the case of the website 8kun, as described previously.

The second reason for the neo-Nazi migration to the dark web has a legal basis. The post-Charlottesville ban of the Daily Stormer marked a turning point in neo-Nazi communications. The website was banned because it was claimed that it promoted racist and extreme content that might have led Fields to carry out his car attack. Social media companies have their own “law” – their terms of use – which users must obey. In other cases concerning internet content, radical far-right activists have been caught and prosecuted not by media companies but by law enforcement agencies. For instance, in 2018, a 13-year-old British boy downloaded manuals from the internet on how to prepare explosives and firearms from readily available supplies. He was sentenced to a 24-month rehabilitation order. He and his neo-Nazi group Feuerkrieg Division (FKD) also publicly posted that non-White people were “sub-humans.” Regarding his case, Jenny Hopkins from the Crown Prosecution Service said, “He claimed not to have racist views and just wanted to appear ‘cool’, but the body of evidence led to him pleading guilty to possession and dissemination of terrorist material.”²¹

Cases like this one relate not only to laws about the internet but also to laws concerning affiliation with terrorist organizations and the promotion of terrorism. In the United States, for instance, the First Amendment protects the right to spread hate and racist propaganda as long as it does not include direct and immediate incitements to violence. Thus, social media companies are not obligated to moderate or censor hate speech. As mentioned previously, some do moderate content because if they did not, then users would abandon their platforms. Their motive for moderation is thus business and profit-related, not based on legal requirements. Anti-Nazi legislation does not exist in every country; however, it does exist in some Western countries, including Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, and, of course, Israel. Thus, in these countries, people spreading neo-Nazi propaganda such as Holocaust denial can be prosecuted, fined, or even sent to prison (Bazylar, 2006; Topor, 2019a).

For instance, the German Network Enforcement Act (which complements section 86 of the German penal code, as mentioned before) requires social media companies to take down posts and ban users and groups within 24 hours of receiving a complaint about a certain post. In 2019, Facebook was

fined more than \$2 million by the German government for under-reporting complaints. This legislation effectively pushed companies to moderate content in advance.²² In another example, Twitter was discredited and eventually forced to issue an official apology for letting its advertising platform target neo-Nazis, among other groups. In early 2020, the BBC revealed that, by using Twitter's advertising platform, content could be targeted directly at neo-Nazis, leading to the creation of their own sphere of content on Twitter, which may, in turn, have led to fewer complaints. The advertising tool indicated that 67,000 to 81,000 users could potentially be targeted in the United Kingdom alone.²³ In another example, Hervé Lalin, a neo-Nazi Catholic priest, was fined by the French Court for sharing a video on YouTube that incited violence and hatred against Jews.²⁴ Even in Russia, Vladimir Luzgin was fined for reposting content about Nazism on the Russian social media platform VKontakte. The Russian court based the verdict on Part 1, Article 354.1 of the Russian Criminal Code, meaning that Luzgin was not fined directly for racist or antisemitic content but for Nazi content.²⁵

Although cyberspace might appear to be an endless and borderless free and open domain, users and content must conform to the local laws of each individual country. Given the current state of affairs, neo-Nazis find it difficult to operate on the regular internet and mainstream social media since their content is moderated and geo-blocked in some countries, and they can be personally prosecuted, fined, and sent to prison. When they incite direct and immediate action, even the First Amendment cannot protect them from prosecution, as the spread of propaganda can also be reviewed under criminal or terrorism-related laws. Interestingly, because social media platforms have come under public criticism, which harms their business and profit, they too have begun to take action against neo-Nazi/White supremacist/racist and misogynist content. Thus, even when the law gives neo-Nazis a free pass, social media moderates them. Because neo-Nazis do not want to be moderated, fined, or jailed, they migrate to platforms where almost no one can moderate or prosecute them – the dark web and SMAs. On these anonymous platforms, they have established entire communities with their own social media, chats, forums, and boards where they can even sell Nazi-related merchandise. Online community architects, managers, leaders, activists, and lurkers operate anonymously to keep the anonymous neo-Nazi community alive, and it has much more freedom on platforms such as the dark web than on the regular internet. Ironically, it is modern anti-racist society that has pushed neo-Nazis to a platform where they can flourish (Topor, 2019a). However, sweeping the dirt under the carpet does not make it disappear.

The Case of Holocaust Denial: Evidence from TOR and Telegram

The case of Holocaust denial on the internet, specifically on anonymous platforms, is very interesting because some countries find Holocaust denial

offensive and ban it through legislation, while other countries choose not to address the issue, preferring to allow free speech and letting society self-regulate. However, cyberspace has no definitive borders or jurisdictions like countries do, and it masks the identities of Holocaust deniers. While the distortion of facts about the Holocaust might evade being classified as an illegal act, in countries where Holocaust denial is illegal, the total denial of the Holocaust can result in fines or even imprisonment. The case of Holocaust denial is a good example of a specific set of circumstances that pushed neo-Nazis, the deniers, to publish and promote their propaganda online. After an explanation of what Holocaust denial actually is, including the types of denial and a few examples, I present empirical evidence from the Tor dark web and Telegram to show the extent to which Holocaust denial is spread there.

Holocaust denial is, generally, an attempt to deny or negate the well-documented facts about the Nazi genocide of Jews in Europe. Denial and/or distortion of these facts are forms of antisemitism. Apart from denying or distorting pure facts and figures, such as the number of murdered Jews or the purpose of killing mechanisms such as gas chambers and crematoriums, many Holocaust deniers choose to focus on alternative narratives. For instance, some may not deny the death toll but, instead, claim that it was not Jews who were killed during this period (1939–1945) but citizens of another country (see, generally, Lipstadt, 2012; Michman, 2001; Whine, 2008). For instance, many Belarusian officials claim that it was Belarusians who were killed by the Nazis, not Jews. It may well be that many Belarusians were killed, but they were not killed because of their citizenship but because of their religion and beliefs (Smilovitskii, 2016). Others do not deny the number of deaths but claim that, regardless of the scale, death is an outcome of war, and the war was fought on European soil and elsewhere. As previously mentioned, denial of the Holocaust, as with the denial of any crime, serves as a utilitarian tool to whitewash history in order to execute policies of a similar nature or justify these or related policies. In the case of Poland and the legislation it has adopted since early 2018, whitewashing its history serves to hide the “dirty” parts of radical conservatism (Kończal, 2021; Porat, 2013). In the context of this book, as mentioned in Chapter 3, whitewashing Nazism and White supremacy may eventually lead to similar measures being adopted. Holocaust denial may serve as the canary in the mine. In any case, it is not the purpose of this section to elaborate exhaustively on the concept of Holocaust denial but to discuss the reason such denial is prominent online.

Holocaust denial is, as mentioned, illegal in some European countries, although it is not illegal in the United States due to the force of the First Amendment. Other significant de-facto legislators in this context are social media companies; they ban Holocaust denial due to their collaboration with civil society. For instance, Facebook announced in late 2020 that it would ban posts that denied or distorted the Holocaust.²⁶ Twitter, on the other hand, although it also tried to introduce policies banning Holocaust denial, later withdrew its intentions out of, as one anonymous neo-Nazi claimed, the fear of losing users. A Senate hearing did not help. Twitter’s policies did

not change, and Twitter's CEO, Jack Dorsey, mentioned that Holocaust denial is "misleading information . . . But we don't have a policy against that type of misleading information."²⁷ Holocaust denial might not be a direct incitement to violence, but it is concerning to social media companies. Thus, neo-Nazis and Holocaust deniers are pushed away from mainstream social media.

Neo-Nazis are not only concerned they will be banned from social media but also fear imprisonment and fines. For instance, the Brit David Irving and the Germans Ernst Zündel and Ursula Haverbeck are examples of people who have actually been sentenced to prison for Holocaust denial.²⁸ In another example from civil society, former Canadian Football League (CFL) player Khalif Mitchell was fined by the CFL in 2015 for promoting Holocaust denial on Twitter, despite not violating Twitter's terms of service.²⁹ In June 2021, British politician George Galloway, who had himself been accused of promoting antisemitism in the past, removed a volunteer from his political campaign after the volunteer, Shammy Cheema, posted on social media that the "Holohoax" was "the big fat Zionist cow that's been milked for the last 80 years." Whether Galloway's actions were sincere or electorally motivated is known only to himself. However, signaling that Holocaust denial is wrong does put pressure on deniers.³⁰ Another Holocaust denier, the German Nikolai Nerling, was found guilty after filming a propaganda film at the Dachau concentration camp, fined 6,000 Euros, and removed from YouTube. He is now taking shelter in Brazil and has also found shelter on Telegram, where he runs a channel with over 34,000 subscribers, who also fund his actions.³¹ Concerns about legal repercussions have thus pushed Holocaust deniers to the anonymous world of the dark web and Telegram groups and similar private communications, where there is little to no chance of being fined or imprisoned for this type of rhetoric. In the following sections, I will present several examples of Holocaust denial in action and discuss their impact and global reach.

Evidence From the Tor Dark Web

Below, I present and discuss several examples from the Tor dark web. Interestingly, some of the discussed material is published using a hybrid method involving the regular internet, the dark web, and Telegram groups. During the research, numerous examples were found, from single comments on dark web boards and chats to entire posts dedicated to Holocaust denial. Here, I offer only a few examples to illustrate the situation. For instance, the Tor onion website Endchan is an example of a very antisemitic and racist website. In a thread about the board's rules, posted on February 25, 2021, an anonymous user – the board owner/administrator – wrote that the rules were: "1: No jews. The enemy is jews plus traitors and their religion is Judaism. Do not distract from that."³² On March 15, 2021, an anonymous user published a post to the "/pol/" board on Endchan titled "HOLOCAUST PHOTOS CONFIRMED FAKE," and another user (who may have been the same one) replied with "Well shit, we knew that already." The same user

posted several photographs comparing allegedly fake photographs with real ones that deny or downgrade the Nazis' actions.³³

In another example from Endchan, a user published a post titled "Why Hitler Put jews in Camps." The user cited prominent historian Yehuda Bauer and wrote:

In reality, Jews were interned in camps and ghettos during World War II because Jews were generally hostile toward Germany, and many Jewish partisans were actively killing German troops.³⁴

That user and other anonymous users commented on the post with more examples of Jews and/or Soviet partisans fighting Germans. The user concludes that the reason "Why Hitler Put jews in Camps" is because Jews were partisans who killed Germans.

In an example from the board Leftpol,³⁵ on December 21, 2020, an anonymous user(s) published an entire thread denying and distorting the Holocaust. Titled "BUT MUH HOLOHOAX," the post aimed to create a repository of Holocaust denial material that is considered trustworthy and truthful by Holocaust deniers and neo-Nazis. The user wrote the following, adding a picture of alleged fact-checking, "Let's debunk muh holocaust revishunism [*sic*] with FACTS & LOGIC. Articles, books, infographs everythings [*sic*] is welcomed."³⁶

On another website on the Tor network, called "Deutschland – Informationskontrolle, nein Danke!," a user published a long post titled "Die zionistische Holocaust Lüge" (from German: The Zionist Holocaust Lie), explaining:

The Holocaust of the Jews cannot be denied because it never took place. It is the greatest lie of our history and the invention of the greatest criminals on earth, the Khazarian Zionists.

There has been heaps of research from experts in all areas on this topic and no matter where you look, even the Jews are now against this propaganda and have been criticizing and discarding the alleged mass murder of the Jews by the National Socialists for decades.³⁷

In an example suggestive of marketing, a list of Holocaust denial books was published on the NeinChan Tor website on September 8, 2021.³⁸ Here, an anonymous user posted a "Holocaust Handbook collection" of 44 volumes that distort, downplay, and deny the Holocaust, including books edited or written by convicted Holocaust deniers such as Germar Rudolf, a German chemist who was convicted in Stuttgart, Germany, in 1995, then fled to the United States and, upon his return to Germany, was convicted again and imprisoned for inciting racial hatred and Holocaust denial online; he was released on July 5, 2009. Rudolf was also found guilty in the United States after exposing himself while exercising in a park in Red Lion, York County; a local court sentenced him to two years' probation on July 7, 2020.

On his website, which is restricted by several ISPs, Rudolf notes that he has served 44 months in prison.³⁹

The “Holocaust Handbook collection” was published by an anonymous user on the dark web for a reason. While books can be downloaded or purchased from regular websites that promote pseudo-scientific material about the Holocaust, these websites are restricted by ISPs, including Virgin Media, Three, and Vodafone. Furthermore, although it is possible to download digital copies of some books quite easily, the purchase of hard copies is often more problematic since selling and/or shipping to countries that regard these books as illegal can endanger both the seller and the buyer – they might be prosecuted, and both the books and the profit may be confiscated. Further, in a book edited by Germar Rudolf titled *Dissecting the Holocaust – The Growing Critique of “Truth” and “Memory,”* it is noted that “if these sites are inaccessible in the country where you live, try an online anonymizing service.” The sites Rudolf refers to are his own publishing entities and websites: Castle Hill Publishers, Theses & Dissertations Press, www.vho.org, www.codoh.com, and www.Holocausthandbooks.com. As of February 2022, Rudolf is also seeking donations for his legal battles on his personal websites and on fundraising platforms such as GoFundMe.⁴⁰ Some listed books are also available on www.worldhistory.biz; however, one would hope that it is only a matter of time before countries and ISPs restrict access to it.

Whether the anonymous user who posted the 44-volume list on the NeinChan dark web site was interested in promoting sales of the books or just distributing them is beyond the legal scope of this research. However, the fact that most websites and hard copy sales are restricted in many European countries and by some ISPs may have prompted the anonymous user to publish some highlights of the books on the dark web, where users are often more tech-savvy and can bypass local internet restrictions – they are also more likely to know how to use cryptocurrency to purchase hard copies of these books. In any case, this would be an interesting avenue of investigation for journalists.

Evidence From Telegram Channels

Several examples from Telegram channels (groups) are presented and discussed below. Interestingly, as in the case of the dark web, some of the material is published to promote regular internet content or activities that are illegal and/or restricted by countries, ISPs, and content moderators on social media platforms. I have found numerous examples of Holocaust denial on Telegram groups; some are documented throughout the book as evidence. The amount of material is overwhelming, and it would take at least a team of researchers to analyze the material using computational methods. The collected material includes both sporadic comments and posts as well as dedicated channels that only discuss the Holocaust.

Here, I present several examples of Telegram channels, but I focus on the Telegram channel “HoloHoax Info Chan,” which had 1,342 subscribers as of

Table 4.1 Examples of Dedicated Holocaust Denial Channels on Telegram

<i>Channel Name</i>	<i>Link</i>	<i>Subscribers</i>
Holohoax Info Chan	https://t.me/holohoaxinfo	1,342
Hidden Truth	https://t.me/hiddentruthvideos	11,685
Holocaust Lies Exposed	https://t.me/holocaustliesexposed	2,873
The Bunker Final	https://t.me/ZuendelsBunker	341
Bunker Gate	https://t.me/TheBunkerGate	1,068
Holohoax	https://t.me/HolohoaxFacts	70
The Holohoax	https://t.me/Holohoaxer	25
Now You Know the Truth	https://t.me/NSDAPtruth	517
Holohoax Tracker	https://t.me/holohoaxtracker	9
HoloGems	https://t.me/ZisblattsDiamonds	1,286
РЕВИЗИОНИЗМ Холокоста [Revizionizm Kholokosta (Holocaust Revisionism)]	https://t.me/revisionholocaust	381

February 22, 2022, and, since its creation on March 2, 2021, had collected a total of 213,896 views and 130 posts. I would also like to highlight the channel “Holocaust Lies Exposed,” which on the same date had 2,873 subscribers, and which had garnered 1,319,567 views and 2,753 posts in total since its creation on July 14, 2021. There are other neo-Nazi Telegram channels that post material denying or distorting the Holocaust, and some of these will be discussed in the following chapters. Below, Table 4.1 shows a list of dedicated Holocaust denial channels on Telegram.⁴¹ Additional channels and groups on Telegram and other SMAs exist, but they are not publicly accessible. Also, other channels and groups promote Holocaust denial, but they promote it alongside other conspiracy theories.

The above-mentioned Telegram channels promote Holocaust denial or distortion material in several languages, mainly in English, German, and Russian. They all host simplistic, antisemitic, and ignorant discussions about the Holocaust as well as pseudo-scientific discussions of “true” Holocaust historiography. In general, most deny the Holocaust entirely, and, in these channels, it is regarded as either a form of Western, Soviet, and/or Jewish propaganda against Germany. For instance, on November 12, 2021, in an anonymous poll in the “Joe Turner Channel,” which was shared in “Holohoax Info Chan,” the administrator asked: “Which is the bigger lie? The Holohoax or the Coof?” This poll was posted immediately after the administrator of the poll, the architect of that group/community, had written:

We all know the Holocaust is a farce used to milk billions out of the White populations and to use and punish White people for the treatment of Jews, deservingly or not, over thousands of years. It’s a big lie.

Well we all also know the big covid lie as well and I have trouble making up my mind as to which is the bigger lie. Is Covid a bigger lie and conspiracy than the holohoax [*sic*]?

Vote in the poll below to say which is a bigger lie, the holohoax or the coof [COVID-19].

By February 22, 2022, 652 votes had been cast, one of which was mine. The result of the poll showed that 56% had voted for “The Holocaust,” 27% had voted for “About The Same,” 9% for “The Coof,” and 8% for “I Haven’t Made Up My Mind Yet.”⁴²

In the “Holohoax Info Chan” channel on Telegram, which was created on March 2, 2021, the Holocaust Handbook collection can also be found. It was shared by the administrator and owner of the channel on April 26, 2021, along with other propaganda material such as photographs, audio recordings, and videos by Holocaust deniers such as David Irving. In a shared post from May 30, 2021, the administrator shared a recommended reference list from the channel “Eva’s education course.” The list is titled “🔪 Red & White Pill documentaries” and includes no less than 95 titles that generally imply that the Holocaust is a myth and a fraud and that Jews are undermining peace and world order:

1. The Greatest Story Never Told (Original English Full Version HD 6h32min)
2. The Last Days Of The Big Lie
3. EUROPA – The Last Battle ~ The Full Documentary (2017)
4. In The Name Of Zion by Jeff K. (Full Documentary)
5. Hellstorm - The Genocide Of Germany By The Common Enemy HD
6. HÖLLENSTURM (OFFIZIELL) Die Vernichtung Deutschlands [Hellstorm In Deutsch]
7. New World Order Communism By The Backdoor
8. The Ultimate Red Pill
9. Adolf Hitler - A Last Appeal To Reason
10. One Third Of The Holocaust [HD Video HQ Sound]
11. The Bolshevik Revolution White Genocide Holodomor Holocaust Of White Europeans
12. Harvest of Despair (Holodomor) The 1932–33 Ukrainian Famine
13. Peace, Propaganda, & The Promised Land
14. The Israel Palestine Activists Who Became Human Shields
15. INTERNATIONAL JEWRY DECLARES WAR ON GERMANY
16. White Genocide 2018 Documentary
17. CODOH Éric Hunt Denial
18. SHOCKING Videos Of Israel Soldiers Abusing Palestinians
19. The Treblinka Archaeology Hoax 2014 By Eric Hunt (With German Sub)
20. Cremations Nonsense, Aktion Reinhardt
21. The Jewish Global Power Mechanism Explained 2017 (Jeff Kutzler) + Protocols books
22. Elie Wiesel’s Night Auschwitz Holohoax Looney Tunes Eric Hunt

23. Jewish Ritual Murder (The Full Original Banned Documentary)
24. Elie Wiesel And The Holocaust Fraud
25. The Jewish Gas Chamber Hoax
26. The Jewish Plan To Murder ALL Aryans (Holodomor)
27. Das Manifest Zur Brechung Der Zinsknechtschaft
28. Ethnic Germans A Forgotten Genocide
29. The Battle of Two Worlds Speech of Adolf Hitler (Borsigwerke)
30. The Red Pill
31. Trump: The ((snake poem)))
32. Why The Jews Hate Germany
33. The National Socialist Revolution (NSDAP) - by Esoteric Truths
34. Hitler: The Unknown Soldier (A Documentary)
35. DER JUDE WOLLTE DIESEN KRIEG Robert Ley, Adolf Hitler
36. Adolf Hitler's Struggle For Peace
37. Adolf Hitler Think Different
38. Multicultural Wehrmacht & Waffen SS
39. SACRIFICE National Socialism
40. Adolf Hitler This Is War!
41. What Hitler Said About War
42. Nicht Weißer Kamerad
43. Adolf Hitler Explains Why They Attacked Stalingrad
44. Truth Will Triumph Adolf Hitler
45. Alerta Judiada We Will Fight
46. ISIS EXPOSED
47. Adolf Hitler The European Crusade
48. Ein Farbiger Erzählt Die WAHRHEIT Zu Hitlers SWASTIKA Und Ihrer Herkunft (deutsche Untertitel)
49. World Awakening "jew\$" Lies By Pastor Ray Hagins
50. Apartheid
51. Adolf Hitler - The Cost Of War
52. Adolf Hitler - No Retreat, No Surrender; That Is German Law!
53. Adolf Hitler - A Woman's Struggle
54. Adolf Hitler's Warning
55. Satanyahu's Unit 8200 (Full Documentary)
56. Other Losses - Die Verschwiegene Geschichte Deutschlands Nach 1945
57. Das Erwachen Des Löwen
58. ☩ Is It Pagan ☩ By Dr. Joseph Goebbels ☩
59. Thanks Jews!
60. They Cannot Stop Us!
61. Kai Murros - We Will Make Them Pay
62. Der Ewige Jude (English Subtitles)
63. Adolf Hitler - A Man Against Time
64. Hitler Stood Up For Your Rights!
65. Angela Merkel Fordert DEUTSCHEN VÖLKERMORD! [100% Beweisvideo]
66. Adolf Hitler - German Volk, Remember What You Are!

67. Taking That Giant Red Pill, And Realizing That Adolf Hitler... Was RIGHT.
68. Operation Barbarossa
69. Adolf Hitler - You Said I Was A Dreamer
70. You Give Us More Scheckles Goyim!!!
71. The Early Years (Hitler and the NSDAP), by NSfilm
72. World Awakening Nationalists Were The Racists
73. The Jewish Problem Dr. Joseph Goebbels
74. Gauland: Zur Not sterben für Israel
75. One Day In Gaza 2019 Leaked Documentary
76. Anti Semitism Will Spread
77. The Rise Of Adolf Hitler And The NSDAP
78. Germanic National Socialism Adolf Hitler
79. Adolf Hitler On Cultural Marxism
80. Adolf Hitler Hitler Talks About Czechoslovakia
81. Adolf Hitler Hitler Talks About His Unconquerable Waffen SS
82. Adolf Hitler's Schwester Paula
83. Sie Kämpften Für Deutschland
84. How To Be A ZIONIST
85. Do You Support Israel?
86. Israel's New Racism The Persecution Of African Migrants In The Holy Land
87. Third Reich - Nobody has done more for peace than Adolf Hitler
88. Hate is good
89. On The Accusation That Hitler Created Israel
90. WAS HITLER A ROTHSCHILD AGENT? ADOLF HITLER THE LAST GREAT WHITE MAN
91. Accusing Hitler Of Being A Zionist
92. National Socialist Germany (tribute)
93. Verloren In Klessin (Lost In Klessin)
94. Adolf Hitler - Penser different
95. No More Apologies!

The channel “Hidden Truth,” which also refers to an open Telegram discussion group called “Legion of Truth,” presented an even more extensive reading/watch list for Holocaust deniers made up of 190 items.⁴³ Interestingly, many items on the above-mentioned list, and the 190-item list, have been disseminated via dozens of public groups. For instance, the video *Europa: The Last Battle* – which denies the Holocaust, blames the Jews for the outcome of the Second World War, and portrays Jews as the force behind communism – was shared in no less than 19 channels.⁴⁴ While it is difficult to calculate the precise number of Telegram users who were exposed to it, as some are members of several channels, the recommendation for this Holocaust denial video was probably seen by no fewer than 100,000 users.

On the channel “Bunker Gate,” the administrator(s) admitted to having other channels and accounts. The administrator(s) wrote that he/she had

decided to leave Telegram completely and abandon his/her channels, including the two channels “The Radicalization Library” and “Nigger Hate Archive.” The administrator(s) promised to refund any donations made with the Monero cryptocurrency (XMR). The “Bunker Gate” channel was created on May 6, 2021, to publish the private and public channels of, apparently, the same administrator(s). The channel refers to dozens of other channels that circulate very similar racist and antisemitic material, such as @bestofconsphole, @BunkerDocumentaries, @libsoftiktok, @tiktokhate, @HolocaustLiesExposed, @wsg_mirror, @conspnews, @Bunker_Audio, @donnersender_archiv, @BunkerClips, @pol_archive_threads, @biz_mirror, and @ZuendelsBunker. These include mirror channels and archived and/or banned channels. The administrator(s) also mentioned his/her contact email (kconsphole@protonmail.com) and the Monero address for donations.⁴⁵ The message was also circulated on other channels, such as “Holocaust Lies Exposed.” In the groups, the administrator(s) also shared a link to a Tor dark web site (<https://3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion>).

This type of propaganda circulation is not something to ignore, as it requires a significant investment of technical expertise, funding, time, and hardware, including dedicated servers, computers, and handheld devices. This leads me to assume that those who operate this Holocaust denial, anti-semitism, and racism propaganda mechanism are an organized group of like-minded extremists who have orchestrated this operation to influence the far right, whether in the United States or Europe. The Monero address for donations is the same in all groups. The address is valid and is on the Mainnet network, meaning that it is not registered on test networks such as testnet or regnet. However, transactions associated with the address could not be found.⁴⁶

An open-source search for the email address provided by the administrator of “The Bunker Gate” does provide certain useful information. On November 26 and 27, 2021, the @forotrail profile on the conservative social media platform Gettr published several posts that included the email address, the mentioned Telegram channel and other channels, the same Monero address, and a hashtag for the far-right blog Zero Hedge #ZeroHedge.⁴⁷ This hashtag was also used by several prominent figures on Gettr, including the far-right influencer Steve Bannon, who served as a chief strategist in the Donald Trump administration.⁴⁸

The fact that a single administrator or group operates and manages this Holocaust denial and conspiracy circulation operation indicates that they have developed an online community that they now nurture. They can be referred to as the community architect(s). Since most of their groups restrict interaction – subscribers can only view or share content – most subscribers are passive lurkers who only consume content. While Telegram is much more accessible than the Tor dark web, dark web sites such as 8kun, Endchan, ni-chan, NeinChan, and many others allow more interaction – any user can comment, post, and share.

Having seen innumerable offensive Holocaust denial posts, I decided to ask users about the Holocaust and about material that denies or distorts it. One user, who calls himself/herself Werner Naumann on Telegram, contacted me and shared dozens of files and several links to websites promoting Holocaust denial. The real Werner Naumann, it should be noted, was a state secretary in Joseph Goebbels' Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda and was later appointed Head of the Propaganda Ministry by Adolf Hitler. When I asked this Telegram user if he/she thought the Holocaust had actually happened or not, he/she shared a meme illustration of two dogs, with the writing: "Inside you, there are two dogs; [One is saying] It never happened; [Another is saying] They Deserve It; Both are Right." He/she later went on to claim that the Holocaust had been fabricated for propaganda purposes – to demonize National Socialism and mortify the German population into compliance.

Other users in other Telegram groups replied to my questions about purchasing the Holocaust Handbook collection and referred me to Rudolf Germar's websites, including www.vho.com and www.codoh.com. They noted that it was dangerous to order hard copies using a credit card since you might be rejected and stigmatized by credit card companies. They suggested using cryptocurrency and noted that banks are also engaged in censorship, extending the will of the governments. When I asked to learn more about the Holocaust, the administrator of the channel "Now You Know the Truth" replied:

I see where you are coming from. The view as a whole is this: if the Holocaust happened the exact way they said it did, then we know that they are using it to their advantage and that if we understand the ideology and the actions of Adolf Hitler, then we know exactly why the Holocaust happened without the liberal historical view clouding it. On the other hand, if it did not happen the way they said it did, then it has become the greatest fabrication in the history of mankind. Either way, what is essential for you to know is that they use this as a sympathy tool to do whatever they want. They are at the very top of this hierarchy in the world. Before Nazi Germany, they were up there, then they sank, and now they are the ultimate being, towering over every other race on earth.

Here, the Telegram administrator used the word "they" to indicate Jews.

On February 27, 2022, the administrator of the Telegram channel "Bruderschaft_thule" published a video about Ursula Haverback, who I mentioned earlier in this chapter. Haverback was sentenced to prison in Germany for denying the Holocaust. Some members of the channel praised Haverback, and one member who called themselves @-&)# wrote that the Holocaust was a Jewish lie and that their country, which forbids Holocaust denial, is ruled by Jews:

She was put in prison at 90 for speaking the truth. She was there at the time and was accused of lying. We have a law here that forbids us to tell the truth because we are ruled by Jews. This highly intelligent woman fights for her people. She survived the war, the murders by the Soviet soldiers and the Americans. If we free ourselves, this woman will get a memorial!

The truth doesn't have to have a law to protect it, a lie does.

Conclusion

Since the very beginning of the internet, it has been embraced by neo-Nazis and White supremacists who grasped the potential of a complex communication system that is difficult to regulate and moderate. There are two main reasons for the migration of neo-Nazis, first to the regular internet and then to anonymous platforms such as the Tor dark web and Telegram. In the first place, neo-Nazis perceived radio, print, and television to be hostile media outlets that are controlled by Jews, and, since they could not easily or significantly disseminate their propaganda via traditional media, they chose to migrate to the online domain – the regular internet. However, following public and official pressure to moderate, censor, and regulate the regular internet and even social media platforms, many neo-Nazis chose to migrate once again from the regular internet to the anonymous internet – to dark webs and SMAs such as Telegram. In short, because mainstream media and social media have gatekeepers, neo-Nazis attempt to avoid them.

The second reason for the neo-Nazi migration to the online domain and anonymous platforms is to do with the law. Because some countries prohibit racism, antisemitism, and Holocaust denial, many neo-Nazis are afraid of being fined or imprisoned. In some cases, their only way to promote or sell their material is to publish it on the dark web or Telegram channels and to use cryptocurrency. Using regular internet and social media platforms without social accountability, such as Gab or Gettr, or using Tor and Telegram allows neo-Nazis to avoid prosecution. They can also build and maintain their community of global neo-Nazism without concerning themselves with physical borders or local laws. Interestingly, many neo-Nazis attempt to stay anonymous while engaging in the extensive promotion of propaganda. For instance, in the case of Holocaust denial, they do not disseminate material on a single website, channel, or platform; rather, they share content in a hybrid manner: on regular websites that allow it, on archives of websites, on the dark web, and in Telegram groups. As for the structure of neo-Nazi online communities, I have come to the as yet unverified conclusion that only a handful of neo-Nazis and White supremacists operate the entire conspiracy theory marketing campaign, and the hundreds of thousands of other users are merely lurkers, consumers of content. To verify this assumption, however, technology companies will have to de-anonymize users, something which is unlikely to happen.

Lastly, it should be noted that there is no lack of hostile, racist, and anti-semitic content and organized groups on the regular internet and fringe

social media. Neo-Nazis, and White supremacists in general, are engaged on many platforms. However, since some websites issue notices about their dark web backup sites, it is safe to assume that neo-Nazis understand that when technology companies come under enough public and financial pressure, they will censor hostilities, even in countries such as the United States where the First Amendment protects neo-Nazism – that is, the American government might not censor these groups directly, but American companies will.

Notes

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- and/or via an indirect routing mechanism such as a VPN. This has been checked and verified using personal browsers from a British IP address as well as using www.blocked.org.uk and www.geotargetly.com.
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- 45 Monero (XMR) address for donations: 85eb8TT9C5BAJnTno4ws6LEyAN4B B26NXWcX4r4G7U6D9ZmWgCLBvnsSPqETdX4Njo2mw9m5LwBiQdTgwr32Fhq3VQhEusW
- 46 Monero (XMR) information is publicly visible at <https://xmchain.net>.
The associated keys for the Monero address are:
View Key: 351110d6c8853897d196779672197e0a9c3f9386f978e9d9fb22917c362342fb
Spend Key: 5452b21d0bc25e37a40070393235dd5382d1b6da6037dcb10a77a3ccd7777a33
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5 Antisemitism on the Dark Web

Traditional Conspiracy Theories on New Technologies

The dark web, and anonymous communications in general, are the perfect platform for extremists, terrorists, criminals, and, in the context of this book, neo-Nazis. As mentioned, anonymous communication platforms allow users to hide behind a digital veil and lower their risk of being exposed – thereby lowering the risk of social pressure and consequences as well as the risk of legal prosecution. Neo-Nazis can certainly disseminate their propaganda on the regular internet; however, with the growing pressure on technology companies to stay “clean,” the only platforms on which they can communicate openly and freely are the dark web and other anonymous ones such as Telegram. Hate speech on the dark web does not have to be legal, though there is such a thing as “legal racism” – freedom of speech such as that protected by the First Amendment in the United States. Illegal racism is that which crosses the line between words and actions. This process is further explained in the next chapter. In general, racism is illegal if it incites violence based on racial or antisemitic prejudice.

Racism and antisemitism on the dark web are intriguing phenomena, as this hate speech is not officially associated with a location, group, or form of identity (although users do mention their unverified locations at times). While this may also be true of the regular internet and social media, at least to some extent, the dark web acts as a cloud of ideas that float around without any particular association with the users who are their proponents. Far-right activists have brought about a proliferation of social media in the United States and prompted technology companies to create “free speech” or exclusively right-wing social media platforms such as Gab and Gettr. One must also keep in mind that, while the Tor dark web was originally an American intelligence project, it has, by now, spread around the world, and its users come from various countries and have various identities and incentives. Racist and antisemitic propaganda can even be a type of disinformation-based influence campaign. For these reasons, my goal in this chapter is to analyze not the surveyed users, who are anonymous, but the essence of their words. As mentioned in the introduction, this book focuses on the songs, not the band.

Thus, this chapter aims to answer several questions: What are the main trends of racism and antisemitism on the dark web, who are the main victims

(targets), and how are they mainly targeted? And does antisemitism on the dark web differ significantly from traditional antisemitism, discrimination, and action against Jews, considering the fact that, as the data shows, Jews are the main targets of neo-Nazis? These questions are addressed in three main parts. First, I explain what antisemitism is and how it can be defined. Second, the general outline and co-occurrence findings are explained. Third, several significant case studies are presented and compared to the theory outlined in the previous chapters. Methodologically, this chapter is based on an analysis of 264 different expressions of racism and antisemitism on various websites on the dark web, including boards, forums, chats, blogs, social media websites, marketplaces, and pastebins. The method used to gather this data is a convenience sample. This method was used because many dark web sites change their metadata, archives, appearance, domain addresses, and content to be more anonymous. There is no convenient yet cost-efficient method to gather data from the dark web unless one focuses on a single website, and, while entire law enforcement agencies and large technology companies attempt to do so, it is outside the price range of junior academic research grants. The data is analyzed quantitatively using co-occurrence analysis (cross-tabulation), and several selected case studies are qualitatively compared to common theories and definitions of racism and antisemitism. In the next chapter, several case studies are used to exemplify how the words on a random forum can lead to actions, hate crimes, and terrorism.

Antisemitism: What It Is and How to Define It

Antisemitism, in essence the hatred of Jews, is both a societal and governmental phenomenon in which Jews are persecuted, discriminated against, hated, blamed for almost every negative social crisis, and, at the worst of times, murdered. Dubbed “the longest hatred” by the renowned scholar Robert Wistrich (1994), antisemitism has many forms, expressions, explanations, and excuses. Throughout history, Jews have been blamed for almost every negative event, whether by pagans, Christians, or Muslims (Wistrich, 2013, pp. 1–17, 349–364). In this section, where I explain what antisemitism is and how to define it, it is not my intention to outline the entire historical path of the phenomenon but to explain its significant ideas and tropes and the main related conspiracy theories.

In the earliest years of Judaism, pagan societies, which worshiped many gods, tried to eradicate the Jewish people due to their different beliefs and minority status as believers in a single God. Interestingly, the ancient negative attitudes toward Jewish people were not so much racist as reactive, Machiavellian, and of a social and political nature, in the sense that the pagans perceived Jewish particularism to be a threat. For instance, in the period 160–67 BCE the Jewish people, specifically the Maccabeans, rebelled against the Seleucid Empire – the Hellenistic Greek king and leader of Judea, Antiochus IV Epiphanes. Epiphanes persecuted the Jews and enforced several discriminative decrees. He tried to force the Jews to abandon Judaism

and adopt paganism, i.e., to worship many other gods, he tried to eradicate the Sabbath, and he made the Jews eat non-kosher food, along with many other anti-Jewish decrees (see Blech, 2006; Klein, 1984; Ruether, 1974, pp. 23–30; Wistrich, 2010, pp. 79–107).

Antisemitism, as we know it today, increased with the spread of the Roman Empire and Christianity. Christianity actually began as a sect of the Jewish religion. But as it evolved, and after Jesus had been executed by the Roman Empire, antisemitism in its worst form started to emerge, as the Jews were collectively perceived as the killers of Christ. Subsequently, as the Roman Empire conquered and spread throughout Europe, parts of the Middle East, and parts of the Maghreb, Christianity spread with it, as well as the hatred of Jews (Klein, 1984; Ruether, 1974, pp. 184–194; Wistrich, 2010).

European Christians, descendants of the Greco-Roman and Hellenistic empires, were encouraged by clergymen to persecute, discriminate against, and even murder Jews, whether to make up for their past sins or to make the alleged killers of Christ suffer. Jews were treated as scapegoats and forced to wear yellow identification tags to differentiate them from mainstream society or religion, long before the Nazi regime compelled the Jews to wear similar tags. Later, Jews were blamed for various negative events. For example, in the 14th century, Jews were blamed for spreading the Black Death (Black Plague) and accused of murdering Christian children to bake matzoh bread out of their blood; they were not allowed to own land or join a labor guild (Laqueur, 2006, pp. 39–70; Wistrich, 2010). One of the first documented cases of blood libel took place in Norwich, England, in 1144: English Jews were blamed for murdering a young Christian boy to bake their Passover matzoh bread (Julius, 2010, pp. 109–118; Laqueur, 2006, pp. 39–70).

Throughout history, Jews have suffered from both organized and sporadic violence, as leaders blamed them for social, political, and economic problems – many believed that Jews had sinister plans and conspiracies against humanity, specifically against non-Jews. As science, racial theories, and enlightenment in general advanced, the Jews' status declined even further. The Jewish people were not only discriminated against by Christians, Aryans, and Western Europeans, they were generally characterized as a threat to humanity. As Wistrich (2010) argued, the road from deicide to genocide was not always smooth, and the myths of the all-powerful “Semites,” agents of Satan, grew more powerful over time. The combined legacy of ancient, Christian, medieval, and pseudo-scientific and enlightened anti-Jewishness led modern schools of social thought, such as socialism and fascism, to create an ultimate plan to deal with the Jews. The outcome of this antisemitic populism through the ages, catalyzed by the birth of modernity, was of course the Holocaust – the largest organized crime against Jews and against humanity that has been committed to date (Boyer, 1981; Geehr, 1982).

In the 20th and 21st centuries, antisemitism changed from the earlier religious or pseudo-scientific types. The two types blended together. Christian tropes started to be used by secular people, emancipation was applied only to one's own nation, in a fascist manner, and regimes, institutions, and politicians

began to embrace antisemitism for their own benefit – it came to be used in a very Machiavellian way as a political propaganda tool. The Jews were blamed for wars, economic problems, unemployment, the spread of disease and illness, unsolved criminal cases, and murders. The Jews represented the communist enemy to the Nazis; later, they represented the capitalist enemy to the Soviets. They were too rich, too poor, not educated enough, too educated, too particular and enclosed, or too general and cosmopolitan. The Jews were the ultimate scapegoat (Wistrich, 2010, pp. 79–107, 600–631, 929–939).

In addition, anti-Zionism, the opposition to a Jewish state, emerged in the late 19th century and grew particularly strong after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. Putting aside discussions related to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the argument that Jews do not deserve their own state is extremely discriminatory – it is antisemitic. If Christians, Muslims, and every other community, nation, or people are entitled to their own state, so are the Jews (Topor, 2018, 2021).

Although non-antisemitic anti-Zionism can exist, at least in theory, most cases of anti-Zionism are antisemitic. This “new” antisemitism is very similar to the classic types. The demonization of Israel cannot be mistaken for legitimate criticism (Sicher, 2011; Topor, 2018). As Johnson (2016) argued in a report about antisemitism in the British Labour Party, antisemitism was once “justified” using religious, cosmopolitan, pseudo-scientific, communist, and capitalist arguments. Now, antisemites justify it as an opposition to Israel’s right to existence. Once, Jews were persecuted and discriminated against because of their religion; now, in addition to all other issues, they are persecuted and discriminated against because of the Jewish state (Bergmann, 2013; Sacks, 2017).

Generally, and without expounding further on the history of antisemitism, it is a negative belief that people hold, in which they perceive Jews as negative or hostile. According to the ADL Global 100 Index, people perceive Jews as:

1. More loyal to Israel than to the country they live in.
2. Having too much power in the business world.
3. Having too much power in international financial markets.
4. Still talking too much about what happened to them during the Holocaust.
5. Uncaring about what happens to anyone but their own kind.
6. Having too much control over global affairs.
7. Having too much control over the United States government.
8. Thinking they are better than other people.
9. Having too much control over the global media.
10. Responsible for most of the world’s wars.
11. Finally, people hate Jews because of the way they behave.¹

Nowadays, according to the definition of antisemitism put forward by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA),² people express

antisemitism in public life, in the workplace, in schools, in the media, on social media, and even in religious spheres. Generally, antisemitism is based on anti-Jewish perceptions (as described in the above list) and includes:

- Calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion.
- Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as a collective – such as, especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government, or other societal institutions.
- Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews.
- Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g., gas chambers), or intentionality of the genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of National Socialist Germany and its supporters and accomplices during World War II (the Holocaust).
- Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust.
- Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.
- Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a state of Israel is a racist endeavor, and applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.
- Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis.
- Drawing comparisons between contemporary Israeli policy and that of the Nazis.
- Holding Jews collectively responsible for the actions of the State of Israel.³

As I demonstrate in the following sections, antisemitism is also expressed in similar ways on the dark web.

Antisemitism and Racism on the Dark Web: Trends and Concepts

This section presents and explains the co-occurrences between perpetrators, their targets, types of websites, and types of manifestations. The findings are also connected to the theories about White supremacy, antisemitism, and racism that were introduced and discussed in Chapter 3. With the help of a research assistant, I analyzed each of the 264 cases and coded them according to their targets, perpetrators, type of manifestations, and type and name of websites. The codes for this analysis are presented in Table 5.1 below. They

Table 5.1 Coding Groups of Antisemitic and Racist Trends on the Tor Dark Web

<i>Targets</i>	<i>Perpetrators</i>	<i>Type of Manifestation</i>	<i>Type of Website</i>	<i>Name of Website</i>
Arabs	Neo-Nazis	Call for Action	Blog	• 8chan
Asians	White Supremacists	Conspiracy Theory	Chat	• 16chan
Black People	Unknown Perpetrator	Conspiracy about the Holocaust	Forum/ Board	• Ableonion
Indigenous/ Latino People	Extreme Islamists	General Racism	Marketplace	• Anon Café
Muslims		Doxxing	Pastebin	• Balkanchan
Jews		Reference	Social Network	• Connect
Christians				• Dailystormer
				• DeepPaste
				• Democratie Participative
				• Dread
				• Dream Market
				• Endchan
				• Europe Ecologie Les Bruns
				• Fatchan
				• Go Beyond
				• Hidden Answers
				• MultiChan
				• NeinChan
				• NeuChan
				• Ni-Chan
				• Onion FTP Database
				• The Archive
				• The Hidden Wiki
				• Tightrope
				• Truthboard
				• TruthLeaks

are based on heuristic definitions of races and religions as presented by the anonymous users. Therefore, for instance, I chose to code “Arabs” and “Muslims” separately, as the terms are used separately on the web. Neo-Nazi perpetrators and White supremacists were also coded separately since in some cases the perpetrators used Nazi expressions, and in others they did not. However, as these findings are based on the previously outlined theories of neo-Nazism and White supremacy, in the following sections, I refer to both cases as if they were the same. As Chapter 3 made clear – neo-Nazis are White supremacists.

Co-Occurrence Between Racist Perpetrators, Targets, Manifestations, and Websites

The findings presented below are worrisome due to the nature of the manifestations. Neo-Nazis on the dark web openly call for action to be taken

Table 5.2 Co-Occurrence Between Targets and Types of Manifestation

	<i>Arabs</i> Gr=12	<i>Asians</i> Gr=23	<i>Black</i> <i>People</i> Gr=66	<i>Christians</i> Gr=11	<i>Indigenous/</i> <i>Latino</i> <i>People</i> Gr=0	<i>Jews</i> Gr=211	<i>Muslims</i> Gr=21
Call for Action Gr=81	6	5	31	4	0	62	9
Conspiracy about Holocaust Gr=24	0	0	2	0	0	24	0
Conspiracy Theory Gr=184	6	18	40	5	0	171	13
Doxxing Gr=14	1	1	7	0	0	9	0
General Racism Gr=21	5	6	11	0	0	15	5
Reference Gr=21	0	0	1	1	0	15	0

against non-Whites, mainly against Jews and Black people, in the form of violence, harassment, or doxxing. They spread various conspiracy theories and post material to be used for “education” (reference). For instance, Table 5.2 shows the co-occurrence between the targets and the type of manifestation. Of the 264 cases, 171 conspiracy theories targeted Jews, 40 targeted Black people, 18 targeted Asians, 13 targeted Muslims, and 6 targeted Arabs. Jews were doxxed 9 times, and Black people were doxxed 7 times. Neo-Nazis called for action to be taken against Jews on 62 occasions and against Black people on 31 occasions. The co-occurrence numbers for all combinations can be seen in Table 5.2.

Which platforms do neo-Nazis mainly visit on the dark web, and what type of manifestations do they post on each platform? Table 5.3 shows that, in 131 of the 264 cases, neo-Nazis used forums and boards to post conspiracy theories, and they posted 34 conspiracy theories on blogs. They posted 53 calls for action on forums and boards and doxxed their targets 9 times on pastebins and 5 times on forums and boards. The anonymous users also posted references to neo-Nazi material and conspiracy theories 14 times on forums and boards and 4 times on blogs. The rest of the co-occurrences can be seen in Table 5.3.

Neo-Nazis target various races, ethnicities, and religions on the dark web. Their racist and antisemitic posts appear on various platforms. Texts about all targets appear mainly on forums and boards as posts and comments. For instance, as presented in Table 5.4, of the 264 cases, Jews appear 151 times

Table 5.3 Co-Occurrence Between Types of Website and Types of Manifestation

	<i>Call for Action</i> Gr=81	<i>Conspiracy about Holocaust</i> Gr=24	<i>Conspiracy Theory</i> Gr=184	<i>Doxxing</i> Gr=14	<i>General Racism</i> Gr=21	<i>Reference</i> Gr=21
Blog Gr=36	5	12	34	0	0	4
Chat Gr=5	4	0	4	0	4	0
Forum/ Board Gr=176	53	11	131	5	13	14
Market place Gr=2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pastebin Gr=15	14	0	2	9	2	1
Social Network Gr=8	3	1	5	0	1	0

on forums and boards, Black people appear 45 times, Asians appear 15 times, Muslims appear 13 times, Christians appear 10 times, Arabs appear 8 times, and Indigenous/Latino people, who are often referred to by neo-Nazis as “Indians” (that is, not people from India), do not appear. Interestingly, neo-Nazi activities on the dark web perpetuate common and traditional concepts of antisemitism, such as the promotion of structured conspiracy theories about Jews, and Jews have a significant presence in blogs compared to other targets – they appear 35 times in blog posts. Thus, neo-Nazis dedicate entire blogs to their hatred of Jews and, as demonstrated in the examples in the following section, perceive Jews as their main target or nemesis. The remainder of the co-occurrences can be seen in Table 5.4.

Another question that arises from the exploration of dark web racism and antisemitism, which applies to these trends in general as well as on the regular web, is that of the archnemesis – that is, which groups of people are the main concern of neo-Nazis? Interestingly, as presented in Table 5.5, Jews and Black people are the two groups that appear together the most often, and, as further presented in particular examples, neo-Nazis employ racist, antisemitic, and conspiracy-driven arguments against Jews and Black people more than they do against other groups. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Jews have been blamed for the global COVID-19 pandemic, despite the existing anti-Asian racism that has caused Asians, and Chinese people in particular, to be blamed for COVID-19. Similarly, Black people are generally blamed for crime, despite the existence of anti-Muslim and anti-Arab sentiments among neo-Nazis. Several significant examples are presented in the following sections to explain these trends.

Table 5.4 Co-Occurrence Between Types of Website and Targets

	<i>Arabs</i> Gr=12	<i>Asians</i> Gr=23	<i>Black</i> <i>People</i> Gr=66	<i>Christians</i> Gr=11	<i>Indigenous/</i> <i>Latino</i> <i>People</i> Gr=0	<i>Jews</i> Gr=211	<i>Muslims</i> Gr=21
Blog Gr=36	1	2	4	0	0	35	3
Chat Gr=5	1	1	5	0	0	4	1
Forum/ Board Gr=176	8	15	45	10	0	151	13
Market place Gr=2	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
Pastebin Gr=15	1	1	6	0	0	7	0
Social Network Gr=8	1	1	2	1	0	5	1

Table 5.5 Co-Occurrence Between Targets

	<i>Arabs</i> Gr=12	<i>Asians</i> Gr=23	<i>Black</i> <i>People</i> Gr=66	<i>Christians</i> Gr=11	<i>Indigenous/</i> <i>Latino</i> <i>People</i> Gr=0	<i>Jews</i> Gr=211	<i>Muslims</i> Gr=21
Arabs Gr=12	0	6	9	1	0	10	10
Asians Gr=23	6	0	13	0	0	22	8
Black People Gr=66	9	13	0	3	0	50	14
Christians Gr=11	1	0	3	0	0	7	3
Indigenous/ Latino People Gr=3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jews Gr=211	10	22	50	7	0	0	16
Muslims Gr=21	10	8	14	3	0	16	0

As Table 5.5 shows, Black people are mentioned in conjunction with Jews 50 times, 14 times with Muslims, 13 times with Asians, 9 times with Arabs, and 3 times with Christians. Jews, aside from being mentioned with Black people 50 times, are mentioned 22 times with Asians, 16 times

with Muslims, 10 times with Arabs, and 7 times with Christians. The rest of the co-occurrences can be seen in Table 5.5.

Explaining the Trends: Jews and Black People First

The preceding overview of trends and co-occurrences has shown that Jews and Black people are the main targets of neo-Nazis/White supremacists. The two groups appear together most frequently, and neo-Nazis call for action against them and spread conspiracy theories about them the most. Although other groups, mainly Muslims and Asians, also suffer from racism, neo-Nazis on the dark web do not stray far from their ideological ancestry. This is not to in any way suggest that other people suffer less from racism in real life; these details simply highlight the core of neo-Nazi and White supremacist ideology. Interestingly, “cyber” neo-Nazis on the dark web perceive Jews as the “brains” behind alleged conspiracies of global domination and Black people, Muslims, or immigrants in general as the “brawn.” In their writing, they argue that not only does the pure White race suffer from sinister Jewish plans, but other races do as well – thus, neo-Nazis argue that although Black people and Muslims are inferior to the White race, they too are being manipulated by Jews, who are directing them to act against Whites.

In the case of Black people, neo-Nazis on the dark web describe them as less than human, associate them with evils such as crime, and call for White domination over non-Whites. Neo-Nazis on the dark web do not stray significantly from the original Nazi and/or White supremacy ideology – that the White race is superior to all. In the case of Jews, neo-Nazis on the dark web do shift away from historical stereotypes and tropes to focus mainly on more contemporary conspiracy theories. As explained in Chapter 3, throughout history, Jews have been perceived as killers of Christ, inhuman, associated with the devil and all evil, and dispossessed from God’s inheritance. They have also been associated with finances and greed, the manipulation and control of innocent (Christian) people, and even murderous rituals such as the killing of children or the poisoning of wells. In Nazi Germany, Jews were described as the archenemy of the *Volk*, inhuman and tainted with evil characteristics such as greed and manipulation. In contrast, neo-Nazis on the dark web appeal to more contemporary antisemitic conspiracy theories. Their antisemitism is Nazi or racial in nature rather than religious, and they associate Jews with manipulation, control, and greed. Like their regular web counterparts, they use “echo” or triple parentheses around a word to describe it as Jewish – for instance, the (((system))).⁴

Antisemitic Conspiracies: Old Thoughts on New Platforms

In this part, I focus mainly on antisemitism and compare the trends on the dark web to ancient and traditional anti-Jewish attitudes and conspiracy theories to explain each significant conspiracy theory or concept. Each of

the below examples is structured similarly: I explain the case and then its background. I also discuss immediate implications where applicable – for instance, in the case of doxxing. While I base my analysis on several key cases, I have seen other cases of a similar nature that have had to be excluded for reasons of space and focus.

Case 1: “Niggers, Jews... Bad News”

Jews and Black people are the go-to subjects of neo-Nazi and White supremacist racism and conspiracy theories. As explained above, neo-Nazis consider Jews to be sophisticated and manipulative and Black people to be brutal criminals. In a screenshot taken from the dark web site 16chan (Figure 5.1),



Figure 5.1 An Antisemitic and Racist Poster on 16chan.

an anonymous user posted an illustration of Jews and Black people – this illustration very succinctly presents neo-Nazi thought and reads: “Niggers, Jews... Bad News!”

In the illustration, the righthand figure has a stereotypical Jewish look (i.e., large nose, poor eyesight corrected by glasses, baldness) and represents a wealthy, well-dressed lawyer or banker who manipulates markets such as rental prices. The Jew is reaching out his hand – demanding payment. Thus, this figure not only perpetuates racial stereotypes but also conspiracy theories, such as those associating Jews with greed and finances – conspiracy theories that, as explained in Chapter 3, date back centuries.

On the left side of this illustration, a Black man is depicted with stereotypical physical characteristics – a wide nose, large lips and mouth, and dressed in a coat and hat that represent less sophisticated or common clothing. He is holding a gun and is also reaching out his hand to demand payment, threatening the (likely White) victim not with a financial notice, as the Jew is doing, but with a gun. The Black man is depicted as a criminal.

This type of racism and antisemitism is not exclusive to anonymous communications such as the dark web. Racist and antisemitic illustrations or posts are shared daily on all types of social media. However, while proper moderation can ensure such posts are removed from the regular web, it cannot be done as easily on the dark web, let alone on a dark web site operated by neo-Nazis and White supremacists.

The illustration in Figure 5.1 highlights the conceptual framework within which White supremacist neo-Nazis operate. Interestingly, the scapegoating of Jews and Black people is also promoted on the regular web and on more restricted Telegram channels. One particular example of interest is a survey conducted by the administrators of the Telegram channel “///Racism still Accelerationism,” which was shut down by Telegram itself; entry to the channel was barred in May 2022, with the note: “This channel can’t be displayed because it violated Telegram’s Terms of Service.”

Although the survey was conducted on “///Racism still Accelerationism,” it was forwarded to other channels, such as “Cricket house 3///0” and “Random Thoughts For Plebs.” One forwarded message depicted a Jew and a Black person in a stereotypical and racist manner similar to Figure 5.1, asking: “If you drop a wallet to the ground, who’s gonna reach it first? JEWS - or- NIGGERS” (see Figure 5.2). On December 14, 2021, the actual poll run by the administrators of “///Racism still Accelerationism” had 2,065 views and 882 replies. The poll was anonymous, and its results were as follows: 18% answered that “Niggers” would reach for the wallet first; 18% answered that “Jews” would; 58% answered, “I’m white, I’ll find you and return your wallet with everything still in it”; and another 6% answered with what seems to be a facetious option: “I’m gay, I’ll keep your wallet and stick it up my ass” (see Figure 5.3).

Although this example deviates from the focus of this chapter, the dark web, it provides significant support for the information collected on the dark web about neo-Nazi ideas and main concepts. First, the anonymous poll




Figure 5.2 Antisemitic and Racist Poll Promotion on Telegram.




Figure 5.3 An Antisemitic and Racist Poll on Telegram.

reveals that Jews and Black people are associated with greediness and theft. Second, the facetious option about gay people reveals that neo-Nazis also have highly homophobic attitudes. Third, neo-Nazis perceive themselves as not only physically superior but also morally superior to other groups. The

fact that the poll included an option stating that the respondent is White and will therefore return the wallet suggests an underlying idea that White people are not greedy and do not steal.

Case 2: “Blacks vs. Jews”

Another popular topic in the neo-Nazi domain is race wars; this refers both to a war between the White race and others as well as to their goal of turning various people and religions against each other. This sinister neo-Nazi conspiracy, exaggerated though it may be, can create new or intensify existing rifts and conflicts between people. While Jews and Black people generally support each other against racism and antisemitism, especially in the United States, neo-Nazis try to create and widen rifts between the groups.

In the example in Figure 5.4, from 16chan, an anonymous user posted a discussion with the title “Blacks vs. Jews,” in which he/she argued that



Figure 5.4 An Antisemitic and Racist Thread on 16chan.

Black people need to be turned against Jews. Other users also contributed to the sinister scheme, arguing that Black people need to be encouraged to blame Jews for European and American racism and slavery instead of White European people:

If you get the blacks to start demanding publically [*sic*] that jews hand over some shekels, I am pretty sure their greedy and prideful nature of the jews would be ot [*sic*] tell niggers to go fuck themselves... [*sic*]

An incitement to violence – “R A C E W A R N O W!” – is also included in the post; this would probably have been removed if it had appeared on regular social media.

Case 3: “KIKE FAMILY [JEWISH FAMILY DOXX]”

One illegal act that is frequently carried out using anonymous communications is doxxing – the act of “seeking and publicly publishing online private or identifying information about an individual or a group with the purpose of exposing them to other online users.”⁵ The purpose of doxxing is to harass people or ruin their reputation. For instance, abusive internet users who gain access to this private information might make abusive phone calls, send emails, visit people in their homes or workplaces, or worse. While doxxing also happens on the regular web, monitoring, regulation, and legal action can easily ensure that private information is removed from websites because websites, and ISPs in general, are accountable for their content.⁶ Doxxed information on anonymous platforms such as the dark web or Telegram groups is much harder to monitor and remove.

In the example in Figure 5.5, an anonymous user posted several items of private information on a dark web pastebin – a website that allows users to anonymously paste any text they desire. His/her chosen title of “KIKE FAMILY” leaves no doubt that this doxxing is antisemitic. I have censored the actual details and names in the figure since I do not want to further expose this family’s personal information. The anonymous antisemitic user posted addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, social media accounts, names of family members, and more. In this post, he/she also wrote that the family members being doxxed were “Millionaire kikes who work for the ADL.”

This kind of doxxing can have very dangerous consequences, as it is not meant to discredit anyone’s reputation but to enable like-minded anti-semitic users on the dark web to harass this Jewish family by going to their house, calling them, and emailing them. There is no indication of how severe the consequences might be – one victim might be harassed by phone and another might be attacked. Having been exposed to many doxxing posts over the years, I can only conclude that antisemitic and racist doxxing should be regarded as incitement to violence. However, this is the reason it is more often done on the dark web or Telegram than on mainstream social media or regular websites.




Figure 5.5 A Doxxing Post Targeting a Jewish Woman and Her Family.

Case 4: “The Jewish Roots of Modern China”

Over the centuries, Jews have been the common scapegoat of many societies. As explained in Chapter 3, each society adapted antisemitism for its own purposes. With the birth of modern political ideologies such as communism, capitalism, Nazism, and fascism, antisemites siding with one ideology blamed Jews for the other – capitalists blamed Jews for communism, and communists blamed Jews for capitalism. Nazis and fascists blamed Jews for both communism and capitalism.



Figure 5.6 A Post on Tor Website 16chan Blaming Jews for Chinese Communism.

In the example in Figure 5.6, an anonymous user posted about Jewish influence in modern China. The user made an effort to present the ideas and information graphically and posted it as a picture file on the dark web site 16chan. While there is no indication as to whether this illustration was created by the user or simply shared by them, the fact that it was posted as a picture, not as text, suggests that the anonymous user wanted it to be shared across many platforms (as illustrations and memes are often shared more easily online).

The post includes prominent socialist and Marxist figures, including Karl Marx, Vladimir I. Lenin, Jacob Rosenberg, Israel Epstein, and Sidney Shapiro, who are all depicted with a Nazi-era yellow Star of David with the word “Jude” on it. Thus, this post, on a dark web neo-Nazi discussion board, suggests that they blame Jews for communism and Marxism, and specifically for Chinese communism. In the illustration, it is mentioned that “Jews dominated Mao Tse Tung’s inner circle”; “85 to 90% of the foreigners helping the Chinese at the time of Communist takeover were Jewish”; and “Modern China is literally founded on Jewish political philosophies and they have been extremely influential in them to this day.”

Case 5: “Jews must also be sterilized or killed”

Incitement to violence, not only on a racial basis, is illegal in many parts of the world as well as in the United States. While free speech, even if




Figure 5.7 A Post on Tor Website 8chan Calling for Jews to be Killed.

hostile, is protected by the United States Constitution, local law enforcement and social media platforms do take action against explicit incitement to violence – by deleting posts and banning users. However, on anonymous platforms such as the dark web, users are free to spread any form of hatred and incitement.

In the example in Figure 5.7, an anonymous user on the dark web site 8chan suggested a solution to what he/she and 8chan’s community perceived as a modern social problem – the erosion of White privilege. In this post, he/she suggested that laws, rights, and freedoms should apply only to White males. He/she even suggested that the age of consent should be changed to 5. Moreover, he/she proposed implementing genetic testing to find out whether certain White people have Jewish genes, and, if so, they “shall be considered non-Whites under the law.” Those identified as Jews should be permanently marked on their head for visibility. Finally, he/she suggested that Jews must be sterilized or killed “at the earliest opportunity as well.”

It is evident that the anonymous user, who marked himself/herself as being from Canada, is not only antisemitic, focusing his/her hostility on Jews, but also that he/she is basing their suggestions on traditional White supremacy and Nazism. The Nazis were the ones to suggest that Jews should be marked and treated as if they were subhuman or animals.




Figure 5.8 A Post on Tor Website 8chan Blaming Jews for Clipping Coins.

Case 6: Coin Clipping Scandal

Jews have been associated with finances and specifically with greed for centuries. While this trope did not emerge immediately in early Christian anti-Judaism, it developed over time because only Jews were permitted to engage in usury, and, as many Jews were literate and educated, they served as financial advisors to royal courts.

In the example in Figure 5.8, an anonymous user on the dark web site 8chan shared an antisemitic illustration alongside a screenshot from the Haaretz news website. The user suggested that Jews were clipping coins to collect thin scraps of metal to melt and create duplicate coins. The illustration explains that the reason coins now have ridges is to make it difficult for Jews to clip metal out because if they did, they would have to create new ridges as well.

It is probable that the Haaretz article title was only added alongside the antisemitic illustration to make it seem more credible; although the accusations were made specifically against Jews, the phenomenon was widespread throughout Britain and Europe. For instance, the case in the example refers to the “Coin Clipping Scandal” that occurred in Britain in 1278–1279. As coins were valued based on their weight, people used to clip some of the metal out of the coin, use the clipped coins for everyday finance, and retain the clipped metal to later melt it into new coins. Jews

were specifically targeted for committing a crime that was far more socially widespread (Fox & Topor, 2021, p. 146). The 8chan user helped keep this antisemitic trope alive.

Case 6: “Enemy Jews Exposed”

The last example from the dark web is a screenshot taken from the dark web site PicoChan, which illustrates many common antisemitic ideas. An anonymous user posted an illustration on PicoChan that might not have originated on the dark web but would most likely be removed from regular social media if posted there.

The question asked in this illustration is “WHO’S REALLY IN CONTROL?” Below this header are nine “types” of Jew, and below them the illustration says “ENEMY JEWS EXPOSED” (Figure 5.9). The “types” of Jew are all based on a “generic,” stereotypical illustration of a Jew who is making sinister plans – demonstrated by the action of rubbing his hands together. According to this post, the illustrated Jew controls the “Fed Reserve & Wall Street,” “Internet Spying,” “Hollywood & TV,” “Law Courts,” “Cancer Industry,” “Pornography,” “Wars for Israel,” “Sex Trafficking,” and “Fake Opposition.” These accusations are far from original; they follow




Figure 5.9 A Post on Tor Website PicoChan Presenting Common Antisemitic Stereotypes.

age-old trends of blaming Jews for social, political, and economic problems, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter and in Chapter 3.

The theory that Jews control everyday life and cause various problems was not accidentally circulated by this anonymous user; he/she (and the creator of this illustration, if they are not the same person) based the accusations on antisemitic notions that have been circulating in society for a long time – that is, they did not invent the wheel, they just reposted it. In Table 5.6, the accusations are compared to the ADL Global 100 Index that described antisemitic perceptions, as well as to the common explanations of antisemitism described in Chapter 3 and the beginning of this chapter.

A review of the antisemitic illustration in Figure 5.9 and the comparative Table 5.6 reveals that many of the antisemitic types in the illustration are based on early examples of disinformation campaigns – “fake news.” Jews have been treated as society’s scapegoats for centuries, and the long tradition of antisemitism is the basis for contemporary antisemitism. In the examples above, antisemitic conspiracy theories can be traced to fabrications such as *The Protocols of The Elders of Zion*, Ford’s *International Jew*, Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*, or Rohling’s *Talmud Jew* (Litvak & Webman, 2010; Perry & Schweitzer, 2008).

As Fox and Topor (2021, pp. 118–120) argued, one of the most well-known examples of an antisemitic conspiracy theory is *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. These are documents fabricated by the *Okhrana* (Russian: Охрана), the Russian Tsar’s secret police. They were divided into several topics that together promoted the lie that Jews are engaged in sinister plots to dominate the world by eroding society and social norms (see Jacobs & Weitzman, 2003, pp. 21–25). In short, the dark web illustration shows a set of common and traditional antisemitic conspiracies, mainly based on fabrications such as *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed 264 cases of antisemitism and racism from the dark web. After analyzing the cases and comparing them to more traditional antisemitism, it is evident that antisemitism and racism on the dark web are very similar in nature to real-world antisemitism. The reasons neo-Nazis prefer to publish antisemitic and racist texts and illustrations on the dark web are for personal protection and to avoid censorship, as has been mentioned throughout this book – that is, they use the anonymity of the dark web to protect themselves from prosecution when they post illegal content, which mainly consists of doxing people or calling for actual physical harassment and violence. Antisemitic and racist posts of that kind are monitored and censored by large social media platforms, and, as neo-Nazis would prefer to publish their propaganda without such disturbances, they prefer to use the dark web.

The findings from the analysis of 264 cases have revealed some very interesting points. It is evident that Jews and Black people are the main targets of White supremacist neo-Nazis, and these two groups appear together the

Table 5.6 Antisemitic Accusations Compared to Common Antisemitic Perceptions of Jews

<i>Anonymous Accusation in Figure 5.7 that Jews Control Domains</i>	<i>Antisemitic Perceptions of Jews (Based on the ADL Global 100 Index)</i>	<i>Historical/Traditional Anti-Jewish Myth</i>
Fed Reserve & Wall Street	Jews have too much power in the business world; Jews have too much power in international financial markets; Jews have too much control over the United States government	Throughout the centuries Jews have been associated with finances, money, and greed.
Internet Spying	Jews have too much control over the global media; Jews have too much control over global affairs	In the 20th century, conspiracies emerged that Jews control various parts of life, including the media. In the 21st century, this also includes the internet. This conspiracy can be traced back to the discredited fabrications of <i>The Protocols of the Elders of Zion</i> .
Hollywood & TV	Jews have too much control over the global media	Jews have been accused of controlling various parts of life, including the media and communications industry. This conspiracy can be traced back to the discredited fabrications of <i>The Protocols of the Elders of Zion</i> .
Law Courts	Jews have too much control over the United States government	See the explanation above.
Cancer Industry	Jews do not care about what happens to anyone but their own kind	See the explanation above.
Pornography	Jews do not care about what happens to anyone but their own kind	See the explanation above.
Wars for Israel	Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the country they live in; Jews are responsible for most of the world's wars	See the explanation above. This antisemitic conspiracy is not only promoted in neo-Nazi circles but also in anti-Israeli far-left or extreme Islamist circles.
Sex Trafficking	Jews do not care about what happens to anyone but their own kind	See the explanation above.
Fake Opposition	Jews have too much control over global affairs	See the explanation above.

most. Other groups, such as Muslims or Asians, also suffer from racism, but, at least in the case of the Tor dark web, they are mentioned less often than Jews or Black people. Neo-Nazis on the dark web perceive Jews as the “brains” behind sinister plots to dominate the world and the White race. Black people are perceived by neo-Nazis as the “brawn”: They commit crimes and are manipulated and controlled by Jews to act against the White race.

Notes

- 1 See: ADL. (n.d.). *Global 100 Index*. <https://global100.adl.org/map>
- 2 See the IHRA definition of antisemitism: www.holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definitions-charters/working-definition-antisemitism
- 3 See the IHRA definition of antisemitism: www.holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definitions-charters/working-definition-antisemitism
- 4 ADL. (n.d.). *Echo*. www.adl.org/education/references/hate-symbols/echo
- 5 Topor, L. (2022, January 14). Antisemitism by exposure: Doxxing Jews and minorities. *ISGAP Flashpoint*, 83. <https://isgap.org/flashpoint/antisemitism-by-exposure-doxxing-jews-and-minorities/>
- 6 Ibid.

6 Online Radicalization

From Words to Actions

Brenton Tarrant was a catalyst for me personally. He showed me that it could be done. And that it needed to be done.¹

These were the words of 19-year-old John Timothy Earnest, who went on a murderous shooting spree on April 27, 2019, opening fire inside the Chabad of Poway Synagogue near San Diego. Earnest appears to have been radicalized in the online domain, specifically by White supremacist Brenton Tarrant, who murdered 51 people in two New Zealand mosques on March 15, 2019. Tarrant livestreamed his attack via Facebook Live – an act that helped radicalize many others worldwide.² The El Paso Walmart shooting on August 3, 2019, was another one of a significant number of online and real-world actions inspired by Tarrant’s livestream.³ In fact, Tarrant’s actions proved so inspirational that this perpetrator has his own dedicated support websites, pages, posts, and discussions on the dark web (see Figure 6.3, which is discussed in detail later in this chapter).

This chapter deals with online antisemitism and racism and addresses a vital question: How do antisemitism and racism shift from the online to the real domain and vice versa, and what role does anonymity play in this process? Methodologically, to answer these questions in a way that best reflects reality, a comparative qualitative analysis of several significant case studies is carried out. The concept of process tracing is also utilized to understand how certain actions lead to additional violent actions. In terms of structure, this chapter has three main parts. The first part presents a summary of the background of online antisemitism and racism, elaborating on the message of the entire book. The second part explains the process of online radicalization, including the use and abuse by radicals (mainly neo-Nazis) of anonymity, the online domain, and the dark web. The third part reviews and analyzes significant case studies in which either the dark web or the general online domain served as a significant agent of influence – either before the actions or after the fact. Based on these case studies, it is my impression that the internet, and specifically anonymity, has become a utilitarian tool for spreading radical propaganda, endorsing terrorism and neo-Nazism, and

radicalizing and recruiting people worldwide with the click of a mouse and a few keyboard strokes.

Background: Online Antisemitism and Online Racism

Antisemitism and racism are two similar but simultaneously unique phenomena, as has been pointed out in previous chapters. Online antisemitism and racism currently thrive with the use, or abuse, of the internet and anonymous communications, just as print and radio were abused by Hitler in Nazi Germany and just as radio was abused during the Rwanda Genocide (Klein, 2017, pp. 1–3; Somerville, 2012). Various online platforms allow extremists to hide their true identities and thus evade legal and social consequences. An anonymous dark web user can spread hate, call for action, and manage independent and secret radical communities, regardless of local norms and laws. Moreover, online hatred can be openly promoted in the name of free speech in places such as the United States or anonymously promoted in places such as Germany where neo-Nazism (alongside other extreme ideologies) is not legally permitted (Daniels, 2009, pp. 3–13; Keum & Miller, 2018; Topor, 2019a). Recently, even social networking platforms such as Facebook and Twitter have become governing actors as they have come to realize that social networks are amplifying extremism and racism.⁴

For instance, in 2012 many famous people left Twitter after experiencing racial abuse. At the time, Twitter had a neutral policy, as publicized by its spokeswoman:

Twitter is a neutral platform, but we have rules that outline what users can and can't do. We do not pro-actively monitor content, but will review all reports of violations, and act on a case-by-case basis.⁵

In the 2020s, however, due to public and official pressure, Twitter has had no choice but to expand its policies against hate speech – both in terms of regulations and monitoring. Fearing a boycott, Facebook has taken similar actions.⁶

To conclude this summary, online antisemitism and racism have become combined – they are expressed in the form of prejudice, discrimination, and violence against a negative “other” that is published and promoted online. Indeed, as Andre Oboler concluded in 2008, although contemporary antisemitism may be based on age-old stereotypes and conspiracy theories, these are now spreading globally through new technologies and methods of communication and socialization.⁷

Online Radicalization: “Like, Share, Recruit”

What is radicalization, and how does radicalization on the dark web and other anonymous platforms, or the online domain in general, affect society? Radicalization is the process of developing extreme worldviews, beliefs,

emotions, and behaviors. Radicalization consists of both feelings and actions. The feelings and emotions of radicalized people shift from socially accepted and normative worldviews to extreme worldviews that distinguish between “us” and “them,” between positive and negative matters. The actions include the preparation, in any way or form, for an intergroup conflict and the willingness to participate in such – whether in the physical “real” domain or the cyber domain. People are radicalized through exposure to extreme material (Borum, 2011; McCauley & Moskaleiko, 2008).⁸ For instance, it has been suggested that the conspiracy theories and extremism put forward in the 1978 book *The Turner Diaries* were directly linked to the Capitol riot in January 2021. Although the book was published more than 40 years ago, the internet made it more relevant than ever (Munn, 2021).⁹ Furthermore, radicalization is not only a personal process but also a group process – social actors or political parties and groups are radicalized when they renounce dialog and tolerance – as was demonstrated in the case of Holocaust denial on anonymous platforms in Chapter 4 (Trip et al., 2019). As Luke Munn (2019) has described (and just as occurs in other cases, such as extreme Islamic radicalization), far-right radicalization is not an instant matter but a process in which people are incrementally nudged along a particular radical path.

Interestingly, however, globalization, migration, and specifically the internet play a hugely significant role in this process. The World Wide Web is, in fact, causing a form of accelerationism through which people are being pushed into radicalism faster and faster. The internet makes radical content available to all, with no filters or limits; it also allows users to assume almost full anonymity, thus reducing the risks of social criticism, pressure, and possible legal persecution for illegal behavior in countries where racism and extremism are outlawed (Topor, 2019a).¹⁰ Furthermore, anonymous platforms are welcoming and convenient “hunting grounds” where neo-Nazis can troll and abuse Jews and others, discuss racist matters, conspiracy theories, and ideology among themselves, and reach an unlimited number of other users in an instant. Additionally, all these discussions incite people to act and join the radical movement (Jakubowicz et al., 2017, pp. 95–108).

For instance, in 2018 it was estimated that the ISIS terror group had managed to attract, radicalize, and mobilize over 40,000 foreign nationals from 110 countries worldwide using social media – numbers any marketing graduate would be proud to achieve in a business context. Facebook, Twitter, Gab.ai, YouTube, ask.fm, Instagram, Tumblr, TikTok, as well as private and secure messaging applications such as Telegram, WhatsApp, Kik, and Viber, have all been used by ISIS and far-right groups to radicalize and recruit supporters of terror (Weimann & Masri, 2020).¹¹

How do neo-Nazis recruit? For example, as described in a January 2021 *TIME* magazine article titled “Like, Share, Recruit,” the radical neo-Nazi Azov Battalion from Ukraine managed to turn Facebook into a recruitment platform and facility. Azov members manage closed Facebook groups and

operate Telegram channels, publishing radical messages as well as communicating with social media users via private messaging applications, the content of which technology companies cannot legally monitor.¹² For instance, after the Christchurch massacre, the Azov group helped spread extreme content both in print and online. But the recruitment effort does not end with online conversations. The Azov Battalion has a summer training camp for children and young people where extreme ideology is taught alongside actual fighting skills.¹³ While fighting with other Ukrainian forces against Russia at Mariupol or in the Crimea, the group has managed to become an ultra-nationalist armed militia. Regardless of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, the process of joining with official forces legitimizes Azov's presence in the Ukrainian military and other security branches. As the online domain allows the Azov Battalion to recruit globally, it has managed to become international by recruiting foreign White nationalists to fight in it.¹⁴

The functional part of radicalization is action. The example of the Azov Battalion is functional in the sense that radicalized people are learning, training, and preparing for conflict. They then go out to fight against an outside or seemingly unrelated enemy – in this case, Russia. (Note, however, that this example is not meant to support Russian actions in Ukraine but rather to exemplify how neo-Nazism is operating in Ukraine.) Yet radicalization is not particular but global; generic radical material is spread worldwide via anonymous platforms and social media, reaching all types of White supremacists and Jihadi extremists (Dragon, 2015).¹⁵

Another example is the fighting manuals and training guides that can be found on the dark web, as well as calls for donations to support “White Power” or the “Islamic Struggle.” Dark web sites store and publish “how-to” guides, manuals, and other related documents about fighting skills, firearms, explosives, drugs, chemistry, and poisons, as well as censored documents that can generally not be found on the regular internet, such as neo-Nazi propaganda or anti-Jewish and other racist conspiracy documents. The material is also “dumped” in online pastebins for everyone to see.¹⁶ Firearms, explosives, and other illegal materials are sold and later used on the streets. For instance, Ali David Sonboly, the Munich shooter who murdered nine people in 2016, bought his gun on the dark web.¹⁷

Admittedly, online radicalization and calls for political participation or action are also found on the regular web, both on social media and on fringe far-right websites such as 4chan. Yet, as Kasimov (2021, pp. 149–170) revealed, the majority of posts on the 4chan website deal with hypothetical situations and political discussions, as well as calls for online participation. Of the calls for action that have been posted, a relatively small number call for action in the real world – that is, to commit vandalism or violence. A common assumption regarding this finding is that users realize these websites are monitored and are afraid they will be moderated or held to account.

The most extreme material can be found on the dark web. But how do internet users find themselves on the dark web in the first place?

Interestingly, the increase in online regulation is pushing them from regular social networks such as Facebook or Twitter, where their manifestations are banned, to the dark web and secure messaging applications where in most cases no official or binding regulations can be applied. Governments and technology companies worldwide regulate the regular web, prompting radical users to simply shift their activities, and even whole communities, to unregulated places where they can publish any type of content (Jardine, 2019; Topor, 2019a; Weimann, 2016a). Then, once censored material such as recorded shootings and killings is made available on the dark web, people are inspired by the material. For instance, Brenton Tarrant was inspired by Norwegian mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik. Tarrant himself, with Robert Bowers, inspired John Earnest, the Poway Synagogue shooter, and Stephan Balliet, the Halle Synagogue shooter, who introduced himself online as popular dark web activists frequently do – “anon” – before using the gaming website Twitch to livestream his attack.¹⁸ Patrick Crusius, the El Paso shooter, was also inspired by similar radical online material and posts.¹⁹

As Eric Jardine (2019) argued and demonstrated, uneven regulation policies have led to a surface-to-dark web content cycle, through which radical material is transferred from the “controllable” surface web to the harder-to-control dark web. This was further described in Chapter 4 of this book. From there, banned material is once again brought up to the surface web in the form of titles, “abstracts,” links, exit nodes from the surface web to the dark web, and more – that is, the video of a murder might not be hosted and available on the surface web, but links and directions can be found to where it is hosted on the dark web. Furthermore, as dark webs such as Tor are considered American strategic intelligence tools, there is little opportunity to change the platforms for the better, let alone take them offline (Topor, 2019a).

To conclude this part, online radicalization is carried out by various malicious users and is not limited to ideology or geographical boundaries of publication, travel, or jurisdiction. Since people are spending more time online, and due to the ease and convenience of the internet, they are more likely to be exposed to radical material and engage with online radical communities. The communities exert peer pressure and endorse actions – actions in the online domain but also in the real physical domain. Actions such as mass shootings and terror attacks.

The online domain serves as a catalyst that shifts people from the keyboard to the streets. In addition, with the increase in social media monitoring and regulation, as mentioned previously, radical users are pushed to less regulated platforms such as the dark web and private messaging applications. As Weimann (2016a) and Topor (2019a) suggested, monitoring alone, without proper educational measures, is counterproductive. Radicals are pushed underground, where they are not eradicated but are free to plan and to act. Given the current state of affairs, the transition from social media to the dark web is inevitable.

From Online Discussions to Real World Shootings: Tracing the Process of Radicalization

The online domain has managed to increase hatred and racism. It, and particularly the dark web, has enabled conspiracy theories and calls for action to spread globally. This has created a globalized network of antisemites and racists, stretching from Norway (Breivik) to New Zealand (Tarrant) to Ukraine (the Azov Battalion), from Germany (Balliet) to the United States (Earnest, Crusius) and elsewhere. It seems that racist nationalists and neo-Nazis are not nationalists at all but globalists – participants in a global struggle for White supremacy. In this part of the chapter, several case studies of violence and terrorism are analyzed and discussed using the concept of process tracing – that is, I try to discover whether one case led to others and whether they can be traced to the online domain. All the chosen cases are related to the far right, White supremacy, and neo-Nazism. At first glance, the case studies might seem unrelated – they all took place in different parts of the world and were executed by perpetrators who, as investigations concluded, were not personally familiar with one another. Yet, every shot and every kill inspired and radicalized people worldwide to take action of their own – because they were streamed, posted, or archived online. The cases are presented in chronological order; the main evidence I seek is that which explains the perpetrators' inspirations.

The flowchart in Figure 6.1 is based on the insights and suggestions of Jardine (2019), Munn (2019, 2021), Topor (2019a), Weimann (2016a), and




Figure 6.1 The Online Radicalization Process – From Social Media to the Dark Web, From the Dark Web to Real-World Actions, and Back to the Online Domain.

Kasimov (2021, pp. 149–170), alongside insights from the case studies. It illustrates a worrisome social process in which antisemitism and racism turn from words into actions and vice versa – in a cycle. I refer to this cycle as the theory of online radicalization (TOR, which, coincidentally, is also the acronym of the most popular dark web). In this process, online conspiracy theories, brainwashing propaganda, and peer pressure lead radical internet users to commit real acts of terror and crime. As the title of this chapter also suggests, this social process shifts people from social media to the dark web or secure messaging applications such as Telegram and then from their keyboards to the streets. Conceptually, this online radicalization process has no definite starting point; radicalization can begin and spread at every point of the cycle – that is, it can start as an online call for action, as actual violence reported by the media, or as footage uploaded online.

Radicalization and escalation are processes that can occur in various forms and at various speeds. As Munn (2019) suggested, radicalization is a process in which people are incrementally nudged in a particular direction. Furthermore, as Weimann and Masri (2020) suggested, radicalization is not just a teen or midlife crisis but a process that can start from a very young and naïve age. In this part, I seek to discover what this “nudge” consists of, whether online or in the real world. To achieve this, I analyze four case studies chronologically to find information that links each case to the next one.

After a thorough review of the cases mentioned throughout this book, I decided to focus on the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh (October 27, 2018), the Christchurch massacre in New Zealand (March 15, 2019), the Poway Synagogue shooting (April 27, 2019) and the supermarket shooting in Buffalo, NY (May 14, 2022). As the process in Figure 6.1 suggests, in all four cases, violence or radical content was either livestreamed or uploaded on social media, archived online on the dark web or Telegram groups, and spread worldwide. The consumers of this content were the ones who went on to commit more real-world violence. I have chosen four seemingly unrelated cases in different parts of the world (though the majority of these cases are in the United States) to exemplify how, nowadays, hate is not national but international and how local actions can spread beyond geographical borders through the use of the internet. In all cases, anonymous communications played a role in the process of radicalization, whether before the action or afterward.

The Pittsburgh Synagogue Shooting

On Sabbath morning, October 27, 2018, 46-year-old Robert Gregory Bowers entered the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and immediately opened fire on the worshippers, shouting, “All Jews must die.” He murdered 11 people and injured several others before being shot by police forces and surrendering.²⁰ Bowers was a radical White supremacist who was active online on known racist social networks such as Gab.

He frequently posted content about “invaders,” a term used by White supremacists to describe non-White immigrants. Bowers also claimed that there were “overwhelming jew problems.” Just before the shooting, he posted:

HIAS likes to bring invaders in that kill our people. I can't just sit by and watch my people get slaughtered. Screw your optics, I'm going in.²¹

Bowers blamed the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) for the American immigration problem, accusing Jews of bringing in the “invaders,” in this case people from Latin America. In his online biography on Gab, Bowers also posted, “Jews are the children of Satan,” and “Open you [*sic*] Eyes! It's the filthy EVIL jews Bringing the Filthy EVIL Muslims into the Country!!”²² After Bowers' arrest, he told a law enforcement officer that Jews were coming to murder his people.²³

In this chain of events, it can be assumed that Robert Bowers was radicalized online, specifically on social networks such as Gab. He was also radicalizing others.²⁴ Bowers' profile and posts are not fully accessible to the public, although posts reported in the media shed light on the ideology by which he lived – he disliked immigrants, including Latin Americans and Muslims, and blamed immigration on the Jews. He also blamed the Jews for attempting to commit so-called “White genocide” – the genocide of the (pure) White race. Because Bowers' profile cannot be reviewed entirely, I cannot fully investigate what inspired his actions; therefore, I classify them under the “real-world actions” step in the theory of online radicalization as presented in Figure 6.1. Bowers' shooting served as an inspiration for further White supremacist violence, including the Christchurch Mosque shootings, which took place outside of the United States several months later, and the Poway Synagogue shooting, both of which are detailed below.

Although days, months, and even years have passed since the shootings, Bowers' actions are still glorified by and circulated among neo-Nazi worldwide. For instance, in the Telegram channel “DAYS OF ACTION CALENDAR,” which archives and celebrates neo-Nazi murderers, Bowers is glorified in posters and content made specifically about him. As shown in Figure 6.2, details of his attack are kept in circulation and reach thousands of Telegram users. This helps neo-Nazis keep their martyrdom narrative alive and radicalize others. As Figure 6.2 shows, Bowers' primary victims were “kikes” (a negative slur for Jews), and his motivation, as stated, was “Hatred of kikes.” The anonymous users who posted this information found it important to highlight what he shouted during his attack – “All jews must die.”

Christchurch Mosque Shootings

On March 15, 2019, during Friday morning prayers, Brenton Harrison Tarrant, a 28-year-old man from Australia, began shooting worshippers at the Al-Noor Mosque in Riccarton, a suburb of Christchurch, New Zealand.




Figure 6.2 The Archiving and Glorification of Robert Bowers.

His entire shooting spree was livestreamed via Facebook Live, including his arrival at the mosque. During his stream, Tarrant played several nationalist songs, including a racist anti-Muslim song called “Remove Kebab.” After a few minutes, Tarrant stopped and drove to his next target – Linwood Islamic Centre. There he continued his shooting spree, all livestreamed on Facebook. Before reaching his third target, a mosque in Ashburton, his vehicle was rammed by police and he was arrested. Tarrant’s attack was one of the most significant White supremacist terror attacks in recent years, with 51 victims killed and 40 more injured. Following the livestream, Facebook was boycotted; New Zealand companies removed their advertising from the platform (Every-Palmer et al., 2020).

Tarrant was active online – he both consumed content and posted about his dislike of immigrants, specifically Muslims. He was active on Facebook, Twitter, and the extreme and controversial “/pol/” (short for “politically incorrect”) board on the 8chan platform. Tarrant was also active on the dark web, although there is no publicly available evidence.²⁵ In his manifesto, he claimed that the internet allowed like-minded people to break free from mainstream media and achieve “true freedom of thought and discussion.”²⁶ In answer to the question “From where did you receive/research/develop your beliefs?” Tarrant answered, “The Internet, of course, You will not find the truth anywhere else.”²⁷

Before his attack, he tweeted pictures of firearms alongside Nazi symbols and references such as the number 14, a well-known White supremacy slogan.²⁸ Just before the attack, a then anonymous 8chan user (who later turned out to be Tarrant) hinted about the upcoming terror attack in a group discussion:

Well lads, it's time to stop shitposting and time to make a real life effort post.

I will carry out and attack against the invaders, and will even live stream the attack via facebook.

Alongside this post, Tarrant posted a link to a 74-page manifesto titled “The Great Replacement,” in which he blamed immigrants and minorities for the vast majority of existing social problems.²⁹

Since Tarrant’s actions were livestreamed, they reached many internet users worldwide. For instance, in Ukraine, his actions were supported by a group of neo-Nazis who also planned to carry out a terror attack but were arrested before they could do so. The group helped to spread Tarrant’s 74-page manifesto online in Ukrainian and Russian.³⁰ In Singapore, the authorities detained a 16-year-old teenager who wished to mark the second anniversary of the Christchurch shooting by carrying out a machete attack against Muslims.³¹ White supremacists on the dark web dedicated whole boards, posts, and pages to Brenton Tarrant, ensuring that his actions, footage, and manifesto became an almost permanent and institutional topic, accessible by anyone anonymously. For instance, a dedicated board titled /btg/ “Brenton Tarrant General” can be found on the dark web site NeinChan and includes related material (see Figure 6.3). Another anonymous online example is Telegram, where Tarrant also has support and followers. For instance, Tarrant is glorified and his videos are shared in the Russian language Telegram group “брентон таррант (видео)(манифест)” [“Brenton Tarrant (Video) (Manifesto)”], as well as in many other channels.³² Sadly, not all of Tarrant’s followers were caught on time, as exemplified in the next sub-section.

Poway Synagogue Shooting

On the morning of the last day of Passover, April 27, 2019, exactly six months after the Pittsburgh shooting, John Timothy Earnest, armed with an assault rifle, entered the Chabad of Poway Synagogue near San Diego and began shooting. He managed to murder one woman and injure three more victims before calling 911 of his own accord and surrendering to the police.³³ Before the shooting, Earnest posted a 4,000-word antisemitic and Islamophobic manifesto and noted he would livestream his attack (which he never did). Earnest wrote as if the shooting spree were video games and he wanted to gain a higher score to win.³⁴ John Timothy Earnest drew his inspiration both




Figure 6.3 “Brenton Tarrant General” on the Dark Web Site NeinChan.

from Brenton Tarrant and the Christchurch Mosque shootings and from Robert Bowers and the Pittsburgh synagogue shooting.

In his manifesto, he answered the question “Who inspires you?” with “Jesus Christ, the Apostle Paul, Martin Luther, Adolf Hitler, Robert Bowers, Brenton Tarrant, Ludwig van Beethoven, Moon Man, and Pink Guy.”³⁵ He also wrote:

I do not care about the debt-based currency that Jews like to pretend is money. I do not care for the bread and circus that Jewry has used to attempt to pacify my people. I willingly sacrifice my future – the future of having a fulfilling job, a loving wife, and amazing kids. I sacrifice this for the sake of my people. OUR people. I would die a thousand times over to prevent the doomed fate that the Jews have planned for my race.³⁶

To my brothers in blood. Make sure that my sacrifice was not in vain. Spread this letter, make memes, shitpost, FIGHT BACK, REMEMBER ROBERT BOWERS, REMEMBER BRENTON TARRANT, filter the religious D&C...³⁷

Meme Robert Bowers back and keep up the memes of Brenton Tarrant. Tarrant was a catalyst for me personally. He showed me that it could be done. And that it needed to be done. “WHY WON’T




Figure 6.4 The Archiving and Glorification of John Timothy Earnest.

SOMEBODY DO SOMETHING? WHY WON'T SOMEBODY DO SOMETHING? WHY DON'T I DO SOMETHING?" – the most powerful words in his entire manifesto. Any White man – rich or poor, young or old – who is brave enough can take any action he wants against the tyrannical and genocidal Jew.³⁸

As described above, Earnest did “do something,” but not before calling on his online followers to take similar actions.

John Timothy Earnest was active on the racist website 8chan (later 8kun), which migrated several times from the regular web to the dark web and vice versa. Earnest unhesitatingly states that he was radicalized by being exposed to the actions of others, actions that were archived, promoted, and glorified on anonymous platforms. After his actions, Earnest, like Bowers and Tarrant and many other neo-Nazis, was glorified on anonymous platforms as well. For instance, in the Telegram channel “DAYS OF ACTION CALENDAR,” which archives and celebrates neo-Nazi murderers, Earnest is glorified, and the anonymous users that operate this channel describe his motivation as “Hatred of kikes; continuing Tarrant’s mission” (Figure 6.4).

Buffalo (NY) Supermarket Shooting

On a Saturday afternoon, May 14, 2022, Payton Gendron, an 18-year-old White supremacist, entered a Tops supermarket in Buffalo, New York, and

livestreamed footage of himself shooting indiscriminately. Gendron managed to murder ten people and injure three more before being arrested by local police forces. According to a CNN investigation, Gendron had published several posts on social media platforms, including Discord and 4chan, about his desire to commit this terrorist crime. The shooting spree was well planned. Gendron had previously visited this particular supermarket one day in March, at 12:00, 14:00, and 16:00. He made a sketch of the inside of the store, and, after each visit, he wrote about the activity inside – how many people were in the store, how many were Black, and how many were White. In his posts, he mentioned that, during his 16:00 visit, he was approached by a “Black armed security guard,” who asked him what he was doing going in and out of the store. Gendron answered that he was collecting “census data” – indeed, he had made a census of how many Black people he could kill.³⁹

In his online posts, he mentioned that the Buffalo 14208 ZIP code had a higher population of Black people, and, after his supermarket reconnaissance visit, he wrote, “I’m going to have to kill that security guard at Tops I hope he doesn’t kill me or even hurt me instantly.” Approximately half an hour before the attack, Gendron created a private, invite-only server on Discord to livestream his shooting spree.⁴⁰ Presumably, this was done because social media platforms, and in recent years Discord as well, monitor the content that users share, and he wanted to avoid being censored. Gendron cited the manifesto posted by Brenton Tarrant, saying, “I was not born racist nor grew up to be racist.” However, he did mention that he had become more aware after seeing racist content on the internet; he said, “I never even saw this information until I found these sites,” referring to White supremacy websites.⁴¹ After the murders, one of Gendron’s family members said about him:

I don’t know where he went online – the dark web, or wherever – but apparently he got into some nasty stuff. He’s smart enough to get into dangerous stuff online, which maybe the average person wouldn’t know how to get into.⁴²

After the shooting spree, police found more weapons in Gendron’s possession, one of which was covered in writing, just like the weapon used by the Christchurch killer Brenton Tarrant, indicating that he had indeed been inspired by previous acts like the one Tarrant had committed. He also cited Tarrant’s manifesto, as mentioned above. The writings are references to other neo-Nazi killers such as Tarrant, Bowers, Earnest, Breivik, and others.⁴³

Immediately after the shooting, Payton Gendron’s livestream and manifesto were archived online on the dark web and on Telegram channels, including channels such as “WHITE LIVES MATTER” and “DAYS OF ACTION CALENDAR.” In a post on the latter, it was noted that Gendron’s motivation was “hatred of niggers” and his affiliation was “Tarrant’s 5th Disciple” (see Figure 6.5). Furthermore, conspiracy theories immediately emerged online about Gendron’s origin and causes. For instance, on the dark




Figure 6.5 The Archiving and Glorification of Payton Gendron.

web site EndChan, theories emerged that alleged he was a “Jewish Terrorist,” asking, “Surely it’s just a (((coherence))) ...right?” (see Figure 6.6).

Virtual Communities – Radicalized Individuals

The abovementioned examples of shooting sprees and massacres are worrisome, not only because of the actions themselves but also because it is very difficult to discover who is liable for nudging the individuals into the actions they took. Bowers, Tarrant, Earnest, and Gendron were all radicalized online, both on neo-Nazi websites on the regular web and on the dark web; yet no specific individual pushed them into taking the actions they did – rather, it was their whole virtual community that somehow radicalized them and encouraged or inspired them into these shooting sprees. This is not a psychological analysis of the radicalization process that these neo-Nazis underwent but a conceptual analysis of how neo-Nazi virtual communities nudged these individuals into shooting sprees and how these communities are still operating openly and radicalizing the next murderers – after each shooting spree, anonymous users were quick to archive relevant material and endorse the acts.




Figure 6.6 Blaming Jews for the Buffalo Supermarket Shooting on the Endchan Dark Web.

As per the definition in Chapter 4, an anonymous online community is a group of people who use a private and secure internet platform or service, one that helps them mask their true identity, to engage in common interests. As I have previously explained, a virtual community, much like a regular one, includes a community architect(s), managers, recruiters and leaders, and active/passive lurkers on both open and restricted platforms. The perpetrators mentioned above were part of communities like these, whether on fringe websites such as 4chan or 8kun, private equivalent dark web sites and Telegram channels, or elsewhere in the online domain.

Much of the information about the above-mentioned neo-Nazi attacks is still censored or at least less accessible to the general public. However, from the details that have been released, one can deduce that Robert Gregory Bowers, Brenton Harrison Tarrant, John Timothy Earnest, and Payton Gendron were at least active lurkers in this virtual community of neo-Nazis and might even be considered leaders. Their actions have made them “famous” in many virtual neo-Nazi communities, and many find them inspirational. Bowers, Tarrant, Earnest, and Gendron might be in custody now, but their legacy of terror against non-Whites is promoted and perpetuated by community architects, managers, leaders, and lurkers. Entire posts on the dark web (see, e.g., Figure 6.3) and entire Telegram




Figure 6.7 Details Provided in “Brenton Tarrant General” on the Dark Web Site NeinChan.

channels are dedicated to the glorification of these acts of neo-Nazi terrorism and White supremacy. For instance, as presented previously in Figure 6.3 and further demonstrated in Figure 6.7, Brenton Tarrant has become a neo-Nazi superstar; his actions and personality are being glorified by others – some go so far as to copy his actions, while most express their admiration through emojis and memes. In Figure 6.7, on a page dedicated to Brenton Tarrant, the community architects and managers have published information about Tarrant’s actions, including his writings, videos, personal website, his previous lawyer’s details, and an updated mailing address.

Brenton Tarrant is, of course, not excluded from the Telegram channel “DAYS OF ACTION CALENDAR,” which also includes a post listing the highlights of his actions. His actions are glorified by community leaders on many websites and channels. For instance, in the “4Chan - /POL/HIS/INT” Telegram channel, which had 20,562 subscribers on May 13, 2022, the anonymous user(s) operating this channel requested that other members assist with the translation of Tarrant’s manifesto into additional languages (Figure 6.8). The user noted that the manifesto had already been translated from English into French, Bulgarian, Russian, and Ukrainian. Now, he/she is asking for it to be translated into more languages. At the




Figure 6.8 Translation Thread for Brenton Tarrant's Manifesto on Telegram.

time of this post on March 24, 2019, it was being translated into Polish, Hungarian, Greek, Spanish, Italian, Dutch, Czech, German, Portuguese, Romanian, and Arabic.

It is evident that the translation of the manifesto serves the purpose of promoting this hateful text globally and increasing its reach. Those behind it understand that they need to extend their reach and expand their virtual community. Even though the manifesto is also available on the regular web, they constantly disseminate it in files for ease of sharing.

Conclusion

This chapter sought to explain how manifestations of antisemitism and racism shift from the online domain to the dark web and anonymous platforms such as Telegram and then to the real world and vice versa – that is, how words turn into actions, into acts of violence, which are then turned back into words. Based on the work of Weimann, Munn, Jardine, and Topor, as well as the analysis of the four main case studies, I suggest that the current state of affairs, in which online platforms and regulators only carry out post-facto analysis and action, has led to a vicious cycle of violence. As a cycle, it has no

theoretically definitive beginning or end. As mentioned previously, I refer to this process as the theory of online radicalization, or TOR. TOR describes the process through which online conspiracy theories, brainwashing propaganda, and peer pressure push radical internet users to commit real acts of terror and crime, after which these actions are posted online and inspire others to take similar actions.

The findings described in this chapter are worrisome. The internet has become a utilitarian tool for spreading radical propaganda, endorsing terrorism and neo-Nazism, and radicalizing and recruiting people worldwide with the click of a mouse. Furthermore, the internet has spread White supremacy and nationalism from the national to the international sphere. Nationalism, xenophobia, and local trends of racism have shed the constraints of geographical borders and emerged into the cyber domain, where radicals from around the world are now deeply connected. This has created a globalized network of hate spanning a multitude of countries, from Norway, New Zealand and Ukraine to Germany, the United States, and elsewhere. As I have mentioned throughout this book, racist nationalists are no longer nationalists at all but globalists. Additionally, traditional conspiracy theories about Jews and other minorities are perpetuated in the online domain. In terms of the negative perception of Jews, most perpetrators perceive them as the “brains” behind social problems, while other groups, such as Muslims, Africans, and Asians, are considered the “brawn.”

What action should be taken, given the research question and the subsequent disturbing findings? The answer is not that the online domain should be completely unregulated, as many scholars and practitioners argue. Based on the evidence in this chapter, online and real-world events and manifestations are deeply connected, and each should be regarded as both a dependent and an independent variable in future studies and discussions. Yet it appears that several actions are required to stop the vicious cycle. Social networks need to restrict their “sacred cow” – unconditional freedom of speech; however, such restrictions must be overseen by local and even international regimes, as social media platforms are often overly focused on reach, influence, and profit. Governments need to shift their focus and resources to the online domain, and the traditional press must restrict ISIS-like videography or photography even if this makes their stories less desirable. The current state of affairs is such that all the social media accounts analyzed in this chapter were only thoroughly reviewed and restricted post-facto. One can only assume that, if they had been reviewed and restricted before the deadly events, lives would have been saved.

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7 Conclusions and Recommendations

This book reports on an interdisciplinary study that has sought to attain a deep and evidence-based understanding of White supremacist neo-Nazi communities and individuals on anonymous platforms such as the dark web and Telegram. By examining different types of evidence, this book has compared contemporary trends of anonymous antisemitism and racism to traditional antisemitism and racism. It has examined the core ideology of White supremacist neo-Nazis, their online communities, and the global spread thereof; it has examined how members of the community interact, spread messages, and communicate in general. It has also examined what messages neo-Nazis publish and promote and how they do this, as well as how they push, or nudge, individuals into taking action against Jews, Muslims, Black people, Asians, Latinos, and others. These actions include “soft” actions such as doxxing and “hard” actions such as real-world violence, terror, and shooting sprees. It is impossible to find a single person who is liable for this process of radicalization; the current state of affairs is such that the entire neo-Nazi anonymous online community radicalizes people.

This book has combined the field of antisemitism and racism studies with the study of the online domain, including online socialization and anonymous communications. This combination of fields has served to deepen the understanding of how hatred and conspiracy theories thrive online, shifting freely across geographical borders and jurisdictions, even when companies and countries attempt to regulate and moderate cyberspace. Currently, this regulation and moderation appears to be counterproductive, as extremists have switched to developing and nurturing their online communities of hate on anonymous platforms – platforms most law enforcement agencies find difficult to deal with. Thus, I suggest that regulation and moderation should not take place solely on the regular web, as if to tick a box, but also on anonymous platforms – to a greater extent than is done today. Ironically, many anonymous technologies and platforms were developed in the land of free speech – the United States – and it is on American platforms that neo-Nazis now hide, plot, and make plans to destroy democracy and freedom. For instance, it was American platforms that disseminated the conspiracy theories prompting extremists to charge the Capitol and attempt to

overturn the election results in 2021. While anonymous communications may be useful for intelligence services, they remain a double-edged sword.

Free speech is a vital value in society. Yet liberal and democratic countries must defend themselves to prevent the democratic rise of evil. Mass communication platforms that allow anonymity and overlook accountability should be moderated, even if this goes against the argument of free speech. Let us not forget that, in 1930s Germany, the Nazi Party took power in a democratic system, and a similar trend can currently be seen in the United States. On the one hand, neo-Nazis argue that they should have freedom of speech, but once they gain power, it is exactly such freedoms that they will want to suppress. There is a common phrase in Hebrew that is frequently used to describe a gap between theory and action: “One does not shop with values” (Hebrew: *עם ערכים לא הולכים למכולת*). It means that values are good in theory, but not always in practice. The “value” of free speech is important but only up to a certain limit – the tipping point is when free speech is used to deny free speech and other freedoms to others, and to nudge internet users into committing terrorism.

Although many anonymous platforms are American, they allow hatred to disseminate globally, bypassing other countries’ regulations and local laws. Hateful manifestos are translated into dozens of languages and shared around the world. Calls to action originating in one country turn into actual shooting sprees in another. Antisemitism and racism are no longer nationalist or merely locally xenophobic but international. It is important to emphasize that neo-Nazism and White supremacy, antisemitism and racism are global phenomena, and almost every single country worldwide, and certainly every single country in the Western world, has a particular history of hate. This book has focused on cases in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia because anonymity platforms are more frequently used in these countries. I also chose these cases because of the countries’ history and culture of White supremacy. While they differ from each other to some extent, the concepts of antisemitism, racism, and White supremacy are nonetheless similar. For instance, although Russia is home to very few Black people, the concept of Blackness still developed to describe people of a slightly darker skin tone to differentiate them from White Christian Russians.

Furthermore, users of anonymous platforms worldwide express very similar types of hatred online and share similar thoughts and ideas about scapegoating Jews, blaming Black people and Muslim or Arab immigrants, and calling for action to be taken against them. This was demonstrated in Chapter 5, where a dark web sample was analyzed to determine the key concepts of the Tor platform. Another important point is the similarity and direct continuity between traditional stereotypes, tropes, and conspiracy theories and modern-day ones. The evidence suggests that, socially and politically, there is nothing new under the sun – that is, these social and political phenomena continue to spread, regardless of the platform, whether in the real or the virtual domain.

Among the many radical claims and conspiracy theories presented in this book, the most prevalent is the one that blames Jews for a sinister plot to dominate the world and harm or eradicate the White race. This conspiracy theory is widely believed by many neo-Nazis in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe, Russia, and even the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Ironically, the ones who are actually making sinister plans to dominate or annihilate other groups are neo-Nazis themselves. They build and nurture their anonymous communities, glorify neo-Nazi terrorists, and call for their community members to act against minorities and, of course, the “almighty Jew.”

The findings of this book are worrisome, as they prove that the social phenomena of antisemitism, racism, xenophobia, and general extremism have a great reach and impact via the online domain. Neo-Nazi communities are flourishing on anonymous platforms such as the dark web and Telegram because they are protected there and can hide behind a digital veil of privacy – they can promote hate and call for the killing of Jews, Muslims, Black people, and others without the risk of getting caught. As mentioned, it was regulation and moderation that prompted them to shift their communities to more private and secure platforms where they could interact freely. Thus, this process simply shifted neo-Nazis from A to B instead of dealing with them directly – they have been swept under the rug, but they are still there.

Findings

The first chapters of this book laid the conceptual groundwork for understanding neo-Nazism and White supremacy in the anonymous online domain and understanding the findings of this unique study. After the introduction, Chapter 2 dealt with anonymity as a social phenomenon and modern anonymous forms of communication such as the dark web and Telegram. This chapter combined the technological, socio-political, and philosophical aspects of the realm of anonymous communications. It was important to cover this information before delving into the discussion of antisemitism, racism, and White supremacy in Chapter 3 because, although most readers understand these social phenomena, they generally have a less thorough understanding of anonymity, particularly online anonymity. In my opinion, it is crucial to understand the technology and platforms before discussing the phenomena found on them. One must learn and understand the seas before one can understand how, where, and when ships sail.

Chapter 3 dealt with White supremacy worldwide, including neo-Nazism, antisemitism, racism, and xenophobia. The rise in power and prominence of the far right in the 21st century, particularly neo-Nazism and White supremacy, is a threat to liberalism and democracy, and the online domain acts as a catalyzing agent for these political trends. Aside from a conceptual discussion of White supremacy, racism, and antisemitism, Chapter 3 presented the key justifications for White supremacy, based on my previous

work (Topor, 2022): the religious, biological, and cultural justifications, the protectionism-based argument, and the appeal to freedom of speech. Although these justifications emerged over many centuries, they can be identified in the many examples provided in later chapters, in which neo-Nazis on the dark web or Telegram express their reasons for targeting Jews, Black people, Muslims, or other minorities.

Chapter 4 dealt with the neo-Nazi migration to anonymous platforms and specifically discussed the case of Holocaust denial and the dissemination of related material. Additionally, the concept of online, or virtual, communities was presented and defined to help the reader understand the roles of the different members of the anonymous neo-Nazi community – some promote content and discourse while others simply consume it. An interesting question was raised – why would a Holocaust denier, a neo-Nazi, prefer the online domain to the real domain? Surely extreme White supremacist neo-Nazis would prefer to take actual action against non-Whites and Jews instead of merely posting on social media or forums? Yet it was discovered that the majority of Holocaust deniers do prefer to limit their actions against Jews and non-Whites to the online domain – they prefer words to actions. But why? Chapter 4 described two reasons for this preference for using the internet to hide their true identity, which resulted in the transfer of almost their entire movement to the online sphere.

The first reason concerns the media. Since neo-Nazis, and extremists in general, are censored in the Western mainstream media, they perceive the media – the whole world – to be manipulated by Jews. This is the reason why their community of deniers gradually shifted to alternative platforms. They shifted Holocaust denial to the anonymous online domain because it is less moderated and less regulated and thus allows neo-Nazis to speak freely, without being censored by what they claim is the controlled and manipulated media.

The second reason concerns the law. Since some countries have made neo-Nazism, including Holocaust denial, illegal, and since social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter also moderate content and attempt to block hate speech, including antisemitic speech, Holocaust deniers found themselves facing a legal threat – the expression of Holocaust denial led to bans, fines, and even arrests and imprisonment. For these two reasons, Holocaust deniers chose to utilize the domain of online anonymity; they mainly use the Tor dark web, Telegram channels, and rogue websites to disseminate their content. For instance, the pseudo-scientific “Holocaust Handbook collection” that was discussed in Chapter 4 is disseminated on the dark web and sold for cryptocurrency, as some Holocaust deniers are afraid their bank accounts will be frozen if they sell or buy these books. It was also discovered that the legal prosecution of Holocaust deniers only takes place in response to denials in the real domain or on the regular internet and that law enforcement agencies do not usually engage in hunting down Holocaust deniers on anonymous platforms.

Even though Holocaust deniers hide behind a veil of online anonymity and were pushed off mainstream media and social media, their reach and online presence are still significant. It is estimated that the dark web sites 16chan and NeinChan are viewed by hundreds of thousands of people worldwide, though these estimates vary from website to website. User numbers on Telegram are more accessible, and the reach of some channels is significant. For instance, the Telegram channel “Holohoax Info Chan” had 130 posts but 213,896 views between March 2, 2021, and February 22, 2022. The channel “Holocaust Lies Exposed” had 2,753 posts and 1,319,567 views in the same period. These view counts suggest that, in terms of community structure, there are many passive lurkers.

The anonymous community of Holocaust deniers is not just passive, however – many share content between groups and probably between private contacts as well. They participate in debates, discussions, and even surveys. For instance, in an anonymous poll on the “Joe Turner Channel” on November 12, 2021 (also shared in “Holohoax Info Chan”), the administrator asked: “Which is the bigger lie? The Holohoax or the Coof?” Of the 652 users who voted, 56% voted for “The Holocaust,” 27% voted for “About The Same,” 9% voted for “The Coof,” and 8% voted for “I Haven’t Made Up My Mind Yet.” Neo-Nazis embraced the internet from its very beginning, and, in the age of online anonymity, they have embraced the opportunity to further develop and disseminate their conspiracy theories.

Chapter 5 dealt with antisemitism on the dark web. The findings of this chapter are fascinating since the analysis allowed for a conceptual disengagement of data and metadata – the disengagement of personalities from their ideas. Because the Tor dark web is almost entirely secure, private, and anonymous, neo-Nazis can express their antisemitism while hiding their origins. Since people from around the world use Tor, I could not conclusively associate anybody with a specific country or any other demographic information, even in cases where they voluntarily showed their flag or mentioned other information. This peculiar situation creates a cloud of ideas. Interestingly, however, despite the technological platform, the ideas themselves were very much in line with traditional antisemitism and racism. This suggests that the core of this social phenomenon is no different than it was in previous years. The major difference lies in the reach of the hate propaganda.

The main goal of Chapter 5 was to discover what kind of antisemitism is disseminated on the dark web. It addressed some key questions: What are the main trends of antisemitism and racism on the dark web, who are the main victims, and how are they primarily targeted? And does antisemitism on the dark web differ significantly from traditional antisemitism, discrimination, and action against Jews, considering that the data shows that Jews are the main targets of neo-Nazis? These questions were addressed by analyzing 264 expressions of antisemitism and racism on various dark web platforms. Next, I detailed several significant case studies that each represented key points of interest in the field of antisemitism or salient antisemitic acts on the online

domain, including its spread, calls for soft action such as doxxing, and calls for harder action, including actual violence and terrorism.

The findings were eye-opening. For instance, when analyzing the co-occurrences between racist perpetrators, targets, manifestations, and websites, I discovered that of the 264 cases, 171 conspiracy theories dealt with Jews, 40 dealt with Black people, 18 with Asians, 13 with Muslims, and 6 with Arabs. Jews were doxxed 9 times and Black people 7 times. Neo-Nazis on the Tor dark web called for action to be taken against Jews 62 times and for action to be taken against Black people 31 times. Further, on 131 out of 264 occasions, neo-Nazis used forums and boards to post conspiracy theories, and they posted 34 more conspiracy theories on blogs. They posted 53 calls to action on forums and boards and doxxed their targets on pastebins 9 times and on forums and boards 5 times. This is important because it may be more difficult to trace one-time posts on pastebins than multiple posts on forums. They also posted their reference lists – “reading lists” – of neo-Nazi material and conspiracy theories to forums and boards 14 times and on blogs 4 times.

Neo-Nazis on the dark web use various platforms, but they tend to mention different targets on different platforms. For instance, of the 264 cases, Jews appear in forum and board posts 151 times, Black people 45 times, Asians 15 times, Muslims 13 times, Christians 10 times, and Arabs 8 times. Jews also appear 35 times in blog posts. These patterns of use suggest that neo-Nazi communities on the dark web, while anonymous, do align with traditional ideas and patterns of antisemitism and racism and attempt to promote structural conspiracy theories against Jews – that is, they do not just engage in hate speech but discuss Jews, Judaism, and Israel and publish structured arguments and manifestos.

The archnemesis of White supremacist neo-Nazis, on the dark web and in general, is the Jew, as has been shown many times throughout this book. Yet neo-Nazis have more groups they hate – particularly Black people. Jews and Black people are the two groups that appear together the most – that is, neo-Nazis direct their racist, antisemitic, and conspiracy-driven arguments at a combination of Jews and Black people more than against other combinations of groups. Of the 264 cases investigated in Chapter 5, Black people are mentioned 50 times with Jews, 14 times with Muslims, 13 times with Asians, 9 times with Arabs, and 3 times with Christians. Jews, aside from being mentioned with Black people 50 times, are mentioned 22 times with Asians, 16 times with Muslims, 10 times with Arabs, and 7 times with Christians.

A survey on the racist Telegram channel “///Racism still Accelerationism” supports the findings from the dark web. This survey asked: “If you drop a wallet to the ground, who’s gonna reach it first? – JEWS -or- NIGGERS.” Of the anonymous poll’s 882 respondents, 18% answered that “Niggers” would reach for the wallet, 18% answered that “Jews” would, and 58% answered, “I’m white, I’ll find you and return your wallet with everything still in it.” The final 6% answered facetiously, “I’m gay, I’ll keep your wallet and stick it up my ass.” The fact that all other groups generally hated by White supremacist neo-Nazis were excluded suggests that their focus is on Jews and Black

people. Additionally, the facetious option about gay people reveals that neo-Nazis also harbor antipathy toward the LGBTQ+ community.

The analysis in Chapter 5 resulted in some very insightful findings, as mentioned above. It also revealed that actions in the online domain have real consequences – whether soft actions such as doxxing or hard actions such as directly inciting violence. The last case presented in the chapter is also very important. In today’s day and age, internet users consume content rapidly and use highlights, memes, and illustrations as a tool to communicate messages. In this spirit, the case depicted in Figure 5.9 presents a summary of prominent antisemitic conspiracy theories and publications in a single illustration that web-crawling neo-Nazis, and people in general, can understand. It combines *The Protocols of The Elders of Zion*, Ford’s *International Jew*, Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*, and Rohling’s *Talmud Jew* in a single post accusing Jews of controlling the Federal Reserve and Wall Street, internet spying, controlling Hollywood and television, controlling law courts, being behind the cancer industry and pornography, promoting wars for the State of Israel, sex trafficking, and fake opposition in politics.

Chapter 6 dealt with online radicalization, specifically the question of how antisemitism and racism shift from the online to the real domain and vice versa. To explore this issue, I used a comparative qualitative analysis of several significant case studies while also utilizing the concept of process tracing to understand how certain actions and posts led to acts of violence. By combining information gleaned from the literature review with a thorough analysis of several case studies, I discovered that [online] radicalization is a process. Internet users are being nudged, incrementally, into radical thoughts, which, in some extreme cases, lead to violence and terror attacks. I have also discovered that online hate, racism, and antisemitism are not bound to geographical boundaries; people from one country can radicalize people from other countries.

The actual process of online radicalization can take various forms and occur at various speeds. The online domain acts as a catalyst to action since media and discussions that glorify acts of murder and terror are disseminated globally. A prominent example of such glorification is the Telegram channel “DAYS OF ACTION CALENDAR,” which posts media and information about neo-Nazi terrorists and glorifies them. This type of glorification is reminiscent of the Jihadist and/or ISIS-like glorification of Islamic terrorism. Similar media and content, including entire dedicated pages, were also discovered on the dark web, such as a dedicated Tor webpage that glorifies Brenton Tarrant, the Christchurch terrorist.

After reviewing four cases in detail (the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh, October 27, 2018; the New Zealand Christchurch massacre, March 15, 2019; the Poway Synagogue shooting, April 27, 2019; and the supermarket shooting in Buffalo, NY, May 14, 2022), several dark web sites and Telegram channels, and taking into account suggestions and insights from Jardine (2019), Munn (2019, 2021), Topor (2019a), Weimann (2016a), and Kasimov (2021, pp. 149–170), I suggest that the process of radicalization

in the online domain moves in a cycle that I refer to as the theory of online radicalization (TOR) – coincidentally, this is also the acronym of the most popular dark web reviewed in this study, The Onion Router. In this cycle, online conspiracy theories, brainwashing propaganda, and peer pressure nudge radical internet users to commit real acts of crime and terror after consuming extreme content that glorifies White supremacy, neo-Nazism, and terrorism. This social process prompts people to move from mainstream social media to the dark web or SMAs such as Telegram and then from their keyboard to the streets. Conceptually, it has no definite starting point; radicalization can begin and spread at every point of the cycle – that is, it can start as an online call to action, as actual violence reported by the media, or as footage uploaded online. Notably, all the perpetrators in the case studies mentioned they had been radicalized and inspired by past actions that had a significant online presence. For instance, John Timothy Earnest, who went on a murderous shooting spree on April 27, 2019, inside the Chabad of Poway Synagogue near San Diego said, “Brenton Tarrant was a catalyst for me personally. He showed me that it could be done. And that it needed to be done.”¹

After each neo-Nazi terror act and shooting spree, should we, as a society, seek those responsible for the radicalization? If so, who are they? Sadly, there is no particular figure we can blame for the process of radicalization, aside from directly blaming those who have committed the acts of terror. Indeed, it is very difficult to find somebody liable for nudging the individuals into the whole thing. Bowers, Tarrant, Earnest, and Gendron, like other similar terrorists, were all radicalized online – on neo-Nazi websites on the regular web, as well as on the dark web and Telegram channels. No specific individual pushed them to take the actions they did; rather, their whole virtual community pushed them into these shooting sprees. As the evidence in Chapter 6 has shown, Bowers, Tarrant, Earnest, and Gendron were all glorified on the dark web and various Telegram channels, and their videos of terror and murder, as well as their hateful, antisemitic, and racist manifestos, are still being disseminated online, reaching countless internet users and nudging some into future shooting sprees.

Concluding Remarks

Concluding this book is quite difficult since, on the one hand, it has not presented any substantial or novel insights into antisemitism and racism – certain groups of people still hate other groups of people, as they have for centuries. The case of antisemitism – the attitudes toward and perceptions of Jews – is particularly disappointing since neo-Nazis still hate Jews. This is neither surprising nor novel. On the other hand, however, this book has introduced a whole new domain of socialization and communication to the topic, specifically the anonymous online domain to which White supremacist neo-Nazis have shifted their communities of hate – uploaded them, in a sense.

Throughout the book, it has been evident that antisemitism and racism are not national phenomena. While they may have particular local characteristics, they have, in fact, become borderless and international; they are common to all White supremacists. Interestingly, while people of certain nationalities might not like each other in terms of the international struggle for power, such as Russians and Americans, extremists from each country are bound together by hate. The online domain allows them to communicate, develop, and nurture their communities, and to disseminate hateful propaganda that evades governmental laws and regulations as well as regulation and moderation by technology and social media companies.

The internet, whether anonymous or not, is a far more dangerous tool than other types of mass communication, such as print or radio, since it is very complex to control but very easy to use. The internet has almost no editors, no gatekeepers. Where gatekeepers do exist, the anonymous internet offers a natural substitute. Neo-Nazis who are moderated on mainstream social media platforms quickly migrate to more secure and private platforms such as the Tor dark web (and other dark webs) or Telegram channels. While “free speech” platforms do exist on the regular internet, many radical neo-Nazis use the dark web or Telegram because they do not want to be liable for their radicalization efforts and incitement to violence.

Anonymity is thus a double-edged sword. On the one hand, American intelligence programs such as Tor allow people worldwide to communicate more privately and securely than on the regular internet. This allows them to avoid local restrictions and censorship. It also allows them to protect their private information from businesses that take advantage of invasive web-marketing features. On the other hand, such unregulated anonymity has led to the online dissemination of crime, terror, antisemitism, and racism. Nowadays, criminals sell drugs online, terrorists plan attacks online, and neo-Nazis disseminate conspiracy theories online, along with calls to kill Jews, Black people, Muslims, Asians, and other non-White people.

In this case, words are being turned into actions. I can confidently conclude that neo-Nazis on anonymous platforms carry out three types of actions. First, they disseminate radicalizing conspiracy theories and glorify those that acted against non-Whites and went on killing and shooting sprees; they also attempt to rewrite history by whitewashing or justifying past atrocities such as the Holocaust. Second, they use soft measures to harm their targets: They either publish the names of people they want to harass or doxx them entirely by revealing private information. Doxxing has caused people to change their entire lives to escape harassment. Yet, since doxxing on the dark web or Telegram is almost entirely anonymous, there is very little that law enforcement agencies can do. Third, they use hard measures to harm their targets by calling on community members to kill, assault, or enslave other people.

Free speech is a vital value in liberal and democratic countries. These countries must defend themselves and prevent a “democratic rise” of evil. This was evident on January 6, 2021, when an array of domestic extremists

rioted and raided the United States Capitol after being exposed to radicalizing material online. In the cyber or information age, democracy must defend itself more than ever. We must learn from past mistakes and remember that the Nazi Party took over the Weimar Republic by democratic means in 1933 and, after taking power, went on to suppress personal freedoms and the press. Free speech is not the most important value – equality, respect, and kindness to others are equally important.

What, then, can be done in the face of anonymous neo-Nazism? Before suggesting an answer, I must note that both state and society have not yet fully adopted cyberspace. Useful as it may be, it is still not natural to humans; we lack key understandings and perceptions, which causes some things to appear differently online than in the real world. For instance, to some people, it may seem amusing, easy, and safe to spread hate and harm from behind a veil of anonymity. Yet, without anonymity, such actions bear consequences, whether social or legal. Thus, there is a gap between what people feel they can do online and what people can do in the real world. Until this gap is closed, I suspect online hate and abuse will continue to thrive.

Since individuals and companies act within sovereign countries, I argue that countries, whether on their own or as a group, must use their full powers in the online domain to help make it less anonymous, at least in prominent cases where radicalizing propaganda is being disseminated. We must remember that companies such as Telegram are, after all, companies. They are legal entities that are bound to sovereign countries. Projects such as Tor, useful as they may be, are still funded and run by sovereign countries – thus, large parts of such projects could be shut down or de-anonymized.

If we, as a global society, want to eradicate hate, we must make people liable and responsible for its spread and, at the very least, restrict the promotion of conspiracy theories. Finally, and ironically, while neo-Nazis argue that Jews have sinister plans to control the world, or that Black people marry interracially to drive the White race to extinction, we must remember that White supremacist neo-Nazis are the ones currently making sinister plans in the crevices of the dark web – whether to annihilate Jews or Muslims or to enslave Black or Asian people.

Note

- 1 Dearden, L. (2019, August 24). Revered as a saint by online extremists, how Christchurch shooter inspired copycat terrorists around the world. *The Independent*. www.independent.co.uk/news/world/australasia/brenton-tarrant-christchurch-shooter-attack-el-paso-norway-poway-a9076926.html

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